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“Nothing in life is to be feared, it is only to be understood. Now is the time to understand more, so that 
we may fear less.” 
  Marie Curie 
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SUMMARY  
 
Staphylococcus aureus (SA) is a ubiquitous bacterium in humans and animals. It can cause minor skin 
infections that do not usually require treatment. SA, as well as Methicillin-resistant SA (MRSA), which is 
resistant to a wide range of antimicrobials, can lead to severe infections in humans, especially in 
individuals with a suppressed immune status. MRSA can originate from livestock and is referred to as 
livestock-associated MRSA (LA-MRSA) with pigs as the main reservoir. 
In Denmark, the number of pig herds tested positive for LA-MRSA has increased rapidly since 2008, when 
a Europe-wide study found only 3.5% of production herds positive for LA-MRSA. However, in 2016, the 
prevalence found in a national LA-MRSA screening had reached 88%. At the same time, the number of 
human cases increased in people working at pig farms but also in people with no livestock contact. 
In 2014, Denmark initialised a national action plan to limit the spread of LA-MRSA. However, the effects 
were not sufficient to reduce the number of LA-MRSA-positive herds, nor to limit the number of newly 
infected humans. To be able to increase the efficacy of control programmes in the pig industry, it is 
necessary to understand the transmission routes of LA-MRSA among pig herds. This includes the trade of 
pigs as a potential mechanism for spread, as well as other contact among herds that might lead to the 
transmission of LA-MRSA. Such knowledge would help to evaluate control options that might reduce the 
number of LA-MRSA-positive herds in the future. 
A network analysis using information on Danish pig holdings and their trade connections between 2006 
and 2015 was performed to gain a general knowledge of temporal trends in the number of registered pig 
herds and pig movements. In addition, we investigated loyalty patterns and contact chains for the 24 
registered holding types to identify holding types with a potentially higher risk of disease spread via pig 
movements (Manuscript I).  
The total number of active holdings and the number of pig movements both decreased during the study 
period, while the holding size increased. We observed a large out-going contact chain for breeding and 
multiplier herds, which reflects the pyramidal structure of the underlying network and highlights the risk 
of spreading a disease via pig movements to a wide range of other herds if a pathogen were to affect 
breeding and multiplier herds. However, horizontal connections among pig herds also exist, which could 
lead to additional spread among herds of the same holding type.  
An agent-based Monte Carlo simulation model mimicking the spread of LA-MRSA among pig herds was 
developed to study the epidemic behaviour and to identify the driving factors for LA-MRSA spread among 
pig herds (Manuscript II). As well as transmission based on pig movements registered in the study period 
from 2006 to 2015, indirect transmissions between holdings were modelled based on distance-dependent 
probability distributions. Three types of indirect contact were modelled: (1) abattoir trucks collecting pigs 
from several holdings, (2) humans such as veterinarians, farm workers or guests visiting several holdings 
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on the same day and (3) contact between herds with the same owner. Within-herd dynamics were 
modelled as a three-compartment SIS model with different transmission rates within the three 
compartments of sows, weaners and finishers, and with high- and low-risk transmission routes between 
these compartments. Several scenarios were evaluated to simulate the spread after introduction of LA-
MRSA in varying proportions of breeding and multiplier and production herds in 2006 and/or 2009. We 
compared the model outcomes to the results of LA-MRSA surveys conducted in Denmark during the study 
period. An extensive sensitivity analysis was performed to study the effect of uncertainty of model 
parameters (Manuscript II). 
Pig movements alone were not sufficient to mimic the observed increase in LA-MRSA-positive herds in 
Denmark in any of the modelled scenarios. However, the model identified three factors that played 
important roles in the between-herd spread of LA-MRSA: (1) the within-herd dynamics, (2) the frequency 
and effectiveness of indirect transmission via humans and (3) unexplained introduction of LA-MRSA to 
swine herds. 
We enhanced this simulation model to retrospectively evaluate how different control strategies would 
have influenced the spread of LA-MRSA (Manuscript III). These strategies were combinations of the 
following control measures: (1) reduced numbers of herds using high-risk antibiotics, (2) reduced 
probability for indirect transmission between herds via humans, (3) movement restrictions and (4) 
voluntary eradication in 5-7.5% of the herds. The effects of implementing control in 2007 were compared 
to implementation in 2010.  
Almost all tested control strategies simulated a reduction in the spread of LA-MRSA. The combination of 
two, three or four intervention strategies showed additive effects and led to larger reductions in the 
predicted herd prevalence. An extreme scenario (impeding the use of high-risk antibiotics, reducing risk of 
spread via indirect contact by 75%, implementing movement restriction and culling a percentage of 
positive herds) was able to reduce the predicted prevalence by 86% compared to the predicted prevalence 
without control. Control measures initialised in 2007 had a greater effect compared to initialisation in 
2010 due to the lower initial prevalence in 2007. 
In conclusion, pig movements alone were not sufficient to mimic the development of LA-MRSA herd 
prevalence observed in Denmark in 2008 and 2014. However, they were responsible for around 75% of 
transmissions. Within-herd dynamics and the frequency and effectiveness of indirect contact between pig 
herds via humans showed the highest impact on the predicted herd prevalence. Control measures showed 
the highest relative reduction when implemented in 2007 and when all four potential control measures 
were combined. Categorising herds according to the size of their out-going contact chain increased the 
effect of eradication as a control measure, as herds with higher risk of spreading LA-MRSA via pig 
movements were prioritised in the eradication process. However, eradication should be combined with 
movement restrictions to minimise the risk of re-introduction. 
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SAMMENDRAG (DANISH SUMMARY) 
 
Staphylococcus aureus (SA) er almindeligt forekommende hos både dyr og mennesker. Denne bakterie 
kan forårsage mindre alvorlige hudsygdomme, der normalt ikke er behandlingskrævende. Methicillin-
resistent SA (MRSA), der er resistente overfor en lang række antibiotika, kan forårsage alvorlige 
infektioner hos mennesker, særligt hos individer med nedsat immunforsvar. MRSA kan stamme fra husdyr, 
og denne gruppe af bakterier, der har primært reservoir hos svin, benævnes almindeligvis husdyr-MRSA. 
I Danmark har der været en markant stigning i antallet af svinebesætninger, der er testet positive for 
husdyr-MRSA siden 2008, hvor der kun blev fundet husdyr-MRSA i 3,5 % af de danske besætninger, der 
blev undersøgt som del af en europæisk undersøgelse. I 2016, hvor der igen blev gennemført en dansk 
screening, var denne andel imidlertid steget til 88 %. I løbet af den samme periode steg forekomsten af 
humane tilfælde, ikke bare iblandt mennesker, der arbejder i svinebesætninger, men også blandt 
mennesker uden kontakt med husdyr. 
I 2014, blev der i Danmark iværksat en handlingsplan, der havde til formål at mindske spredningen af 
husdyr-MRSA. Imidlertid var dette hverken tilstrækkeligt til at begrænse antallet af besætninger, der blev 
testet positive for husdyr-MRSA, eller til at begrænse antallet af nye humane tilfælde. For at kunne 
optimere effektiviteten af kontrolprogrammer i svineindustrien er det nødvendigt at opnå en bedre 
forståelse af, hvordan husdyr-MRSA overføres imellem svinebesætninger. Potentielle 
spredningsmekanismer, der kan resultere i spredning af husdyr-MRSA, inkluderer handel med svin såvel 
som anden kontakt imellem besætningerne. Denne viden vil være nyttig i forhold til at evaluere 
kontrolforanstaltninger, som potentielt kan være i stand til at reducere antallet af smittede besætninger.  
I nærværende afhandling, er der udført en netværksanalyse baseret på information om danske 
svinebesætninger og deres handelspartnere i perioden 2006-2015 med henblik på at generere viden om 
variationen over tid i antallet af registrerede svinebesætninger og registrerede svineflytninger. Desuden 
blev stabiliteten af netværkene (loyalty patterns) og antallet af direkte og indirekte kontaktbesætninger 
(contact chains) undersøgt for 24 besætningstyper med henblik på at identificere besætningstyper med 
højere risiko for spredning af sygdom via svineflytninger (Manuskript I). 
I løbet af studieperioden faldt antallet af aktive besætninger og antallet af svineflytninger, mens 
besætningsstørrelserne steg. Avls- og opformeringsbesætninger havde et højt niveau af direkte eller 
indirekte udgående kontakt til andre besætninger (outgoing contact chain), hvilket reflekterer 
pyramidestrukturen af det underliggende netværk og understreger risikoen for at sprede sygdom til en 
lang række andre besætninger via svineflytninger, såfremt avls- og opformeringsbesætninger inficeres 
med et patogen. Imidlertid eksisterer der også horisontale forbindelser imellem svinebesætningerne, 
hvilket kan lede til yderligere smittespredning imellem besætninger af samme type. 
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En individ-baseret Monte Carlo simuleringsmodel, der imiterer spredningen af husdyr-MRSA imellem 
besætninger blev udviklet med henblik på at studere, hvordan spredningen af MRSA udvikler sig og 
identificere de drivende faktorer bag spredningen imellem besætningerne (Manuscript II). Udover smitte 
baseret på svineflytninger registreret i studieperioden fra 2006-2015, blev indirekte spredning imellem 
besætninger modelleret baseret på afstandsafhængige sandsynlighedsfordelinger. Der blev modelleret tre 
typer af indirekte kontakter: 1) Slagtetransporter, hvor der afhentes svin fra flere forskellige besætninger, 
2) Person-kontakt, f.eks. dyrlæger, landbrugsmedhjælpere eller gæster, der besøger flere besætninger i 
løbet af den samme dag, og 3) Ejer-kontakt mellem besætninger med samme ejer. Spredningsdynamikken 
indenfor samme besætning blev modelleret vha. en SIS-model med tre aldersgrupper og anvendelse af 
forskellige transmissionsrater indenfor hver af grupperne søer, fravænningsgrise og slagtesvin, og med 
hhv. høj- og lav risiko transmissionsruter imellem disse grupper. Adskillige scenarier blev simuleret med 
introduktion af husdyr-MRSA i variable andele af avl-, opformerings- og produktionsbesætninger i 2006 
og/eller 2009, og spredningen mellem svinebesætninger blev evalueret. Modelresultaterne blev 
sammenlignet med resultaterne af screeningsundersøgelserne for husdyr-MRSA foretaget i Danmark i 
løbet af studieperioden og der blev udført omfattende sensitivitetsanalyser med henblik på at studere 
effekten af usikkerheden på model parametrene (Manuskript II). 
Svineflytninger alene var ikke tilstrækkelige til at forklare den observerede stigning i antallet af husdyr-
MRSA positive besætninger i nogen af de modellerede scenarier. Imidlertid identificerede modellen tre 
faktorer, som spiller en vigtig rolle i spredningen af husdyr-MRSA imellem besætninger: 1) 
Smittespredning indenfor besætningen, 2) Hyppigheden og effektiviteten af indirekte smittespredning via 
mennesker, og 3) Uforklarlig introduktion af husdyr-MRSA i svinebesætninger.  
Vi udbyggede denne simuleringsmodel for retrospektivt at evaluere, hvordan forskellige 
kontrolstrategier ville have influeret spredningen af husdyr-MRSA (Manuskrift III). Disse strategier 
inkluderede kombinationer af følgende strategier: (1) En nedbringelse af antallet af besætninger, der 
anvender høj-risiko antibiotika, (2) Reduceret sandsynlighed for indirekte smittespredning imellem 
besætninger via mennesker, (3) Handelsrestriktioner, og (4) Frivillig sanering i 5-7,5 % af besætningerne. 
Effekten af at implementere kontrolforanstaltninger allerede i 2007 blev sammenlignet med 
implementering i 2010.  
For næsten alle de undersøgte kontrolstrategier, resulterede simuleringerne i reduceret 
smittespredning. Kombinationer af to, tre eller fire interventionsstrategier havde en additiv effekt og ledte 
til større reduktion i de prædikterede prævalenser af positive besætninger. I et ekstremt scenarie, hvor 
brugen af høj-risiko antibiotika blev begrænset, risikoen for smittespredning via indirekte kontakt blev 
reduceret med 75 %, handelsrestriktioner blev implementeret og alle dyrene i en vis procentdel af de 
positive besætninger blev sendt til slagtning, blev den prædikterede prævalens af positive besætninger 
reduceret med 86 %, sammenlignet med den prævalens modellen prædikterede hvis ingen 
kontrolforanstaltninger var blevet iværksat. Som følge af den lavere prævalens i 2007 havde 
kontrolforanstaltninger igangsat i 2007 større effekt end kontrolforanstaltninger igangsat i 2010.  
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Det kan konkluderes, at svineflytninger ikke alene kan forklare udviklingen i andelen af MRSA-positive 
besætninger i Danmark i perioden 2008-2014. Imidlertid var svineflytninger ansvarlige for ca. 75 % af 
smittespredningen. Spredningsdynamikken indenfor besætningen og hyppigheden og effekten af indirekte 
kontakt imellem svinebesætninger via mennesker havde den største indflydelse på de prædikterede 
prævalenser af positive besætninger. Kontrolforanstaltninger resulterede i den største relative reduktion, 
når de blev implementeret i 2007, mens prævalensen af positive besætninger endnu var lav, og når alle 
fire potentielle kontrolstrategier blev kombineret.  
Effekten af sanering som kontrol foranstaltning øges, hvis besætninger med højere risiko for at sprede 
husdyr-MRSA via svineflytninger blev prioriteret mht. sanering. Sanering bør imidlertid kombineres med 
flytterestriktioner for at minimere risikoen for re-introduktion. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG (GERMAN SUMMARY) 
 
Staphylococcus aureus (SA) ist ein ubiquitäres Bakterium, welches auf der Haut und Schleimhaut von 
Menschen und Tieren vorkommt. Es kann leichte Hautentzündungen hervorrufen, die in der Regel keine 
Behandlung benötigen. Nutztier-assoziierte Methicillin-restistente SA (LA-MRSA) sind gegen alle bisher 
verfügbaren β-Lactam-Antibiotika (z. B. Penicillin), aber auch gegenüber anderen Antibiotikaklassen 
resistent. Sie können deshalb, vor allem bei Menschen mit geschwächtem Immunsystem, schwere 
Infektionen hervorrufen. Hauptreservoir von LA-MRSA sind Schweine. 
In Dänemark ist die Anzahl an Schweinebetrieben, die positive auf LA-MRSA getestet wurden seit 2008 
rapide angestiegen. In einer Europaweiten Studie wurden damals nur 3,5 % der Schweinemastbetriebe 
positiv getestet. Im Jahre 2016 lag die Prävalenz in einer nationalen Studie jedoch bereits bei 88 %. 
Gleichzeitig ist die Anzahl an gemeldeten Fällen bei Menschen mit, aber auch ohne Kontakt zu 
Schweinebetrieben stark angestiegen. 
Dänemark beschloss 2014 einen nationalen Aktionsplan, um die Ausbreitung von LA-MRSA 
einzudämmen. Die Maßnahmen reichten jedoch weder dazu aus, die Anzahl an positiven Beständen zu 
reduzieren, noch die Anzahl an Neuinfektionen beim Menschen zu begrenzen. Um die Wirksamkeit von 
Bekämpfungsmaßnahmen in der Schweineindustrie zu erhöhen, ist ein besseres Verständnis der 
Übertragungswege von LA-MRSA zwischen den Schweinebetrieben nötig. Dies umfasst den 
Schweinehandel als möglichen Übertragungsweg genauso wie andere Kontakte zwischen den Herden, die 
zur Übertragung führen können. Ein solches Wissen würde die Beurteilung von potentiellen 
Bekämpfungsmaßnahmen ermöglichen, um in Zukunft die Anzahl an LA-MRSA positiven Beständen zu 
verringern. 
Als erstes wurde in dieser Arbeit eine Netzwerkanalyse durchgeführt, um allgemeine Informationen über 
die Entwicklung der Bestandszahlen und Handelskontakte zu erhalten. Grundlagen für diese Analyse 
waren Daten über dänische Schweinebetriebe und ihrer Handelsbeziehungen zwischen 2006 und 2015.  
Zusätzlich wurde die Loyalität der Handelsbeziehungen und die Länge von Handelsketten für die 24 
registrierten Bestandstypen untersucht. Ziel war es, Bestandstypen mit potentiell höherem Risiko für die 
Verbreitung von Krankheiten über den Schweinehandel zu identifizieren (Manuskript I). 
Die Anzahl an aktiven Beständen und  registrierten Handelskontakten sank in dem betrachteten 
Zeitraum, während die Bestandsgrößen anstiegen. Die Handelsketten von Zuchtbetrieben waren im 
Vergleich zu anderen Bestandstypen deutlich länger, und spiegeln damit die Pyramidenstruktur des 
zugrunde liegenden Netzwerkes wider, an dessen Spitze sich die Zuchtbetriebe befinden. Außerdem hebt 
dies die Bedeutung hervor, die der Eintrag eines Erregers in Zuchtbetriebe auf das Risiko der Ausbreitung 
im Handelsnetz haben kann. Neben vertikalen Verbindungen wurden jedoch auch horizontale 
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Handelsverbindungen zwischen Betrieben des gleichen Typs beobachtet, die zu einer weiteren 
Ausbreitung von Erregern führen kann. 
Im zweiten Teil dieser Arbeit wurde ein agentenbasiertes Monte Carlo Simulationsmodell entwickelt, 
welches die Ausbreitung von LA-MRSA zwischen den Schweinebetrieben in Dänemark nachbildet. Ziel war 
es, das epidemische Verhalten von LA-MRSA zu untersuchen und die Hauptwege der Ausbreitung 
zwischen den Schweinebeständen zu identifizieren. Neben der Übertragung auf dem Handelsweg 
basierend auf registrierten Handelsbewegungen in dem Studienzeitraum von 2006 bis 2015, wurden auch 
indirekte Kontakte zwischen den Betrieben modelliert. Diese basierten auf distanzabhängigen 
Verteilungen und folgende Übertragungswege wurden betrachtet: (1) Lastwagen, die Schweine von 
mehreren Betrieben zum Schlachthof transportieren, (2) Menschen (z.B. Veterinäre, Farmarbeiter oder 
Gäste), die mehrere Betriebe am gleichen Tag aufsuchen und (3) Kontakte zwischen verschiedenen 
Herden mit dem gleichen Besitzer. Die Ausbreitung innerhalb der Bestände wurde als SIS-Model 
implementiert und umfasste die Übertragung mit verschiedenen Übertragungsraten innerhalb und 
zwischen den drei Bereichen für Sauen, Ferkel und Mastschweine. Die Anzahl der Tiere je Bereich in den 
zwei Gruppen: (S) Empfängliche für LA-MRSA, und (I) positiv für LA-MRSA wurden dabei täglich 
aktualisiert. Verschiedene Szenarien, die die Ausbreitung nach dem Eintrag von LA-MRSA in 
unterschiedliche Anteile der Zucht- und/oder Mastbetriebe nachstellen, wurden miteinander verglichen. 
Die modellierten Ergebnisse wurden mit LA-MRSA Studienergebnissen von 2008 und 2014 verglichen. Eine 
ausführliche Sensitivitätsanalyse untersuchte den Einfluss der Modellparameter auf die Modellergebnisse 
(Manuskript II). 
Der Tierhandel allein war in keinem der simulierten Szenarien ausreichend, um den Anstieg an LA-MRSA 
positiven Herden in Dänemark zu erklären. Das Modell identifizierte jedoch drei Faktoren, die eine 
wichtige Rolle bei der Ausbreitung von LA-MRSA zwischen Schweinebeständen spielten: (1) die Prävalenz 
in den Herden, (2) die Häufigkeit und Effektivität von indirekten Kontakten zwischen den Beständen durch 
Menschen und (3) unerklärliche Einträge von LA-MRSA in Schweinebestände. 
Das Model wurde im dritten Teil dieser Arbeit erweitert, um zu untersuchen, welchen Effekt 
verschiedene Bekämpfungsmaßnahmen auf die Ausbreitung von LA-MRSA gehabt hätten, wenn sie bereits 
während des Studienzeitraumes angewendet worden wären. Die folgenden Maßnahmen und deren 
Kombinationen wurden implementiert: (1) Reduzierung der Anzahl an Beständen, die Risiko-Antibiotika 
verwenden, (2) Reduzierung der Wahrscheinlichkeit für die indirekte Übertragung von LA-MRSA zwischen 
Beständen durch Menschen, (3) Handelsbeschränkungen, die den Handel von positiv getesteten Herden 
zu negativen Beständen verbieten und (4) freiwillige Bestandssanierung in 5-7,5 % der Herden. Die 
Auswirkungen dieser Bekämpfungsmaßnahmen unter der Annahme, dass diese bereits in 2007 oder 2010 
eingeführt wurden, wurden untersucht und verglichen (Manuskript III). 
xix 
 
Fast alle untersuchten Bekämpfungsmaßnahmen und -strategien reduzierten die Ausbreitung von LA-
MRSA in den sechs Jahren nach Einführung der Maßnahmen. Die Kombination von zwei, drei oder allen 
vier Maßnahmen zeigte einen additiven Effekt und führte zu einer höheren Reduzierung der modellierten 
Herdenprävalenzen. Die drastische Kombination aus dem Verbot der Nutzung von Risiko-Antibiotika, der 
Reduktion der Übertragung durch indirekte menschliche Kontakte um 75 %, Handelsbeschränkungen und 
Bestandssanierungen führte zu einer Reduktion der Herdenprävalenz um 86 % verglichen mit dem 
Szenario ohne Bekämpfungsmaßnahmen. Die Einführung der Maßnahmen in 2007 führte durch die 
niedrigere Prävalenz in 2007, zu stärkeren Effekten verglichen mit dem Start der Bekämpfung in 2010. 
Zusammenfassend kann festgestellt werden, dass Handelskontakte nicht ausreichend waren, um die 
Entwicklung von LA-MRSA, wie sie in Dänemark beobachtet wurde, zu erklären. Trotzdem war der Handel 
in dem vorgestellten Simulationsmodell in ungefähr 75 % der Fälle verantwortlich für die Übertragung. Die 
Prävalenz innerhalb der Herden und die Häufigkeit und Effektivität der Übertragung zwischen Beständen 
durch den Menschen zeigte den größten Einfluss auf die Ausbreitung von LA-MRSA zwischen den 
Beständen. Bekämpfungsmaßnahmen zeigten das höchste Potential zur Reduktion der Ausbreitung, wenn 
sie in dem Modell im Jahr 2007 eingeführt und wenn alle vier Maßnahmen kombiniert wurden. Wenn für 
die Auswahl der Bestände, die eine Sanierung durchführen, die Länge der Handelsketten zu Grunde gelegt 
wurde und damit Herden ausgewählt wurden, die ein größeres Potential zur Verbreitung von LA-MRSA 
über das Handelsnetz zeigten, erhöhte dies den Effekt der Sanierungsmaßnahmen. Allerdings sollte die 
Sanierung von Beständen mit Handelsrestriktionen kombiniert werden, um das Risiko des Wiedereintrags 
zu minimieren. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. MOTIVATION  
Disease spread models are widely used in the field of veterinary medicine1,2. They allow for a better 
understanding of the driving mechanisms behind pathogen spread within or between livestock farms. 
Additionally, potential control options could be simulated to evaluate the effectiveness of interventions 
and thus help decision makers set up meaningful control programmes. 
Livestock-associated Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (LA-MRSA) is a pathogen that mainly 
occurs in pigs but has also been found globally in other species like cattle, horses, rodents, companion 
animals and humans3–10. A survey conducted by the European Commission in 2008 found 3% of Danish pig 
production herds were positive for LA-MRSA. Since then, there has been a rapid increase in the number of 
LA-MRSA-positive herds, with 88% of production herds found positive for LA-MRSA in 2016. 
During the same period, there has been a marked increase in the number of human LA-MRSA cases in 
Denmark11. Some of these cases could be explained by the revised MRSA guidelines, which aims to test 
more people at high risk. Nevertheless, since LA-MRSA can be transmitted between pigs and humans, 
there is a need to control LA-MRSA in the pig industry to limit its spread to humans. 
There is a lack of knowledge about how LA-MRSA spreads among pig herds. The importance of the 
different transmission routes, including pig movements and indirect contact, is unknown. Gaining better 
insight into pig movements, and therefore into the structure of the Danish pig industry, would aid in the 
development of a simulation model of LA-MRSA spread among Danish pig herds. Such a model would 
provide a chance to understand and assess the impact of LA-MRSA transmission routes and to investigate 
potential intervention strategies. It could therefore help decision makers enhance the implemented 
control strategy. 
  
2 
 
1.2. OUTLINE AND OBJECTIVES  
The primary objective of this thesis was to gain insight into influential transmission mechanisms of LA-
MRSA among pig herds and to investigate the effects of potential control strategies against this 
transmission. More precisely, the aims were: 
1. To identify patterns of contact between pig herds and potential hubs for disease spread.  
2. To understand and assess the impact of potential routes of LA-MRSA transmission among 
Danish pig herds. 
3. To investigate the effect of different control strategies on the spread of LA-MRSA among 
Danish pig herds. 
This thesis begins with a short introduction to the pig industry in Denmark, as well as an overview of the 
occurrence, spread and control of LA-MRSA in Danish pig herds (Chapter 1). Chapter 2 gives an overview 
on the materials and methods used. The results were summarised in the three manuscripts presented in 
Chapter 3. Network analysis tools were used to gain a better insight into the contact patterns among pig 
herds and their loyalty to trade partners. Additionally, the size of a herd’s out-going contact chain was 
investigated as a measure of their risk of spreading a disease via pig movements, and subsequently their 
potential to act as hubs for disease spread (Manuscript I). Furthermore, a simulation model was 
developed to mimic LA-MRSA spread (Manuscript II) and the effects of potential control measures on LA-
MRSA spread among Danish pig herds (Manuscript III). Chapter 4 presents the most important results 
from the manuscripts and this thesis, followed by a general discussion in Chapter 5 highlighting the 
interconnectivity of the presented studies and an evaluation of the potential consequences of gaps in our 
knowledge on the results. Conclusions (Chapter 6) and perspectives (Chapter 7) complete this thesis. 
1.3. PIG PRODUCTION IN DENMARK  
Denmark is one of the ten largest pig-producing countries worldwide12. The export of pork constitutes 
about 5% of Danish exports, making Denmark one of the largest pig meat exporters12. 
Information on pig holdings is gathered in the Central Husbandry Register (CHR), which is owned by the 
Danish Ministry of Environment and Food. For all Danish pig holdings, the CHR holds information on the 
identification number of the holding and enterprise, the holding type, and the number of sows, finishers, 
and weaners in each holding. The owner must indicate the type of holding during the registration process 
and is responsible for keeping the information in the CHR updated. Furthermore, at least once or twice a 
year depending on herd size, a letter is distributed to each herd owner inviting them to confirm or correct 
their herd information in the CHR, including the number of animals. If a herd is closed, the closure must be 
reported no more than 6 months after the last animal has left the herd. 
(https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=185121). 
3 
 
Danish pig production has a pyramidal structure13,14. Breeding-related holdings (breeding and multiplier 
herds, quarantine stations and boar stations) form the top of the pyramid and sell breeding stock. In the 
centre, production sites (production herds, weaner herds, free-range pig herds, organic herds) produce 
weaners and/or finishers for sale. At the bottom of the pyramid, end-of-production sites (slaughterhouses, 
export isolation facilities, collection points for dead animals, cooling stations, rendering plants) complete 
the production process. Transit sites (traders, trade herds, pig shows, livestock auctions, collection points, 
slaughter animal markets) support the trade among the pig herds. Most trade connections are vertical – 
from the top to the bottom of the production pyramid. Nevertheless, horizontal connections between pig 
herds also exist. Besides these central holding types, pig owners can also register hobby sites (hobby 
herds, pets, wild boar herds, organic wild boar herds) and miscellaneous herds (zoos, experimental 
facilities). 
No definitions of the 24 pre-defined holding types are available in the CHR. There is one category 
covering “breeding and multiplier herds”, even though breeding herds produce and sell purebred breeding 
stock, while multiplier herds produce and sell hybrids. Additionally, the category “breeding and multiplier 
herds” does not necessarily only cover herds that registered sows for breeding, but could include any kind 
of holding due to self-registration by the owner. In general, this is true for all holding types. 
The CHR contains information on pig movements, including identification numbers for the holding and 
the enterprise for both sending and receiving herds. Among other things, the number of moved pigs and 
the date of the pig movement are registered. 
To ensure a high level of quality, a closed production and health system (SPF – specific pathogen-free) 
has been established in Denmark12. Farms enrolled in the SPF system are organised depending on their 
health status. This includes the safety level, health declarations and additional information on the health 
status. In 2018, 3,100 herds in Denmark were enrolled in the SPF system, and were therefore obliged to 
follow the rules of SPF (www.spf-sus.dk/en, visited on 13th August 2018). Furthermore, an unknown 
number of herds not enrolled in the SPF system more or less follow the same set of biosecurity rules, but 
are not tested regularly for diseases included in the SPF system15. 
1.4. LIVESTOCK-ASSOCIATED METHICILLIN-RESISTANT STAPHYLOCOCCUS AUREUS  
Staphylococcus aureus (SA) is an opportunistic pathogen in humans and animals. It does not usually 
cause clinical signs, in which case, the humans or animals are termed ‘colonised’. In the case of a reduced 
immune system, SA can spread and cause minor skin infections that do not usually require treatment. 
Under unfavourable conditions, it can lead to severe infections such as pneumonia or sepsis that could 
result in death. If SA gains resistance against antibiotics, treatment becomes difficult. Methicillin-resistant 
SA is a group of SA that is resistant to beta-lactam antibiotics. MRSA is often multi-resistant, with 
additional resistance against other antimicrobials such as tetracycline. Livestock-associated MRSA (LA-
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MRSA) was first described in the Netherlands in 2005, and a special clonal complex, CC398, was identified 
shortly after16. LA-MRSA has been found in several livestock animals such as pigs, cattle and poultry16–18. 
However, LA-MRSA also colonises humans who take care of the livestock16,19–21. The number of human 
cases without livestock contact has increased in recent years11, and as such, there are indications for 
human-to-human transmission22. 
1.4.1. OCCURRENCE OF LA-MRSA  IN THE PIG POPULATION  
Since its first occurrence in the Netherlands and France in 2005, LA-MRSA has been reported worldwide: 
in Europe, a baseline study conducted in 2008 found LA-MRSA in 19 of 27 European countries3. Later, LA-
MRSA CC398 occurrence was reported in Asia4,23, North America10,24,25, Northern Africa5, South America26 
and Australia27. Besides CC398, other clonal complexes are also circulating in pig populations4,28,29. 
However, the focus in this thesis is on CC398, and only this strain is simulated in the model described. 
In Denmark, several LA-MRSA screenings have been performed since 2008, when 3.5% of Danish pig 
production herds were found positive for LA-MRSA in the European baseline study. In the European 
baseline study, five dust samples were taken in the immediate environment of breeding pigs in the 
holdings and then pooled and tested for LA-RMSA3. Environmental swabs were reported as an easy-to-use 
and non-invasive method. Nevertheless, the number of samples is dependent on the within-herd 
prevalence31 and there is a risk that herds with a low prevalence will not be detected when using this 
method. However, Broens et al.31 recommend avoiding pooling of environmental samples, instead 
investigating them individually to increase the sensitivity, especially in herds with a low within-herd 
prevalence. The results of the EU baseline study might therefore be an underestimation. 
Three screenings for LA-MRSA at slaughterhouses were performed in Denmark between 2009 and 
201232–34. During that period, the observed prevalence increased from 13% of pigs testing positive at 
slaughter in 2009 to 77% in 2012. When interpreting these results, it is important to take into account that 
LA-MRSA might spread during transportation to the slaughterhouse and in the slaughterline35. The results 
might therefore overestimate the occurrence. 
In 2014, a national survey found 63% of breeding herds and 68% of production herds positive for LA-
MRSA36 by testing pools of five nasal swabs per herd. In 2016, 88% of Danish pig production herds were 
tested positive for LA-MRSA11. 
1.4.2. RISK FACTORS FOR THE OCCURRENCE AND PREVALENCE OF LA-MRSA  IN A 
PIG HERD  
Even though this thesis focuses on the between-herd spread of LA-MRSA, the presence and prevalence 
of LA-MRSA within pig herds will influence its spread between herds. Therefore, risk factors for the 
occurrence of LA-MRSA in a pig herd are relevant in setting up meaningful control programmes to also 
limit the spread between pig herds. 
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On rare occasions, LA-MRSA could spontaneously emerge in a pig herd37. Nevertheless, the main reason 
for the occurrence of LA-MRSA in a pig herd is introduction via external sources. Herd characteristics and 
herd management strategies seem to influence whether or not LA-MRSA could spread in a pig herd after 
introduction38–41. 
Alt et al.39 found large (> 1,000 finishers) and medium-sized (500-999 finishers) herds had a higher risk of 
LA-MRSA occurrence. The production type was also associated with the presence or absence of LA-
MRSA39,41. In a study performed in the Netherlands, the herd type was also found to be a risk factor: the 
herd prevalence of LA-MRSA in organic pig herds was reported to be lower compared to conventional pig 
herds42. In Germany, none of the investigated organic pig herds tested positive for LA-MRSA in 201243. 
The number of sources from which a pig herd purchased animals was significantly associated with the 
occurrence of LA-MRSA in pig herds in a univariate analysis39,41. 
Low levels of antibiotics in feed promote improved growth and health benefits in pigs44,45. Nevertheless, 
group treatment with antimicrobials has been identified as risk factor for the presence of LA-MRSA in 
some studies38,39 and led to higher transmission rates and therefore a higher prevalence within the tested 
pig herds46. LA-MRSA could also be resistant to zinc, which is frequently used for the treatment of 
diarrhoea in weaning pigs. The use of zinc could increase the prevalence in weaners and thus lead to the 
persistence of LA-MRSA in pig herds47. 
1.4.3. RISK FACTORS  FOR THE SPREAD OF LA-MRSA  AMONG PIG HERDS  
Pig movements were described as an important route for the spread of LA-MRSA among pig herds35,48,49. 
Nevertheless, there are examples of herds that did not receive pigs from other herds, yet were still 
affected by LA-MRSA50. Other routes of transmission must therefore exist. 
People working at pig farms (farmers, veterinarians, etc.) have been reported to have a higher risk of 
being colonised with LA-MRSA51,52. Despite this, reports of human-to-pig transmission are rare, and it is 
assumed that LA-MRSA was introduced to three pig herds in Norway by humans53. A German study in LA-
MRSA-positive herds found 86% of the farmworkers and 45% of the associated veterinarians were positive 
for LA-MRSA54. A Dutch study showed that veterinarians carried the same LA-MRSA strain for up to 14 
months, though it remains unclear whether the LA-MRSA was persistent or reacquired55. The veterinarians 
in this study visited two to three different farms each working day and up to 10 different farms each 
week55. 
Short-term visitors on pig farms seem to carry LA-MRSA mainly transiently, and most visitors tested 
negative for LA-MRSA after 24 hours56. However, there is still a minor risk of spreading LA-MRSA among 
pig herds when visits are within a short time period. 
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Other livestock, companion animals, rodents and flies were reported to carry LA-MRSA38,39,50,57,58. Their 
role in the transmission between pig herds is not quantified, but it has been suggested that transmission 
could occur50. 
A discussion on whether LA-MRSA could be transmitted via the environment is still ongoing. LA-MRSA 
has frequently been detected in dust samples17,30,59,60. In addition, colonisation via air was recently proven 
in an animal experiment61. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that herd-to-herd transmission via air is 
possible. LA-MRSA has been found in soil close to pig herds in Germany62,63, as well as in slurry63. 
1.4.4. PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF LA-MRSA  SPREAD WITHIN AND BETWEEN 
PIG HERDS  
Prevention and control strategies for LA-MRSA are mainly based on known risk factors for its occurrence 
in and spread between pig herds. 
To prevent the spread of LA-MRSA within a pig herd, Catry et al.64 recommend reducing the use of 
antibiotics as prophylactic treatment and group treatment in order to reduce the selective pressure. 
Besides the potential reduction in within-herd transmission rates46, an additional benefit would be to 
preserve the efficacy of current antimicrobials – both in the veterinary field, and for humans. 
As pig movements play an important role in the spread of LA-MRSA among pig herds48, movement 
restrictions on trade from LA-MRSA-positive to negative herds could also be considered as a prevention 
strategy64. Taking into account the pyramidal structure of Danish pig production, eradication of LA-MRSA 
in breeding herds could be prioritised in order to minimise transmission to herds further down the 
production line64. In countries with low herd prevalence, eradication could be an option53. However, LA-
MRSA is endemic in Denmark and eradication (i.e. sending all pigs from an LA-MRSA-positive herd to 
slaughter, followed by intense cleaning and disinfection of the farm and restocking with LA-MRSA-
negative pigs) would be an extremely costly65 and impractical scenario. It is not realistic that such a 
strategy would be acceptable for the swine industry. 
Cleaning and disinfection of farms has been proven to remove LA-MRSA in the absence of animals66. 
Nevertheless, MRSA showed resistance against quaternary ammonium compounds, a component of 
disinfectants67, which might pose a challenge to successful disinfection. 
In 2014, the first actions against LA-MRSA were established in Denmark, including: 
- hygiene measures to limit the risk of bacteria being carried out of the herd 
- an infection protection plan issued by the farmer and the herd’s veterinarian 
- discontinuation of routine group medication of pig herds 
- establishment of an advisory service for pig and health workers 
- further investigations on antibiotic usage regulations and on alternative vaccination68 
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A year later, a four-year action plan was established by the Danish Ministry of Food and Environment 
based on the recommendations of an expert group50,68. This action plan covered: 
- a 15% reduction in the use of antimicrobials for pigs 
- hygiene measures focusing on the prevention of LA-MRSA spread into the community and the 
working environment in pig herds 
- reduction of contamination in the herds 
- surveillance of the LA-MRSA prevalence 
- investigation of the transmission routes of LA-MRSA 
- international efforts to promote a joint EU strategy to reduce antimicrobial resistance. 
 
Nevertheless, the success of this action plan in controlling LA-MRSA between Danish pig herds is currently 
unknown. 
1.5. NETWORK ANALYSIS  
Animal trade plays an important role in the spread of LA-MRSA among pig holdings48. Describing pig 
movements might help us to gain a better insight into the nature and extent of contact between pig herds, 
and subsequently the potential risk for LA-MRSA transmission among herds. The characterisation of herds 
within the network and the identification of important components of the network might provide 
important information for decision makers when developing control programmes69. 
The first published studies to use network analysis tools were conducted in the field of human 
psychology70, although the concepts might have been developed earlier71. In the veterinary field, network 
analysis has been used since 200372,73. In early publications, static snapshots of the underlying networks 
were investigated, in which the time of the connection between two elements of the network was 
ignored. However, the time at which a trade connection between two holdings occurs is important for 
disease spread, and dynamic network analysis tools have recently been used in the veterinary field74. 
1.6. SIMULATION MODELLING  
A simulation model attempts to represent physical, chemical or biological processes using computer 
programs developed to mimic simplified versions of these processes in order to explore how a situation 
may develop in response to different interventions. Computer-assisted modelling and simulation of 
epidemics have gained importance in veterinary medicine in recent years1. In many cases, building a 
simulation model will offer an insight into the patterns of disease spread and enable a better 
understanding of the interaction of different influential factors for disease spread and persistence. 
Additionally, models could assist in deriving strategies for the control of endemic and epidemic diseases. 
In the veterinary field, simulation models cover a wide range of applications such as modelling the 
within-host infection dynamics, disease-spread modelling within or between populations and evaluating 
control strategies to support decision makers in the control of infectious diseases1. 
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 Simulation modelling provides the opportunity to gain a better insight into complex processes, 
especially in cases where experimental studies are not possible1,2. However, simulation models typically 
involve parameters that are either unknown or only roughly estimated. Together with model assumptions 
made to simplify the real-life process, this could lead to uncertainties in the model outcome. The ethical 
good practice guidelines described highlight the importance of clearly communicating model results, 
limitations and uncertainties in order to avoid misinterpretation and help make the best possible 
decisions75,76. 
In addition to the individual-based (or agent-based) modelling approach used in this thesis, population-
based models have also been described2,77. Population-based models simulate groups of individuals, for 
example susceptible or infected individuals. The number of groups is based on the modelled disease, and 
might be related to the disease status, age or gender classification77. In contrast, individual-based models 
mimic the status of each individual over the simulated time period and simulate the actions and 
interactions of autonomous agents (either individual or collective entities), with a view to assessing their 
effects on the modelled system as a whole. 
Population-based models do not usually allow complex control programmes to be mimicked 
mechanistically, as only proportions of individuals are modelled and thus the assumption is necessary that 
the intervention is applied for all individuals in a certain group, which might not be realistic. 
Individual-based models allow for the mechanistic evaluation of control measures, i.e. based on an 
understanding of the processes within the studied system. These models are usually based on data from 
recent outbreaks or the literature, expert options on the underlying processes, as well as estimates for 
unknown parameters. Model validation and sensitivity analysis can help us to gain a better understanding 
of the uncertainties resulting from the assumptions made and information used to build the model. 
1.6.1. SIMULATION MODELLING OF LA-MRSA 
In addition to the between-herd spread, simulation modelling related to LA-MRSA has been described in 
the following areas: within-herd spread78,79, spread along the pig slaughter line80, and transmission from 
pigs to humans81. 
To date, two between-herd models have been described in the literature: Ciccolini et al.82 used Danish 
movement data from two separate years to simulate the spread of LA-MRSA among Danish pig herds. 
Within-herd dynamics were ignored in the model, as it was assumed that once a herd was affected by LA-
MRSA, a certain proportion of pigs would rapidly become LA-MRSA positive. No control measures were 
included in that model. This study found a significant probability of long-term LA-MRSA persistence due to 
transmission via pig movements alone. However, no comparisons were made to LA-MRSA screenings 
performed in Denmark. A second LA-MRSA model examined the possible spread on pig farms in the 
Swedish pig population, and evaluated the performance and cost of a proposed surveillance programme83. 
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However, the herd prevalence in Sweden is at a very low level compared to that of Denmark, and results 
can therefore not be applied to the current Danish situation. 
11 
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
2.1. NETWORK ANALYSIS (MANUSCRIPT I) 
Information on pig herds and pig movements registered in the Central Husbandry Register (CHR) and the 
Pig Movement Database (PMD) in Denmark between 1st January 2006 and 31st December 2015 were used 
to build a network with pig herds as nodes and pig movements as links between the nodes. In total, 
16,069 holdings and 7,617,681 pig movements were included in the analysis. 
A general description of the underlying datasets was given in order to evaluate trends in the number of 
active herds and registered pig movements. The contact patterns between the registered holding types 
were described by counting the registered movements between all holding types. Static network analysis 
tools were used to determine the herd types in the network components such as the giant strongly 
connected component (GSCC), in which trade connections exist between all pairs of holdings. We also 
evaluated the loyalty patterns of registered holding types by measuring the fraction of preserved incoming 
and out-going trade connections over two consecutive years. Dynamic network analysis tools were used to 
calculate the size of incoming and out-going contact chains of different holding types by assessing how 
many herds were connected by trade within a certain time period. A detailed description of the materials 
and methods used can be found in Manuscript I (Chapter 3.1). 
2.2. SIMULATION MODELLING (MANUSCRIPT II) 
Information from the dataset used in the framework of the network analysis on all herds and 
corresponding pig movements between these herds of five holding types (breeding and multiplier herds, 
production herds, weaner herds, organic and free-ranging pig herds, and hobby herds) were used to mimic 
the spread of LA-MRSA among pig herds. In total, 12,874 herds and 993,474 pig movements were included 
in the study period from 1st January 2006 to 31st December 2015. 
An agent-based Monte Carlo simulation model was developed. Within-herd dynamics, transmission via 
pig movements and indirect transmission among herds were implemented as stochastic processes. A 
three-compartment model was used to mimic the spread of LA-MRSA within and between the sow, 
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weaner and finisher sections of each herd. Higher transmission rates were assumed for herds using high-
risk antibiotics compared to herds that did not receive prescriptions for β-lactams or tetracycline. Pigs 
could be cleared of LA-MRSA with a pre-defined probability at any time during the simulation. Pig 
movements were modelled based on the registered movements in the PMD. The number of LA-MRSA-
positive pigs within the batch of moved pigs was estimated based on the prevalence in the sending herd. 
Indirect contact between pig herds was modelled via (1) contact with humans, (2) trucks picking up pigs 
for the abattoir and (3) contact between herds with the same owner. Model parameters were taken from 
the literature and expert opinions. An extensive sensitivity analysis was performed to study the effects of 
variations in the model parameters on the model outcome. 
Several initialisation scenarios were simulated to mimic different routes of LA-MRSA introduction in the 
pig population and the predicted median herd prevalence on 31st December 2008 and 2014 was compared 
to the results of LA-MRSA screenings performed in Denmark. 
A detailed description of the model and the scenarios is presented in Manuscript II (Chapter 3.2.) 
2.2.1. ADDITIONAL METHODS (NOT PRESENTED IN MANUSCRIPT II) 
To further quantify the impact of the modelled pathways of LA-MRSA transmission among pig herds, we 
investigated how often transmission occurred per 30 days for each of the modelled transmission routes: 
(1) animal movements, (2) indirect contact between pig herds via humans (visitors, veterinarians and 
advisors), (3) abattoir movements and (4) common ownership. In the simulations, records were kept on 
which transmission route affected each herd, and the number of herds that were newly affected by LA-
MRSA via each transmission route. We summed up these numbers for 30 days and calculated the 
proportion of each transmission pathway from the total number of transmissions. 
We evaluated the transmission routes for the default scenario, where LA-MRSA was initialised in 100 
production herds in 2006, in one breeding and multiplier and 100 production herds in 2009. In addition, 
we investigated six scenarios - run in the framework of the sensitivity analysis - related to indirect 
transmission routes, in which (1) the frequency of indirect contact from indoor and outdoor herds, (2) the 
probability of effective transmission via indirect contact, and (3) the probability of transmission via 
abattoir movements were both halved and doubled (Table 3 in Manuscript II, Chapter 3.2). 
2.3. MODELLING CONTROL OPT IONS (MANUSCRIPT III) 
We enhanced the model presented in Manuscript II (Chapter 3.2) with four potential control options: 
(1) A reduced proportion of herds using high-risk antibiotics: two scenarios mimicking 50% or 100% of 
active herds terminating their use of high-risk antibiotics. We simulated LA-MRSA spread within these 
herds with lower transmission rates. 
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(2) Increased biosecurity: the probability of LA-MRSA transmission among pig herds via human contact 
was reduced by 50% or 75% to mimic increased biosecurity. 
(3) Trade restrictions prohibiting trade from LA-MRSA-positive to negative herds: the LA-MRSA status 
was determined one or four times per year for all herds. Based on these simulated test results, pig 
movements from LA-MRSA-positive herds to herds tested negative were ignored. 
(4) Voluntary eradication: after simulating an LA-MRSA screening in all herds one or four times per year, 
7.5% or 5% of herds were randomly chosen to start an eradication process. A stand-still scenario was 
modelled for these herds over a pre-defined time period. All incoming and out-going pig movements 
registered during the stand-still were ignored and the herd status after eradication was set to LA-MRSA 
negative. 
All control options and their combinations were initialised on 1st January 2007 or 1st January 2010. We 
compared the predicted herd prevalence 6 years after control measures began to the scenario without 
control measures. The relative reduction was also compared between the two control start dates to 
evaluate the influence of the predicted herd prevalence at the start of control measures on the reduction 
rates. 
A more detailed description is included in Manuscript III (Chapter 3.3). 
2.3.1. ADDITIONAL METHODS (NOT PRESENTED IN MANUSCRIPT III) 
The predicted median herd prevalence 6 years after initialisation of LA-MRSA in 2007 is presented in 
Manuscript III. The herd prevalence on 31st December 2015 was also predicted to evaluate the effects of 
three additional years of active control measures. 
Selecting herds identified as hubs for disease spread for eradication might offer the potential for a 
further reduction of LA-MRSA spread among pig holdings. However, herds that started the voluntary 
eradication process were selected randomly in Manuscript III. 
The size of the out-going contact chain was calculated for each herd every year as part of the framework 
of the analysis in Manuscript I (Chapter 3.1). These values were added to the input data and could be used 
in the simulation model. After screening herds for LA-MRSA in the simulation model, all breeding and 
multiplier herds (other herds) that tested positive for LA-MRSA were ordered according to the size of the 
out-going contact chain. The 7.5% (5%) of breeding herds (other herds) that tested positive in the 
simulation with the largest out-going contact chains were then defined as hubs and chosen to start the 
eradication process. 
All control options were repeated using a scenario in which LA-MRSA was initialised in 10,000 randomly 
chosen active herds on 26th December 2006. Our goal was to mimic a situation where the herd prevalence 
was at a high level at the end of 2006, just before control measures were started. This would allow us to 
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study the effects of control measures from a high initial prevalence, thus mimicking the current situation 
in Denmark, where the between-herd prevalence is high. In this scenario, there was no second 
introduction in 2009, as in the earlier scenarios. 
If movement restrictions prohibited the movement of pigs from LA-MRSA-positive to negative herds in 
the model, no alternative movement of those pigs was simulated. We assumed that these animals might 
be exported due to the movement restrictions. In addition to recording the reduction in median herd 
prevalence as a consequence of the implemented control measures for each scenario, we also recorded 
the number of ignored movements due to movement restrictions, the number of pigs sent to slaughter 
due to the eradication process, and the number of herds that started the eradication process. 
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ABSTRACT  
To gain insight into the rapid increase in the number of livestock-associated Methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (LA-MRSA)-positive herds in Denmark, we developed an individual-based Monte 
Carlo simulation model. We aimed to assess whether transmission of LA-MRSA via pig movements could 
explain the observed increase in the number of positive herds in Denmark, and to evaluate the effect of 
other between-herd transmission mechanisms. Pig movements alone were not sufficient to mimic the 
observed increase in LA-MRSA-positive herds in Denmark in any of the modelled scenarios. The model 
identified three factors that played important roles in the between-herd spread of LA-MRSA: (1) the 
within-herd dynamics, (2) the frequency and effectiveness of indirect transmissions, and 3) unexplainable 
introduction of LA-MRSA to swine herds. These factors can act as starting points for the development of 
LA-MRSA control programs in pig herds in order to limit the risk of its transmission to humans.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Staphylococcus aureus (S. aureus) is a ubiquitous bacterium in humans and animals, and a common 
cause of minor skin infections that do not usually require treatment. However, both S. aureus and 
Methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA), which is resistant to beta-lactam antimicrobials, can lead to severe 
infections that could result in death, especially in individuals with a suppressed immune status. Livestock-
associated MRSA (LA-MRSA) was first described in the Netherlands in 2005, and a special clonal complex, 
CC398, was identified shortly after1. LA-MRSA has been found in humans, pigs and other animal species 
since 20052–9. In 2006, the pathogen was found in isolates originating from Danish pig farms10. A survey 
conducted in 26 European countries by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) in 2008 found 3% of 
Danish production herds, but no Danish breeding herds, positive for LA-MRSA type CC3982. However, a 
national survey conducted in 2014 found a prevalence of 63% in breeding herds and 68% in slaughter pig 
herds11. LA-MRSA has received enormous media attention due to its zoonotic potential, both in Denmark 
and beyond the borders.  
Danish pig production has a pyramidal structure12,13. LA-MRSA-positive breeding sites at the top of the 
pyramid pose a risk of spreading the pathogen via pig movements to production sites in the centre and 
down to sites like slaughterhouses at the bottom of the pyramid. Several studies have indicated that the 
transmission of LA-MRSA via animal movements is one of the main drivers for its spread among pig 
herds14–16. Other transmission routes described are: air, housing environment, rodents, companion 
animals, vehicles and humans17–23. Understanding the spread of LA-MRSA among pig herds is essential to 
developing meaningful control programs for the pig production sector. The main goal of action plans made 
by the Danish authorities is to reduce the number of LA-MRSA-positive pigs and herds, thereby reducing 
the risk of transmission to humans. 
Simulation models are widely used as a way to inform decision making. They present an opportunity to 
test a hypothesis without experiments or in cases where experimental studies are not possible24,25. They 
cover a wide range of applications such as modelling the within-host infection dynamics, disease-spread 
modelling within or between populations, and evaluating control strategies to support decision makers in 
the control of infectious diseases24. Since EU regulations require identification and registration of animals 
and animal movements26, data are available on a large scale and can be used as input in disease-spread 
39 
 
models. Furthermore, if a pathogen is mainly spread through animal movements, the movement data can 
be used retrospectively to investigate its spread.  
An individual-based Monte Carlo simulation model of the spread of LA-MRSA within and between pig 
herds was developed, integrating available data on Danish pig herds and registered pig movements among 
these herds. The purpose was to examine what might have influenced the rapid spread of LA-MRSA 
among Danish pig herds during the period 2006 to 2015. The aims were to: (1) assess whether 
transmission of LA-MRSA via registered pig movements alone could account for the observed increase in 
prevalence in Denmark, and (2) evaluate the effect of other transmission mechanisms. The results should 
assist in creating an agenda for the control of LA-MRSA in Danish pig herds. 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Data background for the simulation model (input data). In Denmark, information on pig holdings and 
pig movements are registered in the Central Husbandry Register (CHR)27, which is owned by the Ministry 
of Environment and Food. A dataset containing information on 18,648 pig herds and 7,678,851 
movements among pig herds in Denmark was extracted for the study period 1st January 2006 to 31st 
December 2015. The dataset is described in detail by Schulz et al. (2017)13, and data preparation for the 
simulation model is described in the Supplementary Information. Several herds could be owned by the 
same farmer and thus constitute one holding. The study was performed at herd level, but information on 
ownership was retained to aid the modelling of LA-MRSA spread among herds with the same owner.  
Herds registered as: (1) breeding and multiplier herds (breeding sites), (2) production herds, organic or 
free-range pig herds (merged into one category) and weaner herds (production sites), and (3) hobby herds 
(hobby sites) were used in our analysis, as well as the respective movements among these herds. End-of-
production sites (e.g. 133 herds registered as slaughterhouses and 2,961,979 movements to 
slaughterhouses) were excluded because it was assumed that there would be no spread of pathogens 
back into the production chain from these. The remaining herd types and respective movements (2,657 
herds and 116,386 movement records) were excluded because it was assumed they would have little 
impact on LA-MRSA spread due to the low number of registered herds and pig movements (e.g. zoo, 
experimental facilities) or because of missing information on the herd structure and age group of moved 
pigs (e.g. traders, trade herds). Any movements for which the number of pigs was not recorded were 
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excluded (5,595 movement records). This left 49 herds that never moved pigs, and these were also 
excluded. In total, 12,874 herds and 993,474 movements were included in our study. If a herd changed its 
holding type to one not included in this study, the herd was assumed to be closed for the considered year, 
but kept active in the model for all other years. 
LA-MRSA screening results in Danish pig herds. In 2008, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) 
conducted an LA-MRSA survey in 26 European countries2. In subsequent years, national Danish surveys 
reported a rapid increase in the prevalence of LA-MRSA in breeding herds and slaughter pig herds11 (Table 
1). 
Table 1. Overview of LA-MRSA screenings performed in Danish pig herds between 2008 and 2014. 
Yearreference Description Number of tested herds  Estimated LA-
MRSA prevalence 
in %  
[95% confidence 
interval] 
20082 Five dust samples were collected from 
the immediate environment of breeding 
pigs in the herd then pooled and tested 
for LA-MRSA 
95 breeding herds:  
198 production herds:  
0.0 [0.0 – 3.2]  
3.5 [1.8 – 7.1] 
 
201038 Pools of five nasal swab samples were 
taken from five slaughter pigs in five 
different pens 
99 herds with slaughter 
pigs:  
16.2 [9.5 – 24.9] 
201139 Pools of five nasal swab samples were 
taken from five slaughter pigs in five 
different pens 
79 herds with slaughter 
pigs:  
16.5 [9.1 – 26.5] 
201411 Pools of five nasal swabs per herd 70 breeding herds:  
205 production herds:  
63.0 [50.5 – 74.1] 
68.0 [60.9 – 74.1] 
 
Simulation model. An individual-based Monte Carlo simulation model for the spread of LA-MRSA among 
pig herds was developed (Figure 1). Information on pig herds and movement data were read from input 
files at the beginning of each simulation run. After LA-MRSA was initialised, three processes within each 
time step were modelled to simulate within-herd dynamics, transmission via pig movements and indirect 
transmission among herds. For each simulation repetition and on each simulated day, information on 
positive herds was stored in files for later interpretation. 
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Figure 1. Overview of the structure of the livestock-associated Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus model. 
Model initialisation. In the first step, information on herds and movement data was sourced. Four 
additional files were read by the model, and these contained: (1) simulation parameters (Table 2); (2) 
minimum, most likely (mode) and maximum values defining probability distributions (PERT distributions) 
for transmission and cure rates (Supplementary Information, Table S5); (3) a distance matrix containing 
the distances between all herds; (4) distance probabilities of contact among herds for the different types 
of contacts (Supplementary Information, Table S6). 
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Table 2. Overview of simulation parameters and default values. PERT distributions were defined as transformation of the Beta distribution with 
minimum (min), maximum (max) and most likely value (mode) and a mean 𝜇 =
𝑚𝑖𝑛+4∙𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒+𝑚𝑎𝑥 
6
. 
Variable name Default value Description Reference 
Modelling disease spread within a herd 
Environment-related recurrence 
envir 1 Switch on/off environment-related 
recurrence within-herd (0/1) 
 
𝜶𝒆𝒏𝒗𝒊𝒓 2.5 𝛼 in probability function for environment-
related recurrence  
Within-herd module validation 
 
Within-herd dynamics 
tds 1 Switch on/off time-dependent scaling of 
within-herd transmission 
 
𝒙 50 Midpoint s-shape transmission curve Within-herd module validation 
𝒌 0.05 Steepness of s-shape transmission curve Within-herd module validation 
hm 1 Switch on/off homogeneous mixing in small 
herds (0/1) 
 
𝒕𝒉𝒔𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒍 200 Herds sizes below or equal to 𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 are 
categorised as small herds – indicating 
random mixing within herd 
Assumption 
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Variable name Default value Description Reference 
 
 
Modelling disease spread among herds 
Spread via indirect contacts 
ic 1 Switch on/off transmission via indirect 
contacts (0/1) 
 
𝝀𝒊𝒏 0.256 Average daily probability of indirect contact 
originating from an LA-MRSA-positive indoor 
herd 
Adjusted based on Boklund et 
al. (2013)40  
𝝀𝒐𝒖𝒕 0.1864 Average daily probability of indirect contact 
originating from an LA-MRSA-positive 
outdoor herd 
Adjusted based on Boklund et 
al. (2013)40 
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒊𝒏 PERT 
(min = 0.001,  
max = 0.01,  
mode = 0.005071) 
Probability of infection via contact from an 
LA-MRSA-positive indoor herd 
Expert opinion 
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒕 PERT 
(min = 0.001,  
max = 0.01,  
mode = 0.0035) 
Probability of infection via contact from an 
LA-MRSA-positive outdoor herd 
Expert opinion 
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒂 PERT 
(min = 0.001,  
max = 0.01,  
mode = 0.004714) 
Probability of infection via abattoir 
movements 
Expert opinion 
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In the next step, a herd matrix was generated containing the following information for each herd: (1) an 
individual identification number (1 - 12,874); (2) the herd type registered in the CHR in 2006, set to zero 
for herds that were inactive (i.e. no movements registered) in 2006; (3) the simulated LA-MRSA status 
(equal to zero); (4) the number of sows, weaners and finishers registered (or estimated numbers as 
described in the Supplementary Information); (5) the number of LA-MRSA-positive sows, weaners and 
finishers (equal to zero); (6) status of antimicrobial usage based on the herd information (Supplementary 
Information); (7) transmission rates; (8) cure rates. Transmission and cure rates were randomly chosen 
from PERT distributions for each herd based on information from the literature28 (Supplementary 
Information, Table S5).   
To initialise LA-MRSA in the simulation, it was necessary to define the number of herds and the herd 
types where LA-MRSA would be seeded. Additionally, the number of LA-MRSA-positive pigs and the age 
group of the first LA-MRSA cases were set. In the selected herds, ten LA-MRSA-positive sows were 
initialised. If fewer than ten sows were available, LA-MRSA was initiated in the weaner or finisher section. 
Several scenarios to mimic different situations in 2006 and different introductions at later points in time 
were tested (Supplementary Information, Table S7). In 2006, LA-MRSA was seeded exclusively in large 
herds (number of sows, weaners and finishers above 𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙), whereas when it was initialised in later 
years, small herds could also randomly be chosen. 
The model simulated daily time steps, while the herd matrix was updated on a yearly basis, e.g. herd 
type, number of animals and antimicrobial usage were updated according to the input data. Transmission 
and cure rates were only updated if the herd type changed between two consecutive years. The number 
of positive animals in each age group was calculated for the next year based on the prevalence in the 
previous year. If the herd type changed between years, the LA-MRSA status and number of positive sows, 
weaners and finishers was set to zero, with the assumption that cleaning and disinfection were carried out 
before changing the herd type. 
Modelling disease spread within a herd 
The following processes were implemented and used in the order they are described: 
(1) Environment-related recurrence. For herds that had previously been LA-MRSA positive but had no LA-
MRSA-positive pigs on the simulation day (due to self-cleaning or selling all positive pigs), the LA-
MRSA status of the herd was set to negative in the model. Nevertheless, depending on the time since 
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the status changed to negative, an exponentially decreasing probability of one pig reverting to LA-
MRSA positive status due to environmental contamination was simulated (Supplementary 
Information).  
If the herd type changed between two consecutive years, this recurrence due to environmental 
contamination was still possible.  
(2) Self-cleaning of individual pigs. In positive herds, pigs could clear themselves randomly at any time 
according to the cure rates for sows, weaners and finishers within the herd (Supplementary 
Information, Table S5).  
(3) Within-herd dynamics. A three-compartment within-herd model was implemented with transmission 
within the three compartments and high- and low-risk transmission routes between the 
compartments for sows, weaners and finishers (Figure 2). Homogenous mixing within each 
compartment was assumed. High-risk transmission was assumed between subsequent compartments 
within the production line to mimic LA-MRSA transmission due to pig movements within the herd. A 
lower risk of LA-MRSA transmission was assumed in the opposite direction to the production line, 
representing indirect transmission mechanisms e.g. via humans or equipment.  
 
Figure 2. Schematic description of the implemented within-herd LA-MRSA spread. 
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The transmission parameters published by Broens et al.28 (Supplementary Information, Table S5) take 
into account the pen structure in the compartments, which was not reflected in our model. The 
development of the within-herd prevalence in the first year after initialisation of LA-MRSA therefore 
showed a rapid increase (Supplementary Information, Figures S1-S4). In order to slow down the 
within-herd spread to reflect pen structure, a time-dependent shifting function was introduced (as 
described in Equation 5 in the Supplementary Information), representing the speed and steepness of 
LA-MRSA spread as modelled by Sørensen et al.29 
In herds with fewer than a certain number of animals (default value: thsmall = 200), only one 
compartment was modelled and homogeneous mixing was assumed. No time-dependent shifting was 
used for the transmission rates in small herds. Supplementary Information Figure S5 shows the 
within-herd prevalence in production herds with fewer than 200 animals for (a) transmission rates 
adapted from Broens et al.28 and (b) time-shifted transmission rates for (1) herds using high-risk 
antibiotics, and (2) herds not using high-risk antibiotics. 
All subsequent scenarios were run with time-shifted transmission rates adapted based on Broens et 
al.28 and Sørensen et al.29 
Modelling disease spread among herds  
Spread via animal movements. Danish movement data do not include information on the age group of 
pigs moved between herds. As differences in prevalence can be expected among age groups, it was 
necessary to define movement types reflecting the age groups for each movement. The movement types 
were based on the number of registered sows, weaners and finishers in both the sending and receiving 
herd (Supplementary Information).  
Transmission via pig movements was included based on the movement data and types. The number of 
LA-MRSA-positive pigs that were moved to the receiving herd was calculated using a binomial process 
representing the total number of pigs that were moved and the prevalence within the source 
compartment. The herd size in both sending and receiving herds was kept constant, with the assumption 
that whenever pigs were moved in, a similar number of pigs were moved out. However, the number of LA-
MRSA-positive pigs was updated on a daily basis for both herds. If there were no weaners registered in the 
sending herd, but the age group of pigs moved out of this herd was estimated to be weaners, the 
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prevalence in the sow section was used. Nevertheless, the number of positive sows in this section was not 
updated. 
Spread via indirect contacts. Other transmission routes such as vehicles (feeding and abattoir trucks) and 
humans (veterinarians, technicians and visitors) were pooled as indirect contacts among herds. 
Two pathways of indirect transmission were modelled: (1) distance-dependent transmission from LA-
MRSA-positive herds via e.g. humans moving between farms, and (2) transmission related to abattoir 
movements. Indirect transmission related to human and abattoir movements was restricted to contacts 
within the same day of visits to several herds. For each LA-MRSA-positive herd ℎ, the number of indirect 
contacts was calculated based on a Poisson distribution using 𝜆𝑖𝑛, 𝜆𝑜𝑢𝑡, or 𝜆𝑎
ℎ  . It was determined whether 
each indirect contact was effective based on the PERT distributions 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡 or 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎 given in the 
input file (Table 2). In the case of an effective indirect contact, a herd was randomly chosen based on the 
read-in distance probability tables (Supplementary Information, Table S6). 
In addition, transmission among herds with the same owner was modelled to represent shared workers 
or equipment (Supplementary Information).  
Validation and convergence. The model was internally validated using three methods30: (1) face validity – 
using flow charts to ask people with an insight into the system whether the conceptual model was 
reasonable (Figure 1, Figures S4-S8), and in the case of within-herd validation, whether the within-
compartment prevalence represented a meaningful range, (2) the tracing method - following individual 
herds over time to determine whether the logic was correct, and (3) sensitivity analysis - evaluating the 
effect of changes in the fixed parameters. In addition, external validation was conducted by comparing the 
predicted prevalence of LA-MRSA by the model to the observed prevalence of LA-MRSA from the 
screening results in Danish swine herds (Table 1).  
We assessed the number of simulation repetitions required before the variance in the total number of 
LA-MRSA-positive herds stabilised on 31st December 2015 (Supplementary Information, Figure S9). 
Although convergence was reached after 250 iterations, the model was run with 500 iterations per 
scenario to cover any extra variability in the different initialisation scenarios and in the sensitivity analysis. 
A sensitivity analysis was performed based on a scenario in which LA-MRSA was initialised in 100 active 
large production herds on 1st January 2006, as well as one breeding and multiplier herd and 100 
production herds on 1st January 2009. The model was run with different settings (e.g. without 
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environment-related recurrence, Table 3) and all fixed parameters were halved and doubled (Table 3). The 
effects of changes were evaluated by changes in the within-herd dynamics and the total number of 
infected herds 10 years after the first initialisation of LA-MRSA. 
Data processing, simulation modelling and graphical presentation of results were performed in R version 
3.2.2 - "Fire Safety"31. 
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Table 3. Overview of scenarios run in the framework of the sensitivity analysis. All default values (Table 2) were halved and doubled. For PERT 
distributions (𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒊𝒏, 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒕, 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒂), minimum, mode and maximum values were halved and doubled. 
Acronym Description Values 
Modelling disease spread within a herd 
Environment-related recurrence 
NoEnvir No environment-related recurrence within-herd 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟 =  0 
Envir Variation of 𝛼𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟  𝛼𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟 ∈ {1.25, 5} 
 
Within-herd dynamics 
NoTDS No time-dependent shifting of within-herd transmission 𝑡𝑑𝑠 =  0 
Mid Variation of x 𝑥 ∈ {25, 75} 
Steep Variation of k 𝑘 ∈ {0.025, 0.1} 
   
NoHM No homogeneous mixing in small herds ℎ𝑚 = 0 
THhm Variation of 𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙  ∈ {100, 400} 
   
Modelling disease spread among herds 
Spread via indirect contacts 
NoIC No indirect contacts 𝑖𝑐 = 0 
ICin/out Only distance-dependent indirect contact for indoor and 
outdoor herds 
 
ICa Only indirect contact related to abattoir movements  
ICsw Only indirect contact related to herds with the same owner  
FreqICin/out Variation of 𝜆𝑖and 𝜆𝑜 𝜆𝑖  ∈ {0.128, 0.512} 
𝜆𝑜  ∈ {0.0932, 0.3728} 
ProbICin/out Variation of 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 ∈ {𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇(0.0005, 0.005, 0.0025355),   
                    𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇(0.002, 0.02, 0.010142)}  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡 ∈ {𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇(0.0005, 0.005, 0.00175), 
                    𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇(0.002, 0.02, 0.007)} 
ProbICa Variation of 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎 ∈ {𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇(0.0005, 0.005, 0.002357),   
                    𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇(0.002, 0.02, 0.009428)}  
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RESULTS 
Animal movements alone (initialisation scenarios). To assess whether the transmission of LA-MRSA via 
pig movements alone could account for the observed pattern of increased prevalence in Denmark, the 
model was run with 17 initialisation scenarios (Supplementary Information, Table S7). Based on the 
assumption that LA-MRSA was already established in 2006, five scenarios were set up which introduced 
LA-MRSA in varying quantities of breeding and multiplier and/or production herds in 2006. Additionally, in 
12 scenarios, LA-MRSA was introduced at later points in time to mimic new introductions. The simulated 
proportion of LA-MRSA-positive holdings in 2008 and 2014 was compared to the observed results of LA-
MRSA screenings performed in Denmark (Table 1). In all scenarios, LA-MRSA was initialised on 1st January 
2006 in a number of breeding and multiplier herds and/or production herds (Supplementary Information, 
Table S7). Furthermore, scenarios were initiated to mimic further introduction of LA-MRSA in subsequent 
years. The predicted prevalence in breeding and multiplier herds matched the results of LA-MRSA 
screenings performed in Danish pig herds in 2008 (Table 1), but was lower than the observed prevalence 
in 2014 (Figure 3). Animal movements could explain the observed prevalence in production herds in 2008 
for certain scenarios, for example when the spread was initiated in many herds in 2006, or combined with 
initialisation in breeding herds. However, none of the scenarios could explain the observed prevalence in 
2014 using animal movements alone (Figure 3 and Supplementary Information, Figure S6). 
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Figure 3. Herd prevalence in breeding and multiplier herds (a+b) and production herds (c+d) on 31st December 2008 and 
31st December 2014 resulting from simulated LA-MRSA transmission via pig movements only, based on 500 iterations. 
Time-shifted transmission rates adapted from Broens et al.28 were used. The horizontal black line and grey area mark the 
observed prevalence and 95% confidence interval of the LA-MRSA screenings performed in Danish swine herds in 2008 
and 2014. Example acronyms: 06.b5p200 – initialisation in five breeding and multiplier herds and 200 production herds in 
2006, 06.b5_07-09.p200 – initialisation in five breeding and multiplier herds in 2006 and 200 production herds each year 
from 2007 to 2009. 
Animal movements and indirect contacts (initialisation scenarios). In the next step, all initialisation 
scenarios were run using pig movements and indirect contacts as transmission mechanisms and the 
between-herd prevalence on 31st December 2015 was compared. In all scenarios, the modelled 
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prevalence was higher when indirect contacts were added, compared to simulations in which transmission 
was modelled via animal movements alone (data not shown).  
In seven of the initialisation scenarios, the simulated median prevalence in breeding and multiplier herds 
as well as in production herds overlapped with the confidence interval of the LA-MRSA screening results 
for Danish pig herds in 2008 (Figure 4). The median of five of the mentioned scenarios overlapped with the 
2014 screening results for breeding and multiplier herds (Figure 4b). However, for production herds, the 
median of only one scenario overlapped with the 2014 LA-MRSA screening results, whereas the median 
prevalence in 2008 exceeded the observed screening results (Figure 4). The violin plots overlapped with 
the screening results for breeding and multiplier herds as well as for production herds in both 2008 and 
2014 in eight initialisation scenarios, indicating that these scenarios might represent the spread of LA-
MRSA among pig herds between 2006 and 2014. 
53 
 
 
Figure 4. Herd prevalence in breeding and multiplier herds (a+b) and production herds (c+d) on 31
st 
December 2008 and 
31
st
 December 2014 resulting from simulated LA-MRSA transmission via pig movements and indirect contacts, based on 
500 iterations. Time-shifted transmission rates adapted from Broens et al.
28
 were used. The horizontal black line and grey 
area mark the observed prevalence and 95% confidence interval of the LA-MRSA screenings performed in Danish swine 
herds in 2008 and 2014. Black violins mark scenarios in which the simulated median prevalence in breeding and multiplier 
herds and production herds overlapped with the confidence interval of the LA-MRSA screening results. Example acronyms: 
06.b5p200 – initialisation in five breeding and multiplier herds and 200 production herds in 2006, 06.b5_07-09.p200 – 
initialisation in five breeding and multiplier herds in 2006 and 200 production herds each year from 2007 to 2009.  
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Sensitivity analysis. Based on the results, a default scenario of LA-MRSA initialisation in 100 production 
herds in 2006, and in one breeding and multiplier and 100 production herds in 2009 was used for the 
sensitivity analysis. The results of the scenarios with varied parameters were compared to the predicted 
median prevalence of the default scenario to allow the evaluation of the effects of parameter variation.  
Scenarios relating to within-herd dynamics had a large impact on the model outcome. Running the 
model without time-dependent scaling of the transmission rates (NoTDS), and with halved midpoint 
(Mid_h) or doubled steepness (Steep_d) of the time-scaling function resulted in a higher prevalence 
compared to the standard scenario (Figure 5). The modelled prevalence in the scenarios Mid_h and 
Steep_d fitted the LA-MRSA screening results from 2014 better than the default scenario. However, the 
modelled results for 2008 were above the LA-MRSA screening results. Compared to the default scenario, 
reducing the within-herd transmission by doubling the midpoint or halving the steepness of the time-
scaling function decreased the modelled prevalence for breeding and multiplier herds and production 
herds for both years. 
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Figure 5. Sensitivity analysis showing the effect of changing the input for herd prevalence in breeding and multiplier herds 
(a+b) and production herds (c+d). Based on prevalence on 31
st 
December 2008 and 31
st
 December 2014 in 500 iterations. 
Time-shifted transmission rates adapted from Broens et al.
28
 were used. The horizontal black line and grey area mark the 
observed prevalence and 95% confidence interval of the LA-MRSA screenings performed in Danish swine herds in 2008 
and 2014. 
Scenarios representing environment-related recurrence (NoEnvir, Envir_h, Envir_d) and homogeneous 
mixing in small herds (NoHM, THhm_h, THhm_d) showed only small variations in the modelled outcome 
compared to the default scenario (Figure 5).  
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Simulations that only modelled one of the implemented indirect transmission routes also resulted in a 
lower prevalence compared to the default scenario. Nevertheless, doubling (1) the average daily 
probability of indirect contact originating from an LA-MRSA-positive herd (variables 𝜆𝑖𝑛 and 𝜆𝑜𝑢𝑡, scenario 
FreqICin/out_d) or (2) the probability of infection via indirect contact from an LA-MRSA-positive herd 
(variables Probin and Probout, scenario ProbICin/out_d) led to an increased simulated prevalence in 2008 and 
2014 compared to the default scenario, as well as an overlap with the LA-MRSA screening results from 
2014.  
Violin plots for 2010 and 2011 are shown in Supplementary Information, Figure S8. 
DISCUSSION 
Livestock movements have been described as a driving factor in the spread of LA-MRSA, and the 
restriction of trade from MRSA-positive to MRSA-negative herds has therefore been discussed in the 
literature as a potential control option32. In order to assess whether a ban on animal movements would 
impede LA-MRSA spread, it is important to understand the extent to which it affects transmission. In the 
present study, the spread of LA-MRSA among pig herds via animal movements alone and via animal 
movements combined with indirect contact among pig herds was simulated to evaluate the effect of the 
modelled transmission routes. Several initialisation and sensitivity analysis scenarios were run and the 
results compared to the outcome of LA-MRSA screenings performed in Danish pig herds to externally 
validate the model and to evaluate the influence of the used model parameters on the model prediction. 
Based on assumptions in the model, pig movements alone cannot account for the spread of LA-MRSA in 
Denmark for the period 2006 to 2014. Even extensive initialisation in 2006 and subsequent years did not 
lead to the increase in LA-MRSA prevalence observed in Danish pig herds. Therefore, it is likely that a 
prevention strategy including only a ban on animal movements would not have prevented the spread of 
LA-MRSA among Danish pig herds. 
Three routes were included to mimic the transmission of LA-MRSA via indirect contact: (1) human 
contacts, (2) abattoir movements, and (3) same owner. Modelling indirect contact clearly showed that the 
model was able to represent the observed prevalence in 2008, but showed lower predicted prevalence 
compared to that observed in 2014 for the default scenario (Figure 4). Still, the figure clearly 
demonstrates the importance of indirect contact in the spread of LA-MRSA among pig herds compared to 
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modelling the spread using only animal movements (Figures 3-4). The sensitivity analysis on the frequency 
and risk associated with indirect contact also showed its influential impact on the spread of LA-MRSA 
(Figure 5). An LA-MRSA control program must therefore include biosecurity measures to limit the spread 
of LA-MRSA among herds via indirect contact. However, even though literature describing these 
transmission routes does exist21,33,34, detailed information on the frequency and effectiveness of LA-MRSA 
transmission via these indirect routes is lacking. As parameters related to indirect transmission routes 
were shown to be relevant for LA-MRSA spread among pig holdings, more knowledge should be gained to 
reduce uncertainties in the model outcome.  
The model was initiated with many scenarios in an attempt to generate situations that would mimic the 
observed prevalence. The scenarios in which LA-MRSA was only initiated in herds in 2006 did not mimic 
the observed prevalence (Figure 4). Nevertheless, randomly infecting herds in subsequent years resulted 
in an overlap between the some of the scenarios and the observed prevalence, indicating that the model 
is capable of replicating the LA-MRSA epidemic in Denmark between 2006 and 2014. As it is not possible 
to know exactly which (if any) of the modelled scenarios corresponded to reality, it can be difficult to 
choose the best scenario for future modelling of control measures. However, several scenarios can be 
modelled to identify the most effective strategy in different situations. 
The fact that LA-MRSA had to be initialised in many herds over time suggests that it could not have 
spread solely via the simulated processes in this study (namely animal movements and indirect contacts), 
but that other processes must also have contributed. Humans can be persistent carriers of S. aureus and 
therefore be colonised for longer time periods35. In addition, humans working at or visiting a known LA-
MRSA-positive herd might carry the pathogen for some time36 and might be able to transmit it to pigs in 
other visited herds. Therefore, the unexplained introduction of LA-MRSA to pig herds over time could 
represent introductions via humans. LA-MRSA could have been spread locally via for example, air, 
companion animals or rodents. However, to the best of our knowledge, there are no studies providing 
quantification of LA-MRSA transmission through these routes, and they were therefore not incorporated 
into the model framework.   
Results of the sensitivity analysis showed that the parameters representing the within-herd spread of LA-
MRSA had a substantial impact on model predictions (Figure 5). This indicated that the within-herd 
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prevalence could affect the between-herd prevalence and that reducing the prevalence within a herd 
might help to control LA-MRSA spread. This can be used as a starting point to study the impact of reducing 
the within-herd prevalence, for example by reducing antibiotic usage, and/or imposing higher biosecurity 
in a national control program.  
Real data on pig herds and movements registered in the CHR were used as background data for the 
simulation27. Although the CHR provides very detailed data, it was necessary to estimate the age groups of 
moved pigs and, in some cases, the number of animals in a certain age group on the farm. Obligatory 
registration of the age of moved pigs in the CHR and automatic cross-validation between registers would 
increase the accuracy and validity of data in general as well as the accuracy of the results from this study.  
It was necessary to exclude all trade herds due to missing information on the structure of the trade 
facilities. As there is no individual identification system for pigs, it was impossible to identify how long pigs 
might have been owned by traders or how they were mixed, thus potentially spreading LA-MRSA. 
However, there are very few trade herds in Denmark13 and this was therefore considered to be of limited 
importance.  
Only one study simulating the spread of LA-MRSA among pig herds was found in the literature39. This 
study was conducted on pig herds in Denmark and it found that movement-induced transmission alone 
could yield a high probability of LA-MRSA persistence at a very low prevalence. However, the study used 
restricted movement data from only 1 year and did not include within-herd dynamics, which appeared to 
be influential in our study. In addition, indirect contact was modelled implicitly, without modelling the 
frequency or associated risk, and the impact of indirect contact on LA-MRSA spread was therefore not 
studied. 
Besides individual-based Monte Carlo simulation models, also population-based models exist25,37. 
However, these population-based models simulate groups of individuals (herds), and actions such as pig 
movements or indirect contacts between herds would be applied to all herds in a certain group at the 
same time, which is not realistic. In contrast, individual-based models allow tracing of individual herds 
over time providing better insight into the modelled processes.   
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The model was developed to gain better insight into the spread of LA-MRSA among pig herds. However, 
it could be adapted to mimic the transmission of other pathogens that can be shed without clinical signs in 
pigs such as Salmonella. . These pathogens could also be transmitted via animal movements and indirect 
contacts among pig herds. In addition, the model can also be used to simulate the spread of LA-MRSA in 
other farmed animal species. When applying the model to other pathogens or animal species, it may 
require adaptation according to the modelled disease or system. Modules mimicking other transmission 
pathways than the already implemented could be easily added to the original model.  
In future, this model can be used to test control options to limit the spread of LA-MRSA. The effects of 
e.g. trade restrictions, as well as constraints related to indirect contact among herds could be evaluated to 
assist decision makers adapt local action plans. Additionally, the impact of increasing internal biosecurity 
and attempts to reduce antimicrobial usage at herd level could be evaluated. This could lead to the 
establishment of potential thresholds below which the within-herd prevalence would have to remain in 
order to have a clear impact on the between-herd spread of LA-MRSA. 
Data Availability. Data are owned by a third party. The authors had no special access privileges to these 
data. Danish pig movement data can be obtained for a fee by ordering an extract from https://chr.fvst.dk 
and by contacting the CGI Service Desk, tel. +45 70 21 13 21 or e-mailing dk-support.dk@cgi.com.  
Code availability. The R script can be obtained from the authors upon request.  
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ABSTRACT  
There has been a rapid increase in Danish pig herds testing positive for livestock-associated Methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (LA-MRSA) since the first screening in 2008. Despite a national action plan 
to control LA-MRSA in the Danish pig population, 88% of pig herds tested positive in a 2016 cross-sectional 
study of 57 herds. The national action plan was initiated in April 2015 and aimed to reduce the spread of 
LA-MRSA among pig herds. However, its success is uncertain. We used a simulation model mimicking the 
spread of LA-MRSA among pig herds between 2006 and 2015 to evaluate the impact of control strategies 
if these had these been implemented in 2007 or 2010. The strategies were combinations of the following 
control measures: (1) a reduced number of herds using high-risk antibiotics, (2) a reduced probability of 
indirect transmission among herds via humans, (3) movement restrictions, and (4) voluntary eradication in 
5-7.5% of the herds. Almost all tested control strategies simulated a reduction in the spread of LA-MRSA. 
The combination of two, three or four intervention strategies showed additive effects and led to larger 
reductions in the predicted herd prevalence. In addition, the prevalence of LA-MRSA-positive herds at the 
time when control measures were initiated influenced the effects of the control strategies. Combining the 
simulated control measures can be considered in future action plans to control LA-MRSA.   
 
KEYWORDS 
Simulation model, LA-MRSA, Denmark, pig movements, swine, control  
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INTRODUCTION 
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus (S.) aureus (MRSA) is a group of S. aureus that is resistant to most β-
lactam antibiotics1. The main reservoir for livestock-associated MRSA (LA-MRSA) is the pig population, 
though it has also been found in humans and other animal species2. In humans, (LA-) MRSA can cause 
severe infections in children, elderly or immunosuppressed people. The number of LA-MRSA cases in 
humans has increased in recent years3. Transmission from livestock to humans has been established4,5, so 
limiting the spread of LA-MRSA in the pig population may limit the number of LA-MRSA cases in humans. 
The first detection of LA-MRSA in Danish pig farms was in isolates from samples taken in 20066. In 2008, 
a survey conducted in 26 European countries by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) found 3% of 
Danish production herds, but no Danish breeding herds, were positive for LA-MRSA type CC3987. 
However, a 2014 national survey found a prevalence of 63% in breeding herds and 68% in slaughter pig 
herds8, and a similar survey from 2016 found a prevalence of 88% in finisher herds3.  
Danish pig production has a pyramidal structure with breeding herds at the top, production herds in the 
middle and slaughterhouses at the bottom9. Pig movements mainly occur vertically in accordance with pig 
production, but horizontal connections also exist9. Pig movements were identified as an important route 
for the spread of LA-MRSA among pig herds10,11. The Danish Veterinary and Food Administration (DVFA) 
published an action plan for controlling LA-MRSA in April 2015, based on recommendations from a risk 
assessment12. This action plan aimed to reduce the use of antibiotics in pig production by 15% from 2015 
to 2018, thereby reducing levels of LA-MRSA in pig herds. Catry et al. (2010)13 described potential control 
measures to limit the spread of LA-MRSA among pig herds based on risk factors for LA-MRSA spread. They 
suggested: (1) improved hygiene within herds and during transport, beginning with the breeding herds 
and followed by the rest of the production chain, and (2) prevention of pig movements from MRSA-
positive to MRSA-negative herds. 
Schulz et al. (2018)14 developed an agent-based Monte Carlo simulation model of the spread of LA-MRSA 
among pig herds in order to study the epidemic behaviour and to identify the driving factors in LA-MRSA 
spread among pig herds. The model suggested that the spread of LA-MRSA could be explained by three 
transmission routes: animal movements, indirect contact and unexplained introductions. None of the 
three transmission routes on their own were able explain the rapid increase in LA-MRSA prevalence in 
Denmark. However, combining all three routes under the model assumptions mimicked a development of 
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LA-MRSA-positive herds similar to the trend observed in Denmark. Both the frequency and effectiveness 
of indirect contact with humans visiting more than one herd on the same day were identified as sensitive 
parameters in the model presented by Schulz et al.14 The model can be used to assess which control 
measures could have been used to control the spread of LA-MRSA among herds. Retrospective studies on 
how an epidemic in a country/region could have had been influenced may aid in controlling future 
epidemics in the same or in similar areas. 
The objective of this study was to investigate how the spread of LA-MRSA among Danish pig herds 
between 2006 and 2015 could have been influenced by: (1) a reduced number of herds using high-risk 
antibiotics, (2) a reduced probability of indirect transmission via humans visiting more than one herd per 
day (reflecting high levels of biosecurity), (3) movement restrictions between LA-MRSA-positive and 
negative herds, and (4) voluntary eradication of MRSA in 5-7.5% of the herds. Additionally, we compared 
two starting points for these control actions to evaluate the impact on the reduction of LA-MRSA spread.  
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Simulation model 
We used an agent-based Monte Carlo simulation model mimicking the spread of LA-MRSA among Danish 
pig herds between 2006 and 2015. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the original model, which is 
described in detail by Schulz et al.14 Herd information on Danish pig herds and movement data from 1st 
January 2006 to 31st December 2015 were used as the basis for modelling. 
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Figure 1. Structure of the LA-MRSA spread simulation model (adapted from Schulz et al.14). The original structure is 
enhanced by four potential control strategies (dark grey ellipses).  
Within-herd spread was simulated using a three-compartment SIS model with different transmission 
rates within the three compartments of sows, weaners and finishers, and with high- and low-risk 
transmission routes between these compartments (Table 1). PERT distributions with higher minimum, 
mode and maximum values were used for herds using high-risk antibiotics. A stochastic and time-discrete 
simulation process was implemented to mimic spontaneous recovery from LA-MRSA (i.e. colonised pigs 
could randomly be cleared of LA-MRSA at any time, according to pre-defined cure rates). 
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Table 1. Assumed values for a PERT distribution to define herd-specific transmission rates based on the use of high-risk 
antibiotics, adapted by Broens et al.15 The original table was presented in Schulz et al.14 
Use of high-risk 
antibiotics  
Within-
compartment 
transmission 
rate  
Low-risk 
between-
compartment 
transmission rate  
High-risk 
between-
compartment 
transmission rate  
no  min = 0.111  
max = 0.856  
mode = 0.307  
min = 0.00175  
max = 0.00301  
mode = 0.00233  
min = 0.07184  
max = 0.48155  
mode = 0.18301  
yes  min = 0.211 
max = 2.924 
mode = 0.784 
min = 0.00330  
max = 0.01029 
mode = 0.00583  
min = 0.13689  
max = 1.64515  
mode = 0.46796  
 
Between-herd spread was modelled via two routes: direct and indirect contact among pig herds. Direct 
transmissions were modelled using data on animal movements registered in the Central Husbandry 
Register (CHR)16. Registered movements among herds were used directly in the model. In the original 
model, the number of registered sows, weaners and finishers and the number of positive pigs in each of 
these compartments was recorded for each herd during the simulation. Each pig movement record 
consisted of the date of the movement, the number of pigs moved (batch size) and the types of pigs 
moved out of the sending herd and into the receiving herd (i.e. sows, weaners or finishers could be moved 
out of the sending herd and sows, weaners or finishers could be moved into the receiving herd). Pig 
movements were modelled as follows:  
(1) If the sending herd was negative for LA-MRSA (i.e. the number of positive pigs was zero in each of 
the three compartments), no pigs were moved because transmission was not possible, and herd 
sizes were kept constant during each simulated year. 
(2) If the sending herd was LA-MRSA positive, the number of LA-MRSA-positive pigs in the movement 
batch was calculated based on the prevalence of the sending herd (i.e. if the sending herd had a 
within-herd prevalence of 50%, the prevalence in the movement batch was also assumed to be 
50%). In the receiving herd, an increased prevalence was calculated based on the number of 
positive pigs in the receiving herd plus the number of positive pigs in the movement batch. 
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Indirect contact was mimicked as the transmission of LA-MRSA via humans visiting more than one pig 
herd per day and via trucks that collect pigs for slaughter from more than one herd on the same day. 
While data for the collection of pigs sent to the abattoir was available in the movement register and these 
were used to calculate herd-specific lambdas, herd-level data did not exist for visitors. This contact type 
was modelled as a Poisson distribution with the same mean (λ) for all indoor or outdoor herds (Table 2). 
The probability of infection via indirect contact with LA-MRSA-positive herds was modelled as a PERT 
distribution (Table 3). 
Table 2. Overview of simulation parameters and default values used in the LA-MRSA spread model developed by Schulz et 
al.
14
 Only those parameters related to transmission via indirect contact that varied in the presented study are shown. 
Variable name Default value Description Reference 
Modelling disease spread among herds 
Spread via indirect contact 
𝝀𝒊𝒏 0.256 Average daily probability of 
indirect contact originating from 
an LA-MRSA-positive indoor herd 
Adjusted based on 
Boklund et al. (2013)17  
𝝀𝒐𝒖𝒕 0.1864 Average daily probability of 
indirect contact originating from 
an LA-MRSA-positive outdoor 
herd 
Adjusted based on 
Boklund et al. (2013)17 
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒊𝒏 PERT 
(min = 0.001,  
max = 0.01,  
mode = 
0.005071) 
Probability of infection via contact 
from an LA-MRSA-positive indoor 
herd 
Expert opinion 
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒕 PERT 
(min = 0.001,  
max = 0.01,  
mode = 
0.0035) 
Probability of infection via contact 
from an LA-MRSA-positive 
outdoor herd 
Expert opinion 
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒂 PERT 
(min = 0.001,  
max = 0.01,  
mode = 
0.004714) 
Probability of infection via 
abattoir movements 
Expert opinion 
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Table 3. Simulation parameters related to the probability of infection via contact from LA-MRSA-positive indoor and 
outdoor herds used in Schulz et al.
14
  
Variable 
name 
Default value Description 
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒊𝒏 PERT (min = 0.001, max = 0.01, mode = 
0.005071) 
Probability of infection via contact from 
an LA-MRSA-positive indoor herd 
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒕 PERT (min = 0.001, max = 0.01, mode = 
0.0035) 
Probability of infection via contact from 
an LA-MRSA-positive outdoor herd 
 
Herds at different addresses could be owned by the same farmer, and transmission among these pig 
herds was modelled to mimic the contact and potential transmission of LA-MRSA via shared workers or 
equipment. If a herd was positive for LA-MRSA, transmission was implemented among all herds owned by 
the same farmer. Therefore, the herd prevalence was calculated for the positive herd and a low-risk 
transmission rate was used for between-compartment transmission in order to model the spread between 
the positive herd to the sow (or weaner or finisher) section of the other herds owned by the same farmer 
(Table 1).     
In the original study by Schulz et al.14, 17 initialisation scenarios were simulated in which LA-MRSA was 
introduced to pig herds in 2006 and, depending on the scenario, further introductions followed in 
subsequent years. The predicted herd prevalence was compared to LA-MRSA screening results in 2008 
and 2014. We defined a new initialisation scenario for the introduction of LA-MRSA in the first years of the 
simulation period, aiming at a median herd prevalence between 60% and 70% in 2015. We selected 400 
production herds and 10 breeding and multiplier herds at random to be LA-MRSA positive in 2006. A 
second introduction was modelled in 2009, again by random selection of 400 production herds and 10 
breeding and multiplier herds positive for LA-MRSA. 
In the following scenarios, the predicted herd prevalence on 31st December 2012 was the basis for 
comparison among different control strategies. 
Control strategies  
To simulate different interventions and to evaluate their performance, the initial model developed by 
Schulz et al.14 was enhanced. Four control measures were simulated, either separately or in different 
combinations. All control measures were initiated on 1st January 2007 (initiation date) and continued until 
the end of the simulation. To investigate the effect of starting date, i.e. the effect of the initial prevalence 
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of MRSA-positive herds, all scenarios were also run with 1st January 2010 as the initiation date for the 
simulated control strategy. The results were measured as the prevalence of LA-MRSA-positive herds on 
31st December 2012 (for initialisation in 2007) and 31st December 2015 (for initialisation in 2010). This 
enabled us to compare the effects after a similar time period. If several control measures were combined, 
all control measures were initiated on the same date. In addition, this allowed us to quantify the effects of 
control measures under a higher initial LA-MRSA prevalence compared to the initial prevalence in 2007. 
The relative reduction was calculated as the proportion 𝑅𝑠 for each scenario 𝑠, calculated as: 
𝑅𝑠 =  
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑑 −̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑑
, 
with 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?  as the predicted median prevalence of scenario 𝑠  and 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑑  as the predicted median 
prevalence of the default scenario. 
Reduction of high-risk antibiotic use (AB) 
The model included information on the prescription of β-lactams or tetracycline at herd level (Schultz et 
al., 2014). Herds that received prescriptions for these antibiotics were modelled with higher within-herd 
transmission rates (value high-transmission) compared to herds that did not receive prescriptions (value 
low-transmission; Table 1). In the scenarios that used this control measure, 50% or 100% of herds that 
received prescriptions for high-risk antibiotics on the initiation date were randomly chosen. From the 
initiation date until the end of the simulation period, cessation of high-risk antimicrobial use was 
simulated by changing the within-herd dynamics of these herds using transmission rates for herds that did 
not use high-risk antibiotics.  
Reduced probability for indirect transmission via humans (ProbIT) 
In scenarios using this control measure, we reduced the minimum, maximum and mode value of the 
default PERT distributions by 50% or 75% in all herds Table 3).  
Movement restriction (MR) 
To limit the spread of LA-MRSA via pig movements, a potential control option would be to prohibit 
movements from LA-MRSA-positive to LA-MRSA-negative herds. In this case, the status of the herds must 
be known. We enhanced the initial model by simulating periodic LA-MRSA screenings within the herds. 
Testing was simulated by nasal swabs with a sensitivity of 78% and a specificity of 99.9%18. We randomly 
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assigned test results to the simulated herds based on assumed test characteristics of the true status of the 
herds on the day of an LA-MRSA screening.  
For all movements, we then checked the following cases:  
1. If the sending herd had a negative test result, pigs were moved according to the movement data. 
2. If the sending and receiving herds were simulated to have positive test results, pigs were also 
moved according to the movement data. 
3. If the sending herd had a positive test result, but the receiving herd had a negative test result, we 
assumed that the pigs were moved to another LA-MRSA-positive herd. For all LA-MRSA-positive 
herds, we checked for a potential new receiver of the same herd category (dependent on the 
number of registered sows, weaners and finishers) and randomly selected one, if available. If there 
were no potential new receivers, we assumed that the pigs were exported and therefore 
disregarded the movement. 
We ran two scenarios to mimic movement restrictions: testing all herds once per year and testing all 
herds four times per year. We assumed that all herds were tested on the same day. 
Voluntary eradication (Erad) 
Mimicking an eradication process (i.e., depopulation followed by cleaning and disinfection) also required 
testing the herds, as only herds testing positive for LA-MRSA would initiate an eradication programme. We 
assumed that 7.5% of the breeding and multiplier herds and 5% of all other herd types would begin 
eradication after testing positive for LA-MRSA. These herds were chosen randomly out of all breeding and 
multiplier (other herds) that tested positive for LA-MRSA. The eradication process lasted between 168 and 
378 simulation days, depending on the production type of the herd (Table 4). These values were based on 
experience of previous eradication programmes performed in Danish pig herds (personal communication, 
Finn Udesen – SEGES, Danish Agriculture & Food Council). During this time period, no movements (either 
in or out) were performed. We ignored these movements, assuming that the herd did not send pigs to 
other herds, except for slaughter or culling. Moreover, we assumed that the herd would have been 
restocked with LA-MRSA-negative pigs. As soon as the eradication period ended, registered in-coming and 
out-going movements were modelled as implemented in the original model. We ran this control measure 
assuming that herds would be screened for LA-MRSA once per year. When voluntary eradication was 
combined with movement restrictions based on testing all herds four times per year, herds were sampled 
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four times per year as well as at the start of the eradication process. An upper limit of 25% of all registered 
breeding and multiplier herds was set. If this limit was exceeded, no additional breeding and multiplier 
herds initiated eradication. No limit was set for other herd types. 
Table 4. Assumed duration of the eradication process, dependent on herd categories based on the registered number of 
sows and finishers.  
Production type Description Assumed duration of  
eradication process 
Sow herd < 5 finishers per sow 266 days 
Integrated herd 5-7.7 finishers per sow 378 days 
Finisher herd > 7.5 finishers per sow 168 days 
 
All control strategies were added to the original model individually and combined in all possible 
combinations. 
Simulation modelling and graphical presentation of results were performed in R version 3.2.2 - "Fire 
Safety"19. Like the original model, all simulations were run with 500 iterations to cover any extra variability 
in the different scenarios. 
RESULTS 
The default initialisation scenario without control measures led to a predicted median herd prevalence 
of 47% on 31st December 2012 and 62% on 31st December 2015 (Table 5a). On 1st January 2007, the 
median prevalence was 4% [90% prediction interval: 3% - 7%]. Control strategies with this initiation date 
are presented in Table 5a. No reduction in median prevalence was observed when the number of herds 
using high-risk antibiotics was reduced by 50% (Table 5a, Scenario 1.1: AB (50%)). However, a relative 
reduction of 38% was observed if all herds reduced the use of high-risk antibiotics (Table 5a, Scenario 1.2: 
AB (100%)). Furthermore, these scenarios showed larger variation compared to the default scenario. 
Reducing the probability of effective indirect contact from LA-MRSA-positive herds by 50% or 75% 
(Scenarios 1.3 and 1.4: ProbIT (75%) and ProbIT (100%)) led to reductions in the median prevalence to 
37% and 31%, respectively (Table 5a). Movement restrictions did not lead to a reduction in the predicted 
median prevalence when it was based on testing herds once per year (Table 5a, Scenario 1.5: MR 
(1/year)), while a relative reduction of 22% was observed when movement restrictions were based on four 
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yearly screenings (Table 5a, Scenario 1.6: MR (4/year)). Voluntary eradication (Scenario 1.7: Erad (1/year)) 
led to a limited reduction in the median prevalence to 43%. 
Table 5a. Predicted median prevalence of the default scenario and the four individual control measures 6 years after 
initiation of the control programme. The scenario acronyms are described in the main text. 
Scenario ID Scenario  
acronym 
Predicted median herd  
prevalence in % on  
31st December 2012 with 
initialisation of control on 
1st January 2007 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
Predicted median herd  
prevalence in % on  
31st December 2015 with 
initialisation of control on 
1st January 2010 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
No control measures   
0 Default  47 [42 - 52] 62 [59 - 65] 
   
Single control measures   
1.1 AB (50%) 47 [30 - 61] (0%) 59 [46 - 70] (6%) 
1.2 AB (100%) 29 [13 - 44] (38%) 48 [26 - 60] (24%) 
1.3 ProbIT (50%) 37 [31 - 43] (21%) 57 [52 - 60] (9%) 
1.4 ProbIT (75%) 31 [26 - 37] (33%) 53 [48 - 57] (15%) 
1.5 MR (1/year) 47 [43 - 53] (0%) 63 [60 - 66] (-1%) 
1.6 MR (4/year) 37 [32 - 42] (22%) 55 [51 - 58] (12%) 
1.7 Erad (1/year) 43 [38 - 49] (8%) 59 [55 - 62] (6%) 
 
In the next step, we combined two control scenarios. We observed an additive effect that was slightly 
larger when the combination included a reduction in high-risk antibiotic use in all herds (Table 5b, 
Scenarios 2.6-2.10). The variance increased in all scenarios that included the reduction of high-risk 
antibiotics. The lowest median herd prevalence (15%) was found when reduced high-risk antibiotic use in 
100% of the herds was combined with a 75% reduction in the probability of effective indirect contact from 
LA-MRSA-positive herds (Table 5b, Scenario 2.7). 
The combination of three control measures led to a maximum reduction in the simulated median 
prevalence to 10% herd prevalence when the reduction of high-risk antibiotics in all herds, movement 
restrictions based on four tests per year, and voluntary eradication scenarios were combined (Table 5c, 
Scenario 3.16). In 14 of 20 scenarios, the relative reduction was higher than 50%.  
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Table 5b. Predicted median prevalence of the default scenario and a combination of two control measures 6 years after the initiation of the control 
programme. The scenario acronyms are described in the main text. 
Scenario ID Scenario acronym Predicted median herd  
prevalence in %   
on 31st December 2012, 
initialisation of control on 
1st January 2007 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
Predicted median herd  
prevalence in %  
on 31st December 2015, 
initialisation of control on 
1st January 2010 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
Combination of two control measures   
2.1 AB (50%) ProbIT (50%) 36 [22 - 49] (24%) 52 [39 - 64] (16%) 
2.2 ProbIT (75%) 30 [17 - 42] (37%) 49 [36 - 60] (22%) 
2.3 MR (1/year) 47 [30 - 61] (0%) 59 [48 - 70] (5%) 
2.4 MR (4/year) 35 [22 - 50] (25%) 51 [38 - 63] (17%) 
2.5 Erad (1/year) 42 [26 - 56] (10%) 55 [41 - 67] (12%) 
2.6 AB (100%) ProbIT (50%) 22 [11 - 35] (54%) 41 [23 - 55] (34%) 
2.7 ProbIT (75%) 15 [7 - 26] (68%) 38 [22 - 50] (40%) 
2.8 MR (1/year) 30 [15 - 46] (36%) 48 [28 - 63] (22%) 
2.9 MR (4/year) 21 [9 - 33] (56%) 38 [20 - 50] (39%) 
2.10 Erad (1/year) 26 [11 - 40] (45%) 41 [24 - 57] (34%) 
2.11 ProbIT (50%) MR (1/year) 38 [32 - 43] (19%) 58 [53 - 61] (8%) 
2.12 MR (4/year) 28 [23 - 33] (41%) 49 [44 - 53] (22%) 
2.13 Erad (1/year) 33 [28 - 39] (29%) 52 [48 - 56] (16%) 
2.14 ProbIT (75%) MR (1/year) 32 [27 - 39] (31%) 54 [49 - 58] (14%) 
2.15 MR (4/year) 23 [19 - 29] (50%) 45 [40 - 49] (28%) 
2.16 Erad (1/year) 28 [23 - 34] (41%) 48 [42 - 52] (24%) 
2.17 MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 29 [25 - 34] (37%) 46 [42 - 49] (26%) 
2.18 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 21 [18 - 25] (55%) 36 [32 - 40] (42%) 
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Table 5c. Predicted median prevalence of the default scenario and a combination of three control measures 6 years after the initiation of the control 
programme. The scenario acronyms are described in the main text. 
Scenario ID Scenario acronym Predicted median herd  
prevalence in %   
on 31st December 2012 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
Predicted median herd 
prevalence in %  
on 31st December 2015 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
Combination of three control measures   
3.1 AB (50%)  ProbIT (50%) MR (1/year) 36 [22 - 49] (23%) 53 [40 - 65] (14%) 
3.2 MR (4/year) 26 [16 - 38] (44%) 44 [32 - 56] (29%) 
3.3 Erad (1/year) 32 [19 - 46] (31%) 48 [34 - 61] (23%) 
3.4 ProbIT (75%) MR (1/year) 32 [20 - 43] (33%) 50 [38 - 61] (20%) 
3.5 MR (4/year) 21 [13 - 33] (55%) 40 [28 - 50] (36%) 
3.6 Erad (1/year) 26 [15 - 38] (44%) 44 [31 - 55] (30%) 
3.7 MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 29 [18 - 41] (39%) 42 [32 - 53] (32%) 
3.8 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 20 [11 - 31] (57%) 32 [21 - 42] (48%) 
3.9 AB (100%)  ProbIT (50%) MR (1/year) 22 [10 - 35] (53%) 42 [25 - 56] (32%) 
3.10 MR (4/year) 15 [7 - 25] (68%) 33 [14 - 44] (48%) 
3.11 Erad (1/year) 38 [32 - 43] (61%) 35 [20 - 49] (43%) 
3.12 ProbIT (75%) MR (1/year) 19 [7 - 30] (59%) 38 [22 - 49] (39%) 
3.13 MR (4/year) 13 [6 - 22] (72%) 29 [16 - 39] (53%) 
3.14 Erad (1/year) 15 [5 - 26] (68%) 31 [16 - 43] (50%) 
3.15 MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 16 [8 - 28] (65%) 30 [15 - 41] (52%) 
3.16 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 10 [4 - 18] (79%) 21 [10 - 31] (67%) 
3.17 ProbIT (50%) MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 21 [17 - 25] (55%) 39 [34 - 42] (38%) 
3.18 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 15 [12 - 17] (69%) 29 [25 - 33] (53%) 
3.19 ProbIT (75%) MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 17 [14 - 21] (64%) 34 [29 - 39] (46%) 
3.20 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 12 [9 - 14] (75%) 25 [21 - 29] (60%) 
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Combining all four control measures showed the highest potential to reduce the simulated prevalence 
compared to the default scenario (Table 5d). The smallest median prevalence was estimated at 6% (90% 
prediction interval: 2% - 10%) and was observed with the combination of antibiotic reduction in all herds, 
a 75% reduction in the probability of effective indirect transmission via humans, movement restrictions 
based on testing all herds four times per year and voluntary eradication (Table 5d, Scenario 4.8). LA-MRSA 
was not cleared from all simulated herds following the set-up of control measures in any of the simulation 
scenarios. 
Simulating control measure initiation on 1st January 2010 led to comparable tendencies in the effects of 
single interventions and combinations of the tested control options. The median prevalence on the 
initiation date was 21% [90% prediction interval: 18% - 34%]. In all scenarios, the predicted herd 
prevalence was higher when control was initiated in 2010, compared to the scenarios with an initiation 
date of 1st January 2007 (Tables 5a-d). The smallest median herd prevalence 6 years after initiation in 2010 
was 13% (90% prediction interval: 5% - 19%), compared to 6% (90% prediction interval: 2% - 10%) for 
controls initiated in 2007 in the scenario combining all four control measures (Scenario 4.8). Initiating 
control measures in 2007 generally led to higher relative reduction rates than the same control strategy 
started in 2010 (Tables 5a-d). However, reduction rates were still fairly high when the combination of four 
control measures was initiated in 2010.  
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Table 5d. Predicted median prevalence of the default scenario and the combination of four control measures 6 years after the initiation of the control 
programme. The scenario acronyms are described in the main text. 
Scenario ID Scenario acronym Predicted median herd  
prevalence in %   
on 31st December 2012 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
Predicted median herd 
prevalence in %  
on 31st December 2015 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
Combination of four control measures   
4.1 AB (50%) ProbIT (50%) MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 20 [12 - 30] (56%) 34 [24 - 44] (45%) 
4.2 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 13 [8 - 22] (72%) 25 [16 - 34] (61%) 
4.3 AB (50%) ProbIT (75%) MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 16 [9 - 24] (65%) 30 [21 - 38] (53%) 
4.4 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 11 [6 - 16] (77%) 21 [13 - 30] (66%) 
4.5 AB (100%) ProbIT (50%) MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 11 [5 - 19] (77%) 23 [14 - 33] (62%) 
4.6 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 7 [3 - 13] (86%) 16 [6 - 24] (74%) 
4.7 AB (100%) ProbIT (75%) MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 9 [5 - 15] (80%) 21 [11 - 29] (66%) 
4.8 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 6 [2 -10] (86%) 13 [5 - 19] (79%) 
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Figure 2 shows the development of the predicted LA-MRSA herd prevalence for the default scenario 
(Scenario: 0), and for the scenario with the highest reduction in LA-MRSA herd prevalence (Scenario: 4.8) 
for both of the control strategy initiation dates. 
 
 
Figure 2. Predicted LA-MRSA herd prevalence over the whole study period from 1st January 2006 to 31st December 2015 
for the following three scenarios: (1) Default (blue), (2) Scenario 4.8 (AB (100%) + ProbIT (75%) + MR (4/year) + Erad 
(4/year)) for control measures starting on 1st January 2007 (green), and (3) Scenario 4.8 for control measures starting on 
1st January 2010 (red). Dark lines represent the predicted median herd prevalence, the light dashed areas represent the 
90% prediction interval. The scenario acronyms are described in the main text. 
DISCUSSION 
LA-MRSA spread among Danish pig herds was modelled using four potential control options. The results 
showed that initiating intensive and combined control measures in 2007 would have led to a slower 
increase in the LA-MRSA herd prevalence (Tables 5a-d). In particular, the combination of all four 
implemented control measures showed the potential to limit the spread among pig herds. Nevertheless, 
LA-MRSA was not cleared from all herds during the study period for any of the tested scenarios. Initiating 
control measures in 2010 also showed a reduction in the predicted herd prevalence of LA-MRSA. 
However, the relative reductions were smaller when compared to simulating the start of control in 2007 
(Table 6). 
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Reducing the use of high-risk antibiotics such as β-lactams and tetracycline has been shown to reduce 
transmission rates for the within-herd spread of LA-MRSA15. We found that reducing the proportion of 
herds using high-risk antibiotics had a limiting effect on the between-herd spread of LA-MRSA. This might 
be related to the lower within-herd prevalence and thus to a lower risk of LA-MRSA transmission among 
herds. Our results correspond to the findings of Sørensen et al.20, who used a mechanistic simulation 
model to show that reducing antimicrobial consumption reduced the prevalence of LA-MRSA within a 
farrow-to-finisher herd, but that bacteria was not eradicated. Reducing the within-herd prevalence would 
reduce the probability of infection following contact with a susceptible herd, leading to a reduction in the 
between-herd prevalence. However, as the transmission rate is not zero after a reduction in the use of 
high-risk antibiotics15, the pathogen can still spread and hence eradication did not occur.  
All scenarios that included a reduction of high-risk antibiotics led to increased variance in the predicted 
prevalence on 31st December 2015. Low transmission rates might have led to a higher number of herds in 
which LA-MRSA faded out after introduction. More precisely, LA-MRSA might have been cleared from pigs 
after the introduction of control measures and before transmission within or between the compartments 
occurred. This effect might therefore have reduced the spread of LA-MRSA among pig herds and resulted 
in lower predicted herd prevalences. On the other hand, if LA-MRSA was established in a pig herd, the 
within-herd prevalence reached a similar level to that of herds using high-risk antibiotics14, meaning that 
the spread from these herds to other herds was not affected. This might explain the larger variation in 
herd prevalence at the end of the study period compared to the default scenario. 
Reducing the probability of indirect LA-MRSA transmission among pig herds could be interpreted as 
biosecurity measures for humans visiting more than one herd on the same day. This control measure also 
showed a limiting effect on the between-herd spread (Table 2). Humans visiting a pig herd could carry LA-
MRSA for a period of a few hours up to 2 days21. Regulations to ensure that farm visitors (veterinarians, 
advisors, technicians, guests) wear masks might help to lower the risk of transmission of LA-MRSA to 
another farm21.  
Although pig movements might play a role in the transmission of LA-MRSA among pig herds10,11,14,22, 
movement restrictions only seemed to lead to a marginal reduction in herd prevalence. Additionally, it 
would be necessary to test all herds to ensure that this intervention was effective. This would require 
logistical and financial resources that might not be reasonable in relation to the effects predicted by the 
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model. In addition, there is no perfect method for testing herds for LA-MRSA; in the current model, a 
sensitivity of 78% and a specificity of 100% were used. Despite the high specificity of the available tests18, 
the sensitivity is relatively low, leading to many false negative results. False-negative herds may jeopardise 
the movement restrictions and might be responsible for the low effectiveness of this strategy.  
Eradication (i.e., depopulation followed by cleaning and disinfection) of LA-MRSA in herds that test 
positive for LA-MRSA could be an option to reduce the herd prevalence. We assumed that only small 
proportions of herds that tested positive for LA-MRSA would initiate an eradication programme. 
Depopulation and re-stocking large proportions of pig herds might lead to ethical and economic issues. In 
Norway, where the prevalence of LA-MRSA was low, eradication at herd level helped to limit the spread of 
LA-MRSA on a national level23. Voluntary eradication only marginally reduced the prevalence. However, 
eradication without the combination of movement restrictions poses the risk of re-introduction, especially 
when the herd prevalence is high, which might explain the low effectiveness of this control measure. In 
contrast, voluntary eradication combined with movement restrictions based on four tests per year led to 
one of the largest reductions in the predicted herd prevalence. This example highlights how intensive 
control measures might have had reduced the spread of LA-MRSA in Denmark. However, increasing the 
proportion of herds to be eradicated might be unrealistic as it would affect Danish pig production and lead 
to substantial economic losses24. 
The effects of eradication on the herd prevalence are highly dependent on the proportion of herds that 
initiate an eradication process. Cost-benefit analyses must be included in the decision process when 
setting up control programmes that involve eradication efforts. In addition, the risk of re-introduction 
must be taken into account, for example by combining eradication with movement restrictions to 
minimise this risk. The role of environmental contamination in the spread of LA-MRSA has not yet been 
conclusively determined and therefore might influence the effectiveness of control programmes. 
Herds initiating the voluntary eradication process were chosen randomly. It is therefore possible that 
herds registering no or only a few out-going contacts might have been selected. Prioritising herds with a 
high number of out-going movements or with a large out-going contact chain might increase the effects of 
the eradication process, as clearing these herds would prevent more herds from receiving LA-MRSA via 
animal movements.   
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For simplicity, we assumed that all herds were tested on the same day when the herd LA-MRSA status 
was established. In reality, herds would be tested within a certain time period (of 3 months or 1 year). This 
could influence the effect of movement restrictions and voluntary eradication as varying the time points at 
which LA-MRSA-positive herds are identified might result in control measures starting later, and 
transmission would still be possible until initiation of the eradication process.  
We assumed that the control measures initialised in 2007 did not influence the second wave of LA-MRSA 
introduction in randomly chosen herds in 2009. Despite phylogenetic analysis confirming several 
introductions of LA-MRSA to Denmark25, the route of these introductions is still unknown. The effect of 
control measures on new introductions could therefore not be estimated. For example, LA-MRSA-positive 
workers could have introduced LA-MRSA in new herds, as described in Norway23. This route of 
introduction was not necessarily covered by the implemented control measures, depending on how a 
worker would carry the bacteria into a herd. As a result, introduction was still assumed to be possible, 
even under the implemented control measures. 
We compared the effects of control measures starting on 1st January 2007 and 1st January 2010, and 
found that the early initialisation of control measures led to a larger reduction in the predicted herd 
prevalence on 31st December 2012 compared to 31st December 2015 (Tables 5a-d). This may not be 
surprising, as disease control in 2007 started at a lower herd prevalence compared to initialisation in 2010 
(Figure 2). However, starting the control measures in 2010 still led to reasonably high relative reduction 
rates (Tables 5a-d), despite an initial prevalence of 21%. The prevalence in 2016 was substantially higher 
at 88%3. Therefore, the effectiveness of these strategies from a high initial prevalence should be 
investigated to understand which measures or combinations could be useful in a situation with a very high 
prevalence, such as the current Danish situation. However, this would require a different approach to 
modelling animal movements, as data on registered animal movements are only available retrospectively. 
We therefore emphasise the importance of a region/country with a new introduction of LA-MRSA 
controlling/eradicating it immediately in order to prevent an endemic situation with a high prevalence.  
Combinations of control measures reduced the spread of LA-MRSA, especially when all four strategies 
were combined. Using an extreme scenario including limiting the use of high-risk antibiotics, reducing the 
risk of spread via indirect contact by 75%, implementing movement restriction and culling a percentage of 
positive herds led to a prevalence reduction to only 6% with initiation in 2007 or 13% in 2010. This clearly 
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shows that control of LA-MRSA can be achieved without culling all infected herds. However, it requires 
extreme measures, willingness from the industry and rigour in implementing these measures, otherwise 
high relative reduction rates might not be reached. In addition, it is important to initiate control measures 
as early as possible, as the effects are higher if the herd prevalence is still low. 
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1. NETWORK ANALYSIS (MANUSCRIPT I) 
A variety of static and dynamic network analysis tools are available for investigating animal trade 
networks69. Manuscript I (Chapter 3.1) focused on a general description of the investigated pig movement 
network, loyalty patterns and the size of out-going contact chains of the different holding types registered 
in the CHR during the study period from 1st January 2006 to 31st December 2015. 
A decrease in the number but increase in the size of holdings was observed during the considered time 
period. The frequency of movements decreased over time, which is likely to be related to the decreasing 
number of active holdings. 
The frequency of contact with other holdings was influenced by the registered holding type. In 
addition, the holding type of the receiving herd was influenced by the holding type of the sender. These 
influences reflect the pyramidal structure of the Danish pig industry. 
Clear loyalty patterns for different holding types were observed, yet there was also variability among 
holdings of the same type. Weaner herds showed the highest level of in-loyalty. Boar stations and 
production herds were characterised by a high level of out-loyalty. 
The giant strongly connected components (GSCCs) included less than 1% of active holdings, mainly 
production herds. This indicated fewer horizontal connections in the pig production pyramid. 
All production sites showed low levels of incoming contact chains. A high level of out-going contact 
chain was observed for breeding and multiplier herds, reflecting the fact that these herds form the top of 
the production pyramid and thus pose a higher potential risk of spreading a disease throughout the entire 
pig trade network. 
Holdings combining a low/intermediate out-loyalty and a high level of out-going contact chain might 
have a higher risk of spreading disease. This combination was shown in breeding and multiplier herds, and 
once a pathogen is introduced, the risk of spreading the pathogen along the production line is expected to 
be high. However, breeding and multiplier herds have high levels of biosecurity and the introduction of 
pathogens might therefore be lower compared to other herd types. 
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4.2. SIMULATION MODELLING (MANUSCRIPT II) 
4.2.1. ADDITIONAL RESULTS  
To investigate the impact of each of the modelled transmission routes (animal movements, indirect 
contact via humans, abattoir movements and shared ownership of herds) on the spread of LA-MRSA, we 
calculated the proportion of each transmission route. Figure 1 shows these proportions for the default 
scenario presented in Manuscript II (Chapter 3.2). Animal movements were responsible for around 74% of 
the transmissions (newly affected herds) in our model. Indirect contact, which was shown to be essential 
in mimicking the rapid increase of LA-MRSA-positive herds in Denmark, was responsible for around 20% of 
transmissions (newly affected herds). Abattoir movements (around 5%) and transmission between herds 
with the same owner (around 1%) are predicted to play a minor role in the spread of LA-MRSA. 
Halving or doubling the frequency of indirect contact or the probability of an effective transmission from 
an LA-MRSA-positive indoor or outdoor herd led to comparable results in the proportions of the four 
modelled transmission pathways. Halving (doubling) the parameters led to an increase (decrease) in the 
median proportion of transmissions via pig movements to around 81% (65%, Figure  2). In both cases, pig 
movements constitute the largest proportion of LA-MRSA transmissions in the model. 
Halving (doubling) the probability of infection via abattoir movements led to an increase (decrease) of 
2% in the median proportion of transmissions via animal movements (Figure 3). 
Pig movements were shown to be the transmission route with the highest proportion of transmissions 
among pig herds, irrespective of the scenario considered (Figures 1-3). 
4.2.2. DISCUSSION  
Livestock movements have been discussed as a driving factor in the transmission of LA-MRSA among pig 
herds, and a simulation model was therefore developed to mimic the LA-MRSA situation in Denmark 
between January 2006 and December 2015. Scenarios were modelled to simulate the spread via pig 
movements alone, as well as combined with indirect transmissions via humans, abattoir movements and 
between herds with the same owner. Several initialisation scenarios were run, as the exact time of the 
introduction to Denmark and therefore the true status in 2006 was unknown. 
In the simulation model, breeding and multiplier herds played a key role in the initialisation process. LA-
MRSA was initialised in only one to five breeding and multiplier herds in 2006, but more than 100 
production herds were necessary to reach a similar herd prevalence at the end of the study period. 
Additionally, LA-MRSA was also introduced in later years in several scenarios to reflect unknown 
introductions. Sieber et al.84 described three main clones of LA-MRSA circulating in Denmark, which were 
introduced at different time points. We aimed to demonstrate a new introduction in 2009 by choosing a 
scenario with initialisation in 2006 and 2009 as a default. These new introductions represented 
introductions from unknown sources, such as from newly employed workers carrying LA-MRSA and 
transmitting the pathogen to pigs53. 
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FIGURE 1. Proportion of modelled transmissions (newly affected herds) of LA-MRSA: (1) via pig movements (Movements 
- grey), (2) via indirect transmissions via humans from indoor and outdoor herds (Indirect - green), (3) related to abattoir 
movements (Abattoir - orange), and (4) between herds with the same owner via shared workers or equipment (SW - blue). 
The lines represent the median of 500 simulation repetitions; the hatched area represents the 90% prediction interval. 
 
The model results showed that pig movements alone were not sufficient to mimic the rapid increase of 
LA-MRSA-positive herds in Denmark (Manuscript II). However, even extensive initialisation in 2006, as well 
as in 2006 and 2009 was not sufficient to mimic the situation in Danish pig herds. Adding indirect contact 
showed that the model was able to mimic the observed trend in LA-MRSA prevalence in Denmark. 
However, in these scenarios, the predicted herd prevalence in 2008 was higher than the LA-MRSA 
screening results. Scenarios that involved doubling the frequency or probability of effective indirect 
transmission via humans showed a similar trend to that observed in Denmark during the study period. 
Results of the simulation models are dependent on the model parameters used. While on the one hand 
there is literature available regarding parameters like transmission rates in pig herds, there is a lack of 
knowledge relating to other parameters essential to the model development process. An example is the 
lack of details on the effectiveness of transmission via indirect contact. An extensive sensitivity analysis 
was performed to investigate the influence of uncertain parameters. This sensitivity analysis highlighted 
the influence of the within-herd prevalence and the frequency and effectiveness of indirect transmission 
via humans as key parameters for the spread of LA-MRSA among herds. This highlights the need for more 
research to improve our understanding of the dynamics of LA-MRSA within pig herds and the role of 
humans in its spread, in order to develop an effective control strategy for LA-MRSA at a national level. 
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Assuming homogeneous mixing in small herds did not influence the predicted herd prevalence. It is likely 
that small herds have the same characteristics as hobby herds in terms of trade contacts. In general, they 
have few trade contacts and might therefore play a minor role in the spread of LA-MRSA. 
Varying the parameters related to environmental re-introduction of LA-MRSA to negative herds that 
were previously LA-MRSA positive also did not influence the predicted herd prevalence. However, we have 
little knowledge about environmental transmission, so the effect could be influenced by the method of 
implementation. More knowledge about the impact of the environment is therefore needed to draw 
accurate conclusions about its effects. 
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FIGURE 2. Proportions of modelled transmissions (newly affected herds) of LA-MRSA in four scenarios run in the framework of the sensitivity analysis: 
(a+c) halved and doubled frequencies of indirect contact from an LA-MRSA-positive indoor or outdoor herd and (b+d) halved and doubled probabilities 
of infection via contact from an LA-MRSA-positive indoor or outdoor herd. The lines represent the median of 500 simulation repetitions; the hatched 
area represents the 90% prediction interval. 
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FIGURE 3. Proportion of modelled transmissions (newly affected herds) of LA-MRSA: (1) via pig movements (Movements - grey), (2) via indirect 
transmission via humans from indoor and outdoor herds (Indirect - green), (3) related to abattoir movements (Abattoir - orange) and (4) between herds 
with the same owner via shared workers or equipment (SW - blue). The lines represent the median of 500 simulation repetitions; the hatched area 
represents the 90% prediction interval. 
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4.3. MODELLING CONTROL MEASURES (MANUSCRIPT III) 
4.3.1. ADDITIONAL RESULTS  
4.3.1.1.  PREDICTED HERD PREVALENCE ON 31 S T  DECEMBER 2015 
All scenarios presented in Manuscript III were run until 31st December 2015. If control measures were 
implemented individually, an increase in the predicted median herd prevalence could be observed from 
2012 to 2015 in all scenarios (Table 1a). The relative reduction compared to the default scenario without 
control measures decreased, except for the scenario with reduced antibiotic usage in 50% of the herds 
(Scenario 1.1). 
TABLE 1A. Predicted median prevalence on 31
st
 December 2012 and 31
st
 December 2015 for the default scenario 
presented in Manuscript III. All control measures were implemented individually. 
Scenario ID Scenario acronym Predicted median herd  
prevalence in %   
on 31
st
 December 2012* 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
Predicted median herd  
prevalence in %  
on 31
st
 December 2015 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
No control measures   
0 Default  47 [42 - 52] 62 [59 - 65] 
   
Single control measures   
1.1 AB (50%) 47 [30 - 61] (0%) 60 [46 - 70] (4%) 
1.2 AB (100%) 29 [13 - 44] (38%) 42 [16 - 59] (32%) 
1.3 ProbIT (50%) 37 [31 - 43] (21%) 55 [50 - 59] (12%) 
1.4 ProbIT (75%) 31 [26 - 37] (33%) 48 [42 - 53] (23%) 
1.5 MR (1/year) 47 [43 - 53] (0%) 62 [59 - 65] (0%) 
1.6 MR (4/year) 37 [32 - 42] (22%) 53 [50 - 57] (14%) 
1.7 Erad (1/year) 43 [38 - 49] (8%) 58 [54 - 61] (7%) 
* Results presented in Manuscript III 
Combining two control measures did not stop the increase of the herd prevalence between 2012 and 
2015 (Figure 4). The relative reduction observed in 2015 was lower compared to the relative reduction 
observed in 2012 in all scenarios except Scenarios 2.3 and 2.5, in which there was a slight increase (Table 
1b). When combining three control measures, we again found that the predicted herd prevalence 
increased at least slightly between 2012 and 2015 in all scenarios (Table 1c). 
When combining four control measures, the predicted herd prevalence remained constant in Scenario 
4.8 (Table 1d, Figure 5), while the relative reduction increased in Scenarios 4.4 - 4.8 (Table 1d). 
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FIGURE 4. Predicted LA-MRSA herd prevalence on 31
st
 December 2012 (light grey) and 31
st
 December 2015 (dark grey) for 
two combined control measures (scenario acronyms followed by scenario identification number). Control measures were 
set to start on 1
st
 January 2007. The scenario acronyms are explained in Manuscript III (Chapter 3.2). 
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TABLE 1B. Predicted median prevalence on 31
st
 December 2012 and 31
st
 December 2015 for the default scenario 
presented in Manuscript III. All combinations of two control measures were implemented. 
Scenario ID Scenario acronym Predicted median herd  
prevalence in %   
on 31
st
 December 2012* 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
Predicted median herd 
prevalence in %  
on 31
st
 December 2015 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
No control measures   
0 Default 47 [42 - 52] 62 [59 - 65] 
   
Combination of two control measures   
2.1 
AB (50%) 
ProbIT (50%) 36 [22 - 49] (24%) 52 [36 - 64] (17%) 
2.2 ProbIt (75%) 30 [17 - 42] (37%) 44 [29 - 59] (29%) 
2.3 MR (1/year) 47 [30 - 61] (0%) 60 [45 - 70] (4%) 
2.4 MR (4/year) 35 [22 - 50] (25%) 50 [33 - 62] (20%) 
2.5 Erad (1/year) 42 [26 - 56] (10%) 55 [39 - 66] (12%) 
2.6 
AB (100%) 
ProbIT (50%) 22 [11 - 35] (54%) 32 [14 - 47] (49%) 
2.7 ProbIT (75%) 15 [7 - 26] (68%) 22 [10 - 36] (64%) 
2.8 MR (1/year) 30 [15 - 46] (36%) 43 [20 - 58] (31%) 
2.9 MR (4/year) 21 [9 - 33] (56%) 32 [13 - 47] (49%) 
2.10 Erad (1/year) 26 [11 - 40] (45%) 36 [16 - 51] (42%) 
2.11 
ProbIT (50%) 
MR (1/year) 38 [32 - 43] (19%) 55 [50 - 58] (12%) 
2.12 MR (4/year) 28 [23 - 33] (41%) 44 [39 - 48] (30%) 
2.13 Erad (1/year) 33 [28 - 39] (29%) 49 [44 - 53] (21%) 
2.14 
ProbIT (75%) 
MR (1/year) 32 [27 - 39] (31%) 49 [43 - 54] (22%) 
2.15 MR (4/year) 23 [19 - 29] (50%) 38 [32 - 43] (40%) 
2.16 Erad (1/year) 28 [23 - 34] (41%) 42 [37 - 48] (32%) 
2.17 MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 29 [25 - 34] (37%) 43 [39 - 47] (31%) 
2.18 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 21 [18 - 25] (55%) 31 [28 - 35] (50%) 
* Results presented in Manuscript III 
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TABLE 1C. Predicted median prevalence on 31
st
 December 2012 and 31
st
 December 2015 for the default scenario presented in Manuscript III. All 
combinations of three control measures were implemented. 
Scenario ID Scenario acronym Predicted median herd  
prevalence in %   
on 31
st
 December 2012* 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
Predicted median herd 
prevalence in %  
on 31
st
 December 2015 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
No control measures   
0 Default 47 [42 - 52] 62 [59 - 65] 
   
Combination of three control measures   
3.1 
AB (50%)  
ProbIT (50%) 
MR (1/year) 36 [22 - 49] (23%) 51 [34 - 63] (17%) 
3.2 MR (4/year) 26 [16 - 38] (44%) 41 [26 - 53] (35%) 
3.3 Erad (1/year) 32 [19 - 46] (31%) 46 [29 - 60] (27%) 
3.4 
ProbIT (75%) 
MR (1/year) 32 [20 - 43] (33%) 46 [30 - 59] (26%) 
3.5 MR (4/year) 21 [13 - 33] (55%) 33 [20 - 48] (47%) 
3.6 Erad (1/year) 26 [15 - 38] (44%) 39 [24 - 52] (38%) 
3.7 MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 29 [18 - 41] (39%) 40 [26 - 52] (36%) 
3.8 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 20 [11 - 31] (57%) 28 [16 - 41] (55%) 
3.9 
AB (100%)  
ProbIT (50%) 
MR (1/year) 22 [10 - 35] (53%) 32 [13 - 47] (48%) 
3.10 MR (4/year) 15 [7 - 25] (68%) 22 [10 - 36] (64%) 
3.11 Erad (1/year) 38 [32 - 43] (61%) 26 [11 - 42] (58%) 
3.12 
ProbIT (75%) 
MR (1/year) 19 [7-30] (59%) 28 [12 - 42] (56%) 
3.13 MR (4/year) 13 [6 - 22] (72%) 19 [7 - 29] (70%) 
3.14 Erad (1/year) 15 [5 - 26] (68%) 21 [8 - 34] (67%) 
3.15 MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 16 [8 - 28] (65%) 23 [9 - 35] (63%) 
3.16 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 10 [4 - 18] (79%) 12 [4 - 22] (80%) 
3.17 
ProbIT (50%) 
MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 21 [17 - 25] (55%) 32 [28 - 36] (48%) 
3.18 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 15 [12 - 17] (69%) 21 [17 - 25] (66%) 
3.19 
ProbIT (75%) 
MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 17 [14 - 21] (64%) 25 [21 - 30] (59%) 
3.20 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 12 [9 - 14] (75%) 16 [13 - 20] (74%) 
* Results presented in Manuscript III 
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TABLE 1D. Predicted median prevalence on 31
st
 December 2012 and 31
st
 December 2015 for the default scenario presented in Manuscript III. All 
combinations of four control measures were implemented. 
Scenario ID Scenario acronym Predicted median herd  
prevalence in %   
on 31
st
 December 2012* 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
Predicted median herd 
prevalence in %  
on 31
st
 December 2015 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
No control measures   
0 Default 47 [42 - 52] 62 [59 - 65] 
   
Combination of four control measures   
4.1 
AB (50%) ProbIT (50%) 
MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 20 [12 - 30] (56%) 30 [18 - 42] (52%) 
4.2 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 13 [8 - 22] (72%) 18 [9 - 29] (71%) 
4.3 
AB (50%) ProbIT (75%) 
MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 16 [9 - 24] (65%) 23 [12 - 35] (62%) 
4.4 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 11 [6 - 16] (77%) 13 [7 - 22] (79%) 
4.5 
AB (100%) ProbIT (50%) 
MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 11 [5 - 19] (77%) 14 [5 - 24] (77%) 
4.6 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 7 [3 - 13] (86%) 8 [3 - 14] (88%) 
4.7 
AB (100%) ProbIT (75%) 
MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 9 [5 - 15] (80%) 12 [6 - 19] (81%) 
4.8 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 6 [2 -10] (86%) 6 [2 - 11] (91%) 
* Results presented in Manuscript III 
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FIGURE 5. Predicted LA-MRSA herd prevalence on 31
st
 December 2012 (light grey) and 31
st
 December 2015 (dark grey) for 
the combination of four control measures (scenario acronyms followed by scenario identification number). Control 
measures were set to start on 1
st
 January 2007. The scenario acronyms are explained in Manuscript III (Chapter 3.3).
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4.3.1.2.  ERADICATION OF HUBS  
Running all scenarios including the eradication process based on removing hubs led to a clear initial 
reduction in the LA-MRSA herd prevalence on 31st December 2012 compared to the scenarios run with 
random voluntary eradication (Table 2). The relative reduction increased for all scenarios. An 83% 
reduction in the predicted herd prevalence could be achieved with the combination of two control 
measures (Scenario: 2.18). The lowest predicted herd prevalence was 1% in a scenario combining all four 
control measures, including the eradication of hubs (Scenario: 4.8). 
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TABLE 2. Predicted median prevalence on 31
st
 December 2012 for all scenarios presented in Manuscript III, including random voluntary eradication and 
eradication of hubs. The median herd prevalence without control measures was predicted to be 47% [42% - 52%]. 
Scenario 
ID 
Scenario acronym Predicted median 
prevalence in %  
(random eradication*) 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
Predicted median  
prevalence in %  
(eradication of hubs) 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
Single control measures   
1.7 Erad (1/year) 43 [38 - 49] (8%) 33 [27 - 37] (31%) 
    
Combination of two control measures   
2.5 AB (50%) Erad (1/year) 42 [26 - 56] (10%) 33 [17 - 45] (31%) 
2.10 AB (100%) Erad (1/year) 26 [11 - 40] (45%) 15[6 - 28] (68%) 
2.13 ProbIT (50%) Erad (1/year) 33 [28 - 39] (29%) 23 [19 - 27] (52%) 
2.16 ProbIT (75%) Erad (1/year) 28 [23 - 34] (41%) 18 [15 - 22] (62%) 
2.17 MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 29 [25 - 34] (37%) 26 [22 - 30] (46%) 
2.18 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 21 [18 - 25] (55%) 8 [7 - 10] (83%) 
   
Combination of three control measures   
3.3 
AB (50%) 
ProbIT (50%) Erad (1/year) 32 [19 - 46] (31%) 21 [11 - 34] (54%) 
3.6 ProbIT (75%) Erad (1/year) 26 [15 - 38] (44%) 16 [8 - 27] (66%) 
3.7 MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 29 [18 - 41] (39%) 24 [13 - 36] (48%) 
3.8 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 20 [11 - 31] (57%) 8 [3 - 14] (84%) 
3.11 
AB (100%) 
ProbIT (50%) Erad (1/year) 38 [32 - 43] (61%) 11 [4 - 20] (77%) 
3.14 ProbIT (75%) Erad (1/year) 15 [5 - 26] (68%) 8 [3 - 15] (83%) 
3.15 MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 16 [8 - 28] (65%) 13 [5 - 22] (72%) 
3.16 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 10 [4 - 18] (79%) 3 [1 - 6] (94%) 
3.17 
ProbIT (50%) 
MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 21 [17 - 25] (55%) 18 [14 - 22] (62%) 
3.18 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 15 [12 - 17] (69%) 5 [4 - 6] (90%) 
3.19 
ProbIT (75%) 
MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 17 [14 - 21] (64%) 14 [11 - 17] (70%) 
3.20 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 12 [9 - 14] (75%) 4 [3 - 5] (92%) 
    
Combination of four control measures   
4.1 
AB (50%) ProbIT (50%) 
MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 20 [12 - 30] (56%) 17 [9 - 27] (64%) 
4.2 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 13 [8 - 22] (72%) 4 [2 - 8] (91%) 
4.3 
AB (50%) ProbIT (75%) 
MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 16 [9 - 24] (65%) 13 [7 - 20] (73%) 
4.4 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 11 [6 - 16] (77%) 3 [1 - 6] (93%) 
4.5 
AB (100%) ProbIT (50%) 
MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 11 [5 - 19] (77%) 9 [4 - 15] (82%) 
4.6 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 7 [3 - 13] (86%) 2 [1 - 4] (96%) 
4.7 
AB (100%) ProbIT (75%) 
MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 9 [5 - 15] (80%) 7 [3 - 12] (86%) 
4.8 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 6 [2 -10] (86%) 1 [1 - 3] (97%) 
* Results presented in Manuscript III
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4.3.1.3.  HIGH HERD PREVALENCE IN 2006 
Initialisation in 10,000 herds on 26th December 2006 led to a predicted median herd prevalence of 69% 
(90% prediction interval: 67% - 71%). 
When the model was run with each implemented control measure separately, the median herd 
prevalence on 31st December 2012 was higher in all scenarios that started with high prevalence in 2006 
compared to those with low herd prevalence in 2006 (Table Table 3a). The relative reduction for individual 
as well as for combinations of control measures decreased in almost all scenarios (exceptions: scenarios 
1.1, 1.5, 2.3, 2.5). However, all control measures showed at least a small reduction in the modelled herd 
prevalence 6 years after initialisation of LA-MRSA, even when they were implemented individually (Tables 
3a-d). 
Combining two control measures led to a greater reduction in the modelled herd prevalence on 31st 
December 2012 (Table 3b). The lowest median herd prevalence modelled was for the combination of 
movement restrictions based on testing the herds for LA-MRSA four times per year and voluntary 
eradication (median: 24%, 90% prediction interval: 23% - 26%). 
In the scenario where LA-MRSA was initialised with high herd prevalence in 2006, the combination of a 
reduction of high-risk antibiotic use in all herds, movement restrictions based on testing all herds for LA-
MRSA four times per year and voluntary eradication of hubs (Scenario 3.16h) showed the lowest predicted 
median herd prevalence (median 12%, 90% prediction interval: 6% - 18%, Table 3c). 
Combining all four control measures resulted in only a marginal additional reduction of herd prevalence 
on 31st December 2012 when starting with high herd prevalence in 2006, when compared to the lowest 
value reached in the combination of three control measures (Tables 3c-d). The lowest modelled herd 
prevalence was 8% (90% prediction interval: 3% - 10%) when a reduction in high-risk antibiotic use in all 
herds, a 75% reduction in the probability of indirect transmission via humans, movement restriction based 
on testing all herds for LA-MRSA four times per year and voluntary eradication were all combined 
(Scenario 4.8h). 
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TABLE  3A.  Predicted median prevalence on 31
st
 December 2012 for the default scenario presented in Manuscript III (low herd prevalence in 2006) and for 
a scenario with a high herd prevalence in 2006. All control measures were implemented individually. 
Scenario ID Scenario acronym Predicted median herd  
prevalence in %   
on 31
st
 December 2012 
(low herd prevalence in 2006*) 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
Predicted median herd 
prevalence in %  
on 31
st
 December 2012 
(high herd prevalence in 2006) 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
No control measures   
0 Default  47 [42 - 52] 69 [67 - 71] 
   
Single control measures   
1.1 AB (50%) 47 [30 - 61] (0%) 65 [55 - 74] (5%) 
1.2 AB (100%) 29 [13 - 44] (38%) 60 [38 - 69] (13%) 
1.3 ProbIT (50%) 37 [31 - 43] (21%) 67 [66 - 69] (2%) 
1.4 ProbIT (75%) 31 [26 - 37] (33%) 66 [65 - 68] (4%) 
1.5 MR (1/year) 47 [43 - 53] (0%) 62 [60 - 64] (10%) 
1.6 MR (4/year) 37 [32 - 42] (22%) 63 [60 - 65] (9%) 
1.7 Erad (1/year) 43 [38 - 49] (8%) 65 [63 - 67] (6%) 
1.7h Erad_hubs (1/year)  33 [27 - 37] (31%) 57 [54 - 59] (18%) 
* Results presented in Table 5 in Manuscript III (except scenarios marked with h) 
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TABLE  3B.  Predicted median prevalence on 31
st
 December 2012 for the default scenario presented in Manuscript III (low herd prevalence in 2006) and for 
a scenario with a high herd prevalence in 2006. All combinations of two control measures were implemented. 
Scenario ID Scenario acronym Predicted median herd  
prevalence in %   
on 31
st
 December 2012 
(low herd prevalence in 2006*) 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
Predicted median herd 
prevalence in %  
on 31
st
 December 2012 
(high herd prevalence in 2006) 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
No control measures   
0 Default 47 [42 - 52] 69 [67 - 71] 
   
Combination of two control measures   
2.1 
AB (50%) 
ProbIT (50%) 36 [22 - 49] (24%) 64 [54 - 73] (8%) 
2.2 ProbIt (75%) 30 [17 - 42] (37%) 63 [52 - 71] (9%) 
2.3 MR (1/year) 47 [30 - 61] (0%) 57 [48 - 65] (17%) 
2.4 MR (4/year) 35 [22 - 50] (25%) 59 [48 - 68] (15%) 
2.5 Erad (1/year) 42 [26 - 56] (10%) 61 [51 - 70] (11%) 
2.5h Erad_hubs (1/year) 33 [17 - 45] (31%) 52 [41 - 62] (24%) 
2.6 
AB (100%) 
ProbIT (50%) 22 [11 - 35] (54%) 56 [31 - 67] (19%) 
2.7 ProbIT (75%) 15 [7 - 26] (68%) 58 [37 - 63] (16%) 
2.8 MR (1/year) 30 [15 - 46] (36%) 50 [42 - 59] (27%) 
2.9 MR (4/year) 21 [9 - 33] (56%) 52 [35 - 59] (25%) 
2.10 Erad (1/year) 26 [11 - 40] (45%) 55 [36 - 66] (20%) 
2.10h Erad_hubs (1/year) 15 [6 - 28] (68%) 44 [12 - 52] (37%) 
2.11 
ProbIT (50%) 
MR (1/year) 38 [32 - 43] (19%) 60 [58 - 62] (13%) 
2.12 MR (4/year) 28 [23 - 33] (41%) 61 [59 - 63] (12%) 
2.13 Erad (1/year) 33 [28 - 39] (29%) 62 [61 - 64] (9%) 
2.13h Erad_hubs (1/year) 23 [19 - 27] (52%) 53 [51 - 55] (23%) 
2.14 
ProbIT (75%) 
MR (1/year) 32 [27 - 39] (31%) 58 [57 - 60] (15%) 
2.15 MR (4/year) 23 [19 - 29] (50%) 59 [57 - 61] (14%) 
2.16 Erad (1/year) 28 [23 - 34] (41%) 61 [59 - 63] (12%) 
2.16h Erad_hubs (1/year) 18 [15 - 22] (62%) 50 [48 - 52] (27%) 
2.17 
MR (1/year) 
Erad (1/year) 29 [25 - 34] (37%) 57 [55 - 59] (18%) 
2.17h Erad_hubs (1/year) 26 [22 - 30] (46%) 52 [50 - 54] (24%) 
2.18 
MR (4/year) 
Erad (4/year) 21 [18 - 25] (55%) 45 [43 - 47] (35%) 
2.18h Erad_hubs (4/year) 8 [7 - 10] (83%) 24 [23 - 26] (65%) 
* Results presented in Table 5 in Manuscript III (except scenarios marked with h) 
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TABLE 3C. Predicted median prevalence on 31
st
 December 2012 for the default scenario presented in Manuscript III (low herd prevalence in 2006) and 
for a scenario with a high herd prevalence in 2006. All combinations of three control measures were implemented. 
Scenario ID Scenario acronym Predicted median herd  
prevalence in %   
on 31
st
 December 2012 
(low herd prevalence in 2006*) 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
Predicted median herd 
prevalence in %  
on 31
st
 December 2012 
(high herd prevalence in 2006) 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
No control measures   
0 Default 47 [42 - 52] 69 [67 - 71] 
   
Combination of three control measures   
3.1 
AB (50%)  
ProbIT (50%) 
MR (1/year) 36 [22 - 49] (23%) 55 [47 - 63] (20%) 
3.2 MR (4/year) 26 [16 - 38] (44%) 56 [45 - 64] (19%) 
3.3 Erad (1/year) 32 [19 - 46] (31%) 59 [48 - 68] (15%) 
3.3h Erad_hubs (1/year) 21 [11 - 34] (54%) 50 [40 - 57] (27%) 
3.4 
ProbIT (75%) 
MR (1/year) 32 [20 - 43] (33%) 54 [44 - 61] (22%) 
3.5 MR (4/year) 21 [13 - 33] (55%) 55 [44 - 64] (21%) 
3.6 Erad (1/year) 26 [15 - 38] (44%) 57 [46 - 68] (18%) 
3.6h Erad_hubs (1/year) 16 [8 - 27] (66%) 43 [36 - 55] (37%) 
3.7 
MR (1/year) 
Erad (1/year) 29 [18 - 41] (39%) 53 [43 - 61] (24%) 
3.7h Erad_hubs (1/year) 24 [13 - 36] (48%) 47 [38 - 57] (31%) 
3.8 
MR (4/year) 
Erad (4/year) 20 [11 - 31] (57%) 42 [31 - 50] (40%) 
3.8h Erad_hubs (4/year) 8 [3 - 14] (84%) 20 [11 - 27] (71%) 
3.9 
AB (100%)  
ProbIT (50%) 
MR (1/year) 22 [10 - 35] (53%) 50 [40 - 56] (27%) 
3.10 MR (4/year) 15 [7 - 25] (68%) 52 [34 - 60] (28%) 
3.11 Erad (1/year) 38 [32 - 43] (61%) 50 [37 - 64] (25%) 
3.11h Erad_hubs (1/year) 11 [4 - 20] (77%) 51 [11 - 46] (45%) 
3.12 
ProbIT (75%) 
MR (1/year) 19 [7-30] (59%) 38 [41 - 54] (30%) 
3.13 MR (4/year) 13 [6 - 22] (72%) 48 [18 - 58] (31%) 
3.14 Erad (1/year) 15 [5 - 26] (68%) 49 [32 - 58] (29%) 
3.14h Erad_hubs (1/year) 8 [3 - 15] (83%) 36 [27 - 45] (48%) 
3.15 
MR (1/year) 
Erad (1/year) 16 [8 - 28] (65%) 46 [33 - 53] (34%) 
3.15h Erad_hubs (1/year) 13 [5 - 22] (72%) 38 [28 - 47] (44%) 
3.16 
MR (4/year) 
Erad (4/year) 10 [4 - 18] (79%) 32 [19 - 43] (53%) 
3.16h Erad_hubs (4/year) 3 [1 - 6] (94%) 12 [6 - 18] (82%) 
3.17 
ProbIT (50%) MR (1/year) 
Erad (1/year) 21 [17 - 25] (55%) 54 [52 - 56] (22%) 
3.17h Erad_hubs (1/year) 18 [14 - 22] (62%) 48 [46 - 50] (30%) 
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Scenario ID Scenario acronym Predicted median herd  
prevalence in %   
on 31
st
 December 2012 
(low herd prevalence in 2006*) 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
Predicted median herd 
prevalence in %  
on 31
st
 December 2012 
(high herd prevalence in 2006) 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
3.18 
MR (4/year) 
Erad (4/year) 15 [12 - 17] (69%) 41 [39 - 43] (41%) 
3.18h Erad_hubs (4/year) 5 [4 - 6] (90%) 19 [18 - 21] (72%) 
3.19 
ProbIT (75%) 
MR (1/year) 
Erad (1/year) 17 [14 - 21] (64%) 52 [50 - 54] (24%) 
3.19h Erad_hubs (1/year) 14 [11 - 17] (70%) 46 [44 - 48] (33%) 
3.20 
MR (4/year) 
Erad (4/year) 12 [9 - 14] (75%) 39 [37 - 41] (44%) 
3.20h Erad_hubs 4/year) 4 [3 - 5] (92%) 17 [16 - 18] (76%) 
* Results presented in Table 5 in Manuscript III (except scenarios marked with h) 
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TABLE 3D. Predicted median prevalence on 31
st
 December 2012 for the default scenario presented in Manuscript III (low herd prevalence in 2006) and 
for a scenario with a high herd prevalence in 2006. All combinations of four control measures were implemented. 
Scenario ID Scenario acronym Predicted median herd  
prevalence in %   
on 31
st
 December 2012 
(low herd prevalence in 2006*) 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
Predicted median herd 
prevalence in %  
on 31
st
 December 2012 
(high herd prevalence in 2006) 
[90% prediction interval] 
(relative reduction) 
No control measures   
0 Default 47 [42 - 52] 69 [67 - 71] 
   
Combination of four control measures   
4.1 
AB (50%) ProbIT (50%) 
MR (1/year) 
Erad (1/year) 20 [12 - 30] (56%) 49 [41 - 57] (29%) 
4.1h Erad_hubs (1/year) 17 [9 - 27] (64%) 40 [35 - 52] (42%) 
4.2 
MR (4/year) 
Erad (4/year) 13 [8 - 22] (72%) 36 [27 - 46] (47%) 
4.2h Erad_hubs (4/year) 4 [2 - 8] (91%) 14 (10 - 22] (80%) 
4.3 
AB (50%) ProbIT (75%) 
MR (1/year) 
Erad (1/year) 16 [9 - 24] (65%) 48 [38 - 56] (31%) 
4.3h Erad_hubs (1/year) 13 [7 - 20] (73%) 41 [32 - 49] (41%) 
4.4 
MR (4/year) 
Erad (4/year) 11 [6 - 16] (77%) 35 [27 - 43] (49%) 
4.4h Erad_hubs (4/year) 3 [1 - 6] (93%) 13 [9 - 19] (81%) 
4.5 
AB (100%) ProbIT (50%) 
MR (1/year) 
Erad (1/year) 11 [5 - 19] (77%) 43 [29 - 50] (38%) 
4.5h Erad_hubs (1/year) 9 [4 - 14] (82%) 35 [27 - 43] (50%) 
4.6 
MR (4/year) 
Erad (4/year) 7 [3 - 13] (86%) 30 [14 - 37] (57%) 
4.6h Erad_hubs (4/year) 2 [1 - 4] (96%) 9 [2 - 13] (87%) 
4.7 
AB (100%) ProbIT (75%) 
MR (1/year) 
Erad (1/year) 9 [5 - 15] (80%) 37 [30 - 46] (46%) 
4.7h Erad_hubs (1/year) 7 [3 - 12] (86%) 34 [22 - 43] (51%) 
4.8 
MR (4/year) 
Erad (4/year) 6 [2 -10] (86%) 28 [25 - 35] (59%) 
4.8h Erad_hubs (4/year) 1 [1 - 3] (97%) 9 [6 - 11] (88%) 
* Results presented in Table 5 in Manuscript III (except scenarios marked with h) 
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4.3.1.4.  HERDS AND MOVEMENTS AFFECTED BY CONTROL MEASURES  
Without movement restrictions, 706,065 movements were modelled per iteration between 1st January 
2006 and 31st December 2012. Between 0.2 - 12.3% of the movements were ignored (Tables 4a-d). The 
highest proportion of ignored movements was observed in the scenario with reduced use of high-risk 
antibiotics in 50% of the herds and movement restrictions based on testing all herds four times per year 
(Scenario 2.4, Table 4b). In contrast, the lowest number of ignored movements was found in the scenario 
where the use of high-risk antibiotics was stopped in all herds, the probability of effective transmission via 
indirect human contact was reduced by 75% and with movement restrictions based on testing all herds 
once per year (Scenario 3.12, Table 4c). 
In scenarios with voluntary eradication, the median number of pigs sent to slaughter during the 
eradication process and the median number of herds using eradication were recorded and compared 
across the different simulated scenarios (Tables 4a-d). The number of pigs sent to slaughter during the 
eradication process was lowest in the scenario combining all four control measures (Scenario 4.7), with a 
median of 258,354 (90% prediction interval: 150,962 - 378,129), and highest in the scenario combining 
movement restrictions based on testing all herds four times per year and voluntary eradication (Scenario 
2.18), with a median of 1,493,921 (90% prediction interval: 1,229,622 – 1,773,074). The same scenarios 
led to the lowest (highest) number of herds using eradication. 
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TABLE 4A. Number of ignored movements due to applied movement restrictions, pigs sent to slaughter during the eradication process and herds performing 
eradication in the simulated control scenarios between the implementation of control measures on 1
st
 January 2007 and 31
st
 December 2012, given as the 
median and 90% prediction intervals. All control measures were implemented individually. 
Scenario ID Scenario acronym Ignored movements due to 
applied movement restrictions 
(proportion of ignored movements) 
Number of pigs sent to slaughter 
during eradication process 
Number of herds in 
eradication process 
Single control measures    
1.1 AB (50%) n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1.2 AB (100%) n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1.3 ProbIT (50%) n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1.4 ProbIT (75%) n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1.5 MR (1/year) 3,015 [1,921 - 4,472] (0.4%) n.a. n.a. 
1.6 MR (4/year) 81,543 [66,309 - 100,106] (11.5%) n.a. n.a. 
1.7 Erad (1/year) n.a. 846,744 [676,707 - 1,059,981] 423 [345 - 513] 
1.7h Erad_hubs (1/year) n.a 1,392,703 [1,131,234 - 1,687,769] 501 [411 - 607] 
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TABLE 4B. Number of ignored movements due to applied movement restrictions, pigs sent to slaughter during the eradication process and herds performing 
eradication in the simulated control scenarios between the implementation of control measures on 1
st
 January 2007 and 31
st
 December 2012, given as the 
median and 90% prediction intervals. All combinations of two control measures are presented. 
Scenario ID Scenario acronym Ignored movements due to  
applied movement restrictions 
(proportion of ignored movements) 
Number of pigs sent to slaughter 
during eradication process 
Number of herds in 
eradication process 
Combination of two control measures    
2.1 
AB (50%) 
ProbIT (50%) n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2.2 ProbIT (75%) n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2.3 MR (1/year) 3,113 [1,855 - 5,077] (0.4%) n.a. n.a. 
2.4 MR (4/year) 86,621 [57,471 - 114,874] (12.3%) n.a. n.a. 
2.5 Erad (1/year) n.a. 875,002 [575,435 - 1,178,923] 427 [276 - 582] 
2.5h Erad_hubs (1/year) n.a. 1,435,321 [891,590 - 1,923,824] 516 [324 - 690] 
2.6 
AB (100%) 
ProbIT (50%) n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2.7 ProbIT (75%) n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2.8 MR (1/year) 2,124 [849 - 3,914] (0.3%) n.a. n.a. 
2.9 MR (4/year) 86,621 [57,471 - 114,874] (8.4%) n.a. n.a. 
2.10 Erad (1/year) n.a. 621,040 [341,496 - 905,089] 304 [175 - 442] 
2.10h Erad_hubs (1/year) n.a. 923,040 [540,210 - 1,370,308] 332 [199 - 491] 
2.11 
ProbIT (50%) 
MR (1/year) 2,373 [1,424 - 3,555] (0.3%) n.a. n.a. 
2.12 MR (4/year) 64,286 [50,145 - 81,329] (9.1%) n.a. n.a. 
2.13 Erad (1/year) n.a. 690,257 [538,602 - 860,079] 340 [275 - 419] 
2.13h Erad_hubs (1/year) n.a. 1,089,673 [881,169 - 1,333,437] 391 [321 - 480] 
2.14 
ProbIT (75%) 
MR (1/year) 2,023 [1,168 - 3,336] (0.3%) n.a. n.a. 
2.15 MR (4/year) 56,613 [43,676 - 73,504] (8.0%) n.a. n.a. 
2.16 Erad (1/year) n.a. 607,757 [481,599 - 788,955] 300 [242 - 390] 
2.16h Erad_hubs (1/year) n.a. 945,772 [777,277 - 1,133,816] 344 [282 - 413] 
2.17 
MR (1/year) 
Erad (1/year) 70,411 [56,788 - 86,836] (10.0%) 474,628 [378,392 - 593,597] 235 [191 - 284] 
2.17h Erad_hubs (1/year) 48,383 [38,788 - 60,329] (6.9%) 906,435 [761,574 - 1,094,137] 326 [279 - 386] 
2.18 
MR (4/year) 
Erad (4/year) 60,199 [48,426 - 73,682] (8.5%) 1,493,921 [1,229,622 - 1,773,074] 714 [590 - 854] 
2.18h Erad_hubs (4/year) 15,542 [11,385 - 20,002] (2.2%) 1,705,509 [1,405,569 - 2,036,510] 657 [550 - 776] 
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TABLE 4C. Number of ignored movements due to applied movement restrictions, pigs sent to slaughter during the eradication process and herds performing 
eradication in the simulated control scenarios between the implementation of control measures on 1
st
 January 2007 and 31
st
 December 2012, given as the 
median and 90% prediction intervals. All combinations of three control measures are presented. 
Scenario ID Scenario acronym Ignored movements due to 
applied movement restrictions 
(proportion of ignored movements) 
Number of pigs sent to slaughter 
during eradication process 
Number of herds in 
eradication process 
Combination of three control measures    
3.1 
AB (50%)  
ProbIT (50%) 
MR (1/year) 2,439 [1,215 - 3,830] (0.3%) n.a. n.a. 
3.2 MR (4/year) 65,514 [48,426 - 73,682] (9.3%) n.a. n.a. 
3.3 Erad (1/year) n.a. 703,942 [451,846 - 962,944] 343 [218 - 484] 
3.3h Erad_hub (1/year) n.a. 1,068,327 [699,305 - 1,485,979] 386 [259 - 538] 
3.4 
ProbIT (75%) 
MR (1/year) 2,104 [1,089 - 3,492] (0.3%) n.a. n.a. 
3.5 MR (4/year) 57,718 [39,346 - 80,695] (8.2%) n.a. n.a. 
3.6 Erad (1/year) n.a. 595,474 [401,239 - 855,955] 289 [197 - 418] 
3.6h Erad_hub (1/year) n.a. 915,637 [609,864 - 1,294,360] 331 [218 - 469] 
3.7 
MR (1/year) 
Erad (1/year) 73,423 [49,257 - 100,473] (10.4%) 490,278 [323,939 - 681,882] 239 [158 - 333] 
3.7h Erad_hub (1/year) 51,007 [29,372 - 71,959] (7.2%) 914,229 [593,879 - 1,235,039] 329 [216 - 451] 
3.8 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 62,188 [41,887 - 86,685] (8.8%) 1,485,901 [1,009,896 - 2,046,549] 694 [474 - 977] 
3.8h Erad_hub (4/year) 18,060 [10,483 - 26,463] (2.6%) 1,678,637 [1,130,378 - 2,392,509] 634 [432 - 903] 
3.9 
AB (100%)  
ProbIT (50%) 
MR (1/year) 1,645 [628 - 2,908] (0.2%) n.a. n.a. 
3.10 MR (4/year) 47,935 [26,429 - 64,351] (6.8%) n.a. n.a. 
3.11 Erad (1/year) n.a. 487,799 [291,739 - 721,247] 238 [148 - 341] 
3.11h Erad_hub (1/year) n.a. 768,650 [460,994 - 1,119,151] 279 [175 - 403] 
3.12 
ProbIT (75%) 
MR (1/year) 1,490 [461 - 2,844] (0.2%) n.a. n.a. 
3.13 MR (4/year) 42,884 [24,843 - 64,351] (6.1%) n.a. n.a. 
3.14 Erad (1/year) n.a. 453,890 [254,482 - 671,290] 220 [131 - 326] 
3.14h Erad_hub (1/year) n.a. 660,042 [378,122 - 968,699] 242 [144 - 349] 
3.15 
MR (1/year) 
Erad (1/year) 52,738 [30,370 - 78,672] (7.5%) 353,194 [207,753 - 518,182] 171 [106 - 246] 
3.15h Erad_hub (1/year) 35,905 [18,739 - 56,234] (5.1%) 650,116 [395,937 - 964,670] 236 [147 - 345] 
3.16 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 41,987 [23,557 - 65,946] (5.9%) 1,017,999 [591,626 - 1,551,999] 473 [290 - 720] 
3.16h Erad_hub (4/year) 11,757 [5,598 - 19,258] (1.7%) 1,158,809 [717,719 - 1,698,305] 446 [290 - 636] 
3.17 
ProbIT (50%) 
MR (1/year) 
Erad (1/year) 56,265 [44,271 - 69,209] (8.0%) 385,045 [298,923 - 481,688] 187 [150 - 231] 
3.17h Erad_hub (1/year) 37,567 [228,713 - 48,852] (5.3%) 720,856 [517,480 - 777,598] 262 [217 - 317] 
3.18 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 46,515 [36,798 - 58,021] (6.6%) 1,194,142 [972,157 - 1,425,783] 572 [473 - 675] 
3.18h Erad_hub (4/year) 11,251 [8,502 - 14,828] (1.6%) 1,367,455 [1,146,626 - 1,630,613] 533 [457 - 631] 
3.19 
ProbIT (75%) 
MR (1/year) Erad (1/year) 48,930 [38,834 - 62,110] (6.9%) 337,089 [249,895 - 435,706] 166 [128 - 203] 
3.19h Erad_hub (1/year) 32,473 [24,459 - 41,334] (4.6%) 635,751 [517,480 - 777,598] 231 [192 - 278] 
3.20 MR (4/year) Erad (4/year) 41,767 [32,625 - 52,761] (5.9%) 1,071,833 [876,921 - 1,314,096] 510 [425 - 624] 
3.20h Erad_hub (4/year) 9,844 [7,434 - 13,022] (1.4%) 1,236,589 [1,057,979 - 1,509,640] 484 [417 - 580] 
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TABLE 4D. Number of ignored movements due to applied movement restrictions, pigs sent to slaughter during the eradication process and herds performing 
eradication in the simulated control scenarios between the implementation of control measures on 1
st
 January 2007 and 31
st
 December 2012, given as the 
median and 90% prediction intervals. All combinations of four control measures are presented. 
Scenario ID Scenario acronym Ignored movements due to 
applied movement restrictions 
(proportion of ignored movements) 
Number of pigs sent to slaughter 
during eradication process 
Number of herds in 
eradication process 
Combination of four control measures    
4.1 
AB (50%) ProbIT (50%) 
MR (1/year) 
Erad (1/year) 57,012 [39,603 - 77,580] (8.1%) 382,819 [248,209 - 525,817] 186 [126 - 256] 
4.1h Erad_hubs (1/year) 39,472 [25,264 - 54,344] (5.6%) 718,338 [480,116 - 975,919] 257 [176 - 350] 
4.2 
MR (4/year) 
Erad (4/year) 47,383 [33,330 - 65,429] (6.7%) 1,155,733 [831,920 - 1,616,957] 545 [389 - 771] 
4.2h Erad_hubs (4/year) 13,385 [8,088 - 19,616] (1.9%) 1,333,259 [921,941 - 1,844,933] 511 [368 - 698] 
4.3 
AB (50%) ProbIT (75%) 
MR (1/year) 
Erad (1/year) 49,786 [32,631 - 66,592] (7.1%) 334,818 [213,268 - 469,031] 162 [105 - 228] 
4.3h Erad_hubs (1/year) 32,773 [22,894 - 46,183] (4.6%) 623,546 [430,038 - 842,242] 224 [162 - 303] 
4.4 
MR (4/year) 
Erad (4/year) 41,848 [27,987 - 56,454] (5.9%) 1,033,152 [727,110 - 1,419,543] 484 [335 - 672] 
4.4h Erad_hubs (4/year) 11,018 [6,734 - 16,165] (1.6%) 1,175,029 [812,804 - 1,579,280] 454 [328 - 603] 
4.5 
AB (100%) ProbIT (50%) 
MR (1/year) 
Erad (1/year) 41,824 [25,129 - 62,197] (5.9%) 272,576 [168,738 - 416,836] 135 [85 - 199] 
4.5h Erad_hubs (1/year) 27,732 [16,103 - 43,470] (3.9%) 521,689 [334,068 - 752,720] 191 [126 - 267] 
4.6 
MR (4/year) 
Erad (4/year) 34,017 [20,958 - 49,912] (4.8%) 819,128 [522,736 - 1,215,928] 392 [254 - 564] 
4.6h Erad_hubs (4/year) 9,557 [5,056 - 15,284] (1.4%) 985,815 [635,082 - 1,367,362] 382 [260 - 523] 
4.7 
AB (100%) ProbIT (75%) 
MR (1/year) 
Erad (1/year) 38,971 [23,765 - 56,620] (5.5%) 258,354 [150,962 - 378,129] 127 [78 - 179] 
4.7h Erad_hubs (1/year) 24,957 [13,904 - 37,381] (3.5%) 470,197 [296,766 - 663,725] 170 [112 - 236] 
4.8 
MR (4/year) 
Erad (4/year) 31,107 [18,119 - 45,369] (4.4%) 772,334 [463,941 - 1,086,570] 362 [227 - 500] 
4.8h Erad_hubs (4/year) 8,380 [4,364 - 13,618] (1.2%) 895,348 [575,703 - 1,225,681} 348 [231 - 472] 
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4.3.2. DISCUSSION  
In Manuscript III, the model presented in Manuscript II was enhanced by four potential control 
measures: (1) a reduced number of herds using high-risk antibiotics, (2) increased biosecurity to reduce 
indirect transmissions via humans, (3) movement restrictions prohibiting trade from LA-MRSA-positive to 
negative herds and (4) voluntary eradication in 7.5% (5%) of the breeding and multiplier herds (other herd 
types). We aimed to investigate how these control measures and their combinations could have 
influenced the spread of LA-MRSA in the study period 2006 to 2015 if they had been implemented in 
2007. We could show that almost all control measures led to reductions in the predicted median herd 
prevalence compared to the default scenario if they had been implemented in 2007. Even implementing 
control measures in 2010, when the predicted herd prevalence was higher than 2007, led to similar 
(slightly lower) reduction rates (Manuscript III). The predicted herd prevalence in 2006 was far below the 
current prevalence of 88% in Danish pig herds. We therefore increased LA-MRSA initialisation in 2006 to 
mimic a scenario with high herd prevalence prior to the start of control measures (Chapter 4.3.1). 
Reduction rates were smaller compared to the default scenario presented in Manuscript III, irrespective of 
which control measure or combination was tested. However, a reduction in the predicted median herd 
prevalence could be shown for all control measures and combinations. Therefore, intense and combined 
control measures beginning in the current situation in Danish herds might still lead to a clear reduction in 
LA-MRSA herd prevalence. However, this would require considerable and rigorous efforts, for which 
economic consequences are yet to be estimated. 
The reduction in herds using high-risk antibiotics could be interpreted as a reduction in the within-herd 
transmission rates. Each intervention leading to lower within-herd prevalence might also reduce the 
spread of LA-MRSA among pig herds. However, to the best of my knowledge, it has been shown that only 
a decrease in antimicrobial consumption leads to a decrease in within-herd prevalence85. 
Running all control scenarios until the end of 2015 showed that implemented control measures only 
slowed down the spread of LA-MRSA between pig herds when implemented individually or in 
combinations of two or three control measures (Chapter 4.3.1.1). None of these scenarios were able to 
reduce the herd prevalence after initialisation. However, combining all four control measures kept the 
predicted LA-MRSA herd prevalence at an almost constant level between 2012 and 2015. This result 
indicates that only considerable rigorous efforts might help to reduce the present herd prevalence of LA-
MRSA in swine herds in Denmark. 
In Chapter 4.3.1.1, we investigated how effective eradication of hubs would be compared to randomly 
chosen herds in the voluntary eradication programme. Hubs (defined as herds with the largest out-going 
contact chains of all herds) that tested positive in the simulation were chosen to start the eradication 
process. This approach led to a reduction in the predicted herd prevalence compared to the scenarios with 
randomly chosen herds in the eradication process. Therefore, prioritising herds with a higher potential to 
spread disease via pig movements could be an option to increase the effects of an eradication 
programme. 
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Starting control measures when the prevalence was assumed to be at a high level led to at least slight 
reductions in the predicted herd prevalence in all implemented control scenarios (Chapter 4.3.1.3). 
However, these reductions were clearly smaller compared to starting control measures at a low 
prevalence. However, the effects were smaller when implementing combinations of three or four control 
measures. In addition, scenarios in which herds with a higher potential were prioritised for eradication 
showed a high potential of limiting the spread of LA-MRSA. This highlights the need of rigorous efforts, 
especially when implementing control measures when the prevalence is already at a high level.  
Movement restrictions and voluntary eradication were shown to be effective control measures, 
especially when combined with other implemented control options. However, both of these measures 
would have an effect on the pig industry (Chapter 4.3.1.4). In the case of movement restrictions, trade 
prohibition from LA-MRSA-positive to negative herds might lead to new trade connections and to an 
increased export of pigs. Eradication implies that pigs must be sent to slaughter and that herds should be 
re-stocked with LA-MRSA-negative pigs. The number of pigs and herds varied depending on the control 
scenario, and this must be taken into account when implementing a national action plan. Besides 
economic losses from sending pigs to slaughter or culling due to eradication, there might also be a loss of 
breeding stock, and it may not be possible to compensate for this economically. 
Simplified versions of the control measures were implemented. For example, we assumed that all herds 
were tested on the same day, which is not realistic. Therefore, the effects of control measures might differ 
if another paradigm were to be used. 
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5. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This thesis aimed to provide a better insight into the spread of LA-MRSA among pig herds, quantify the 
driving mechanisms of LA-MRSA spread between herds and study the effect of measures to control LA-
MRSA spread. All analyses were based on the structure of pig herds and the movements of pigs between 
herds registered in Denmark between 1st January 2006 and 31st December 2015. Network analysis tools 
were used to describe the dataset used, to investigate contact patterns among pig herds and to identify 
potential hubs for disease spread. A simulation model was developed to mimic the spread of LA-MRSA 
among Danish pig herds and to investigate the routes of transmission. Four potential control options were 
retrospectively tested for their potential to control the spread of LA-MRSA, both individually and 
combined. 
In general, this thesis illustrates how herd information data, movement data, information on LA-MRSA 
prevalence in Denmark and information on LA-MRSA in general could be combined to provide a better 
insight into the mechanisms of disease spread and the potential for control measures to reduce spread 
among pig herds. The results could be used to adapt the current Danish action plan, but could also be used 
in other regions/countries with LA-MRSA in the pig population. The results of this thesis might present 
realistic expectations of an achievable reduction in herd prevalence with either implemented or planned 
control measures, independent of the current LA-MRSA status of the considered region. 
5.1. LIMITATIONS  
All analyses were based on herd information and pig movements registered in the Central Husbandry 
Register (CHR) in Denmark between 1st January 2006 and 31st December 2015. 
A central discussion point in terms of the CHR is the lack of herd-type definitions registered by the 
farmers. In particular, the combination of breeding and multiplier herds posed challenges during the 
analysis. Breeding herds do not usually have incoming movements; they produce and sell purebred 
breeding stock. Multiplier herds produce and sell hybrids (in addition to purebred breeding stock) and 
could have incoming pig movements. Being able to separate these holding types would have led to more 
detailed information. The impact of initialising LA-MRSA in breeding herds or multiplier herds on the 
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model outcome could have been evaluated in the model. This might have led to a better understanding of 
the role of breeding herds in the initialisation process, as well as in the spread of LA-MRSA in general. 
Information based on the registered herd type must be used with care, as discussed above. However, to 
overcome this, it may be possible to re-categorise the herds using a recently developed algorithm for 
automatic classification of farms and traders in the pig production chain, based on the farm’s trade 
pattern86. In the case of eradicating hubs, re-categorisation might have led to even higher rates of 
reduction of the predicted herd prevalence. However, when implementing control measures in reality, 
categorising all herds according to the herd’s trade pattern might pose additional challenges. 
There were no sows, weaners or finishers registered for some of the herds. We therefore estimated 
values based on herds of a similar type (for a detailed description, see Supplemental Information in 
Manuscript II). When using this information for research, updated herd information would help to avoid 
additional uncertainties, including those faced when estimating missing information. 
Model predictions are limited by the assumed model structure and the data used to parameterise the 
model. There is a lot of information about the structure of Danish pig production, yet the size of registered 
herds might not be up-to-date in all cases. Data on registered pig movements are generally of good 
quality, but the age group of the pigs that were moved (sows, weaners, finishers) is not registered. In 
general, there is still a lack of knowledge about different transmission routes between pig herds. 
Obtaining more precise information on pig herds and the ages of pigs moved would increase the data 
quality – not only for input in the presented model, but for scientific use in general. Additionally, LA-MRSA 
could be transmitted among different animal species or individual animals, between humans and animals, 
or other potential sources. These transmission routes and their importance in the spread of LA-MRSA 
must be studied in detail. This would allow us to model these processes more realistically, rather than 
initiating random introductions in herds, as carried out in 2006 and 2009 for instance (Manuscript II and 
III), thus allowing more precise model predictions. As such, new control measures could be specified based 
on the gained knowledge, which could be tested in the simulation model.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of the network analysis was to identify contact patterns between pig herds and hubs for disease 
spread. The following can be concluded: 
 Although most contact between different holding types follow the production pyramid, many 
horizontal connections also exist. 
 There is considerable variation among herds of the same holding type in terms of their loyalty 
patterns. Therefore, general statements could not be made for holding types. 
 There are substantial variations among pig herds of the same holding types in terms of the size of 
out-going contact chains. Therefore, each herd must be categorised independently of the 
registered holding type in order to estimate its potential as a hub for disease spread. 
To understand and assess the impact of potential routes of LA-MRSA transmission among Danish swine 
herds, a simulation model was developed. Based on the assumptions made to mimic the transmission 
mechanisms, the underlying parameters and the different scenarios simulated, it can be concluded that: 
 Breeding and multiplier herds played a key role when simulating the initialisation of LA-MRSA. 
This highlights their potential as hubs for disease spread, because they are located at the top of 
the production pyramid. Avoiding LA-MRSA introduction to breeding and multiplier herds might 
therefore have led to a reduction in the spread of LA-MRSA. 
 Transmission via animal movements alone was not sufficient to mimic the development of the 
LA-MRSA herd prevalence observed in Denmark during the considered study period (2006 to 
2015). However, movement of live animals was a driving force of LA-MRSA spread among herds. 
 The frequency of indirect transmission via humans, as well as the effectiveness of indirect 
contact between herds via humans greatly influenced the model results. The higher the number 
of contacts; the greater the spread among pig herds and vice versa. 
 The between-herd prevalence was highly correlated with the within-herd prevalence. Reducing 
the within-herd prevalence would therefore be expected to aid in controlling LA-MRSA. 
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The effects of different control strategies on the spread of LA-MRSA among Danish pig herds was 
investigated and led to the following conclusions: 
 Reducing the proportion of herds that use high-risk antibiotics would have reduced the within-
herd transmission and prevalence, which would have reduced the predicted between-herd 
prevalence when control was initiated in 2007 or 2010. 
 Increasing biosecurity by reducing the probability of indirect transmission via humans would also 
have reduced the between-herd prevalence. 
 Imposing movement restrictions alone based on testing all herds once per year would not have 
had an effect on the predicted herd prevalence. However, testing all herds four times per year 
followed by trade prohibition from LA-MRSA-positive to negative herds showed a clear reduction 
in the predicted herd prevalence. 
 Eradication based on randomly chosen herds was not as efficient as targeted selection of herds 
based on their potential to spread the disease from out-going animal movements. 
 Combining control measures showed an additive effect and led to the highest rate of reduction 
when all control measures were combined and implemented in the most intense version. 
 Starting control measures in 2007 with a high prevalence led to a lower reduction in herd 
prevalence compared to starting at a low prevalence. However, even with a high prevalence at 
the start of control, clear reductions in the between-herd prevalence could be achieved.  
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7. PERSPECTIVES 
During the modelling process, we identified knowledge gaps relating to some model parameters, such as 
quantification of the effectiveness of indirect contact between pig herds, and some model processes, for 
instance related to environmental transmissions. Furthermore, the transmission rates within the herds 
were shown to strongly influence the model outcome. However, little information is available on the 
effects of interventions to lower the within-herd prevalence. More precise information gained from 
experimental studies could be used to update the model parameters and to adapt the model processes, 
leading to more precise predictions. 
When setting up control measures, effective surveillance strategies must also be implemented to assess 
the performance of control measures and to identify LA-MRSA-positive herds for eradication. Surveillance 
options could be added to the existing model to evaluate the timeliness and effectiveness of re-
introductions or new introductions of LA-MRSA in the pig population. This could be of special interest after 
reducing the herd prevalence to a specific pre-defined level, or when a decision must be made to 
terminate control measures. 
The model could also be used to assess the impact of control strategies that have been proven to reduce 
within-herd prevalence on the between-herd spread of LA-MRSA. 
The model was developed to provide a better insight into the spread of LA-MRSA among pig herds and to 
evaluate potential control measures. However, it could be adapted to other diseases that spread via pig 
movements among pig herds. The transmission parameters could be easily updated. Modules for other 
transmission pathways could be switched on/off depending on the pathogen under consideration. 
Additionally, new modules could be implemented and added to the original model. 
The current model ran for a retrospective study period. Pig movements could also be simulated based on 
determined movement patterns in order to mimic future study periods. However, it is uncertain how 
farmers would react to control measures: predicting more exports or adjusted trade connections would 
add more uncertainty to the modelled results and would therefore make the predictions less reliable. 
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Finally, the model could be enhanced by economic analysis in order to assess the cost-effectiveness of 
the implemented control measures. 
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9. APPENDIX 
9.1. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR MANUSCRIPT I 
9.1.1. S1  FILE:  SIZE OF HOLDINGS  
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Table 1. Size of holdings of active Danish pig holdings. Descriptive statistics of the holding sizes of active Danish pig holdings (holdings that at least once 
send or receive pigs to or from another holding) between 1 Jan 2006 and 31 Dec 2015 in Denmark. If no sows, finishers and weaners were registered, the 
total holding size was set to “not available”. 
 Number of active 
holdings 
Minimum 1st Quantile Median Mean 3rd Quantile Maximum Not available 
2006 12,814 1 252 816 1,227 1,737 15,750 880 
2007 11,920 1 300 823 1,254 1,700 29,940 398 
2008 10,886 1 395 1,000 1,362 1,900 29,940 390 
2009 9,816 1 440 1,086 1,474 2,000 29,940 392 
2010 9,270 1 500 1,200 1,566 2,121 29,940 374 
2011 8,875 1 520 1,200 1,598 2,230 23,950 342 
2012 8,502 1 600 1,300 1,668 2,300 21,000 561 
2013 8,370 1 650 1,400 1,742 2,400 21,000 952 
2014 8,366 1 700 1,500 1,796 2,430 21,000 1,296 
2015 7,835 1 600 1,410 1,813 2,500 19,620 536 
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Table 2. Proportion of active holdings by holding size. Proportion of holdings active between 1 Jan 2006 and 31 Dec 2015 
in Denmark, categorized by the size of holding. 
Herdsize 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
0 6.87 3.34 3.58 3.99 4.03 3.85 6.60 11.37 15.49 6.84 
0 - 1,000 53.71 56.08 50.35 46.38 43.39 41.72 38.44 33.91 30.67 36.23 
1,001 -  2,000 21.62 23.00 25.03 25.96 26.67 26.63 26.28 25.89 25.26 25.45 
2,001 - 3,000 9.42 10.19 12.32 13.47 14.36 15.13 15.28 15.33 15.14 15.33 
3,001 -  4,000 4.39 3.47 4.77 5.45 6.08 6.58 7.00 7.00 6.97 7.76 
4,001-  5,000 1.76 1.61 1.78 2.25 2.47 2.96 3.16 3.23 3.18 3.87 
5,001 -  6,000 0.99 0.74 0.92 1.10 1.39 1.58 1.53 1.51 1.53 1.83 
6,001 -  7,000 0.66 0.36 0.42 0.47 0.59 0.70 0.69 0.73 0.72 1.03 
7,001 -  8,000 0.23 0.26 0.23 0.25 0.29 0.34 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.65 
8,001 -  9,000 0.09 0.18 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.32 
9,001 -  10,000 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.27 
10,001 -  11,000 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.14 
11,001 -  12,000 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.13 
12,001 -  13,000 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.08 
13,001 -  14,000   0.06 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 
14,001 - 15,000 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 
15,001 -  16,000 0.02 0.02       0.01         
16,001 -  17,000   0.06 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01   
17,001 -  18,000   0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01         0.01 
18,001 -  19,000   0.03 0.03 0.02             
19,001 -  20,000   0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01       0.03 
20,001 -  21,000   0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01   
21,001 -  22,000                     
22,001 -  23,000     0.01               
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Herdsize 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
23,001 -  24,000     0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01         
24,001 - 25,000   0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04           
25,001 -  26,000   0.01                 
26,001 -  27,000   0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01           
27,001 -  28,000                     
28,001 -  29,000       0.01 0.01           
29,001 -  30,000   0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01           
 
133 
 
Figure 1. Holding sizes by holding type. Median (solid line) and average (dashed line) of holding sizes for (a) breeding 
sites, (b) production sites, (c) hobby sites, (d) transit sites, and (e) miscellaneous sites.  Coloured areas represent the range 
between 1st and 3rd quantile. Values for holding types not shown in this figure are not representative and shown in Table 
3-8. 
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Table 3. Descriptive summaries of holding sizes for breeding sites. 
 
 
Number of  
active holdings 
Minimum 1st quantile Median Mean 3rd quantile Maximum Not available 
Breeding and 
multiplier herds 
2006 278 6 1,450 2,330 2,532 3,204 12,580 18 
2007 261 2 1,028 1,740 2,097 2,465 18,500 2 
2008 252 2 1,028 1,860 2,141 2,828 10,950 1 
2009 263 2 1,026 1,900 2,354 2,910 24,890 2 
2010 270 2 1,000 1,825 2,442 2,910 24,890 1 
2011 276 2 950 1,846 2,291 3,102 19,200 0 
2012 272 1 1,000 1,870 2,308 3,138 10,050 4 
2013 271 1 1,050 1,940 2,346 3,153 10,050 12 
2014 260 1 1,132 2,040 2,404 3,170 10,050 16 
2015 234 1 1,280 2,150 2,663 3,530 11,950 1 
Quarantine stations 
2006 71 1 50 125 240 267 2,005 11 
2007 75 1 40 60 178 125 2,960 4 
2008 62 1 33 100 209 205 3,200 2 
2009 57 3 60 125 250 240 3,200 6 
2010 48 3 50 105 192 243 1,250 4 
2011 39 3 45 98 172 205 2,000 3 
2012 46 10 48 100 145 200 700 5 
2013 41 10 45 95 147 240 700 4 
2014 36 1 47 100 146 230 700 1 
2015 44 3 40 95 150 160 600 3 
Boar stations 
2006 18 52 396 660 881 1,320 2,046 3 
2007 17 20 85 197 189 271 393 0 
2008 16 26 108 211 207 278 393 0 
2009 15 26 145 215 210 285 393 0 
2010 16 26 140 206 206 278 393 0 
2011 16 25 72 200 194 299 405 0 
2012 17 26 95 202 200 298 405 0 
2013 17 26 95 202 200 298 405 0 
2014 17 26 95 202 200 298 405 0 
2015 17 26 95 202 203 298 405 0 
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Table 4. Descriptive summaries of holding sizes for production sites. 
 
 
Number of  
active holdings 
Minimum 1st quantile Median Mean 3rd quantile Maximum Not available 
Production herds 
2006 11733 1 287 817 1,222 1,700 15,750 548 
2007 10867 1 300 845 1,253 1,700 29,940 193 
2008 9902 1 410 1,000 1,361 1,900 29,940 195 
2009 8691 1 500 1,100 1,482 2,000 29,940 196 
2010 7940 1 600 1,200 1,601 2,150 29,940 161 
2011 7538 1 614 1,300 1,647 2,250 23,950 110 
2012 7090 1 700 1,400 1,723 2,303 21,000 200 
2013 6819 1 767 1,500 1,792 2,400 21,000 355 
2014 6623 1 800 1,500 1,844 2,440 21,000 444 
2015 6230 1 800 1,550 1,938 2,510 19,620 110 
Weaner herds 
2006 110 30 500 1,000 1,241 1,650 5,080 47 
2007 105 30 1,400 2,200 3,431 4,000 26,600 0 
2008 106 1 1,600 2,300 3,377 3,625 26,600 2 
2009 171 98 1,188 2,300 3,018 3,300 26,600 0 
2010 241 12 1,200 2,062 2,789 3,285 26,600 1 
2011 240 1 1,210 2,162 2,648 3,475 12,400 2 
2012 227 3 1,249 2,288 2,782 3,706 12,400 3 
2013 224 3 1,362 2,345 2,821 3,726 12,400 6 
2014 223 3 1,407 2,400 2,860 3,751 12,400 12 
2015 201 7 1,400 2,545 3,028 3,989 13,000 2 
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Number of  
active holdings 
Minimum 1st quantile Median Mean 3rd quantile Maximum Not available 
Free-ranging pig 
herds 
2006 325 1 10 52 644 936 8,000 45 
2007 279 1 4 20 458 450 10,330 26 
2008 189 1 5 18 559 729 8,255 22 
2009 190 1 5 18 378 250 5,495 25 
2010 157 1 4 11 291 54 5,495 19 
2011 145 1 4 12 304 60 5,495 19 
2012 141 1 4 14 262 72 3,500 35 
2013 153 1 4 14 300 83 3,500 66 
2014 169 1 4 13 300 83 3,500 82 
2015 164 1 3 10 204 55 4,350 36 
Organic herds 
2006 76 1 14 65 338 331 3,080 9 
2007 79 1 10 45 343 350 3,835 6 
2008 117 1 10 118 595 658 10,070 5 
2009 106 1 15 115 640 738 6,297 4 
2010 99 1 12 83 610 875 6,297 6 
2011 93 2 12 140 573 1,000 3,150 4 
2012 90 1 13 159 649 1,162 5,495 6 
2013 87 1 22 223 722 1,261 5,495 11 
2014 90 3 20 210 717 1,272 5,495 15 
2015 88 1 41 470 1,021 1,360 8,490 5 
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Table 5. Descriptive summaries of holding sizes for hobby sites. 
 
 
Number of  
active holdings 
Minimum 1st quantile Median Mean 3rd quantile Maximum Not available 
Hobby herds 
2006 69 NA NA NA NA NA NA 69 
2007 101 1 3 6 105 52 1,600 45 
2008 110 1 2 4 160 32 3,600 43 
2009 196 1 2 5 69 29 2,150 55 
2010 358 1 3 5 52 16 1,585 79 
2011 391 1 2 4 53 12 1,810 104 
2012 454 1 2 4 43 9 3,027 178 
2013 561 1 2 4 22 10 830 335 
2014 721 1 2 4 20 9 830 531 
2015 521 1 2 4 7 6 281 96 
Pets 
2006 5 NA NA NA NA NA NA 5 
2007 2 NA NA NA NA NA NA 2 
2008 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2009 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2010 2 500 688 875 875 1,062 1,250 0 
2011 2 350 350 350 350 350 350 1 
2012 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2013 3 NA NA NA NA NA NA 3 
2014 10 NA NA NA NA NA NA 10 
2015 11 1 1 1 4 3 13 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
        
138 
 
 
 
Number of  
active holdings 
Minimum 1st quantile Median Mean 3rd quantile Maximum Not available 
Wild boar herds 
2006 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2007 2 NA NA NA NA NA NA 2 
2008 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2009 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2010 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2011 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2012 15 4 4 4 4 4 4 14 
2013 8 NA NA NA NA NA NA 8 
2014 8 NA NA NA NA NA NA 8 
2015 11 2 4 13 25 48 72 1 
Organic wild boar 
herds 
2006 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2007 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2008 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2009 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2010 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2011 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2012 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2013 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2014 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2015 1 8 8 8 8 8 8 0 
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Table 6. Descriptive summaries of holding sizes for transit sites. 
 
 
Number of  
active holdings 
Minimum 1st quantile Median Mean 3rd quantile Maximum Not available 
Traders 
2006 7 NA NA NA NA NA NA 7 
2007 6 NA NA NA NA NA NA 6 
2008 10 350 350 350 350 350 350 9 
2009 8 20 103 185 185 268 350 6 
2010 8 20 210 400 307 450 500 5 
2011 5 20 20 20 20 20 20 4 
2012 6 NA NA NA NA NA NA 6 
2013 7 20 20 20 20 20 20 6 
2014 8 20 20 20 20 20 20 7 
2015 3 NA NA NA NA NA NA 3 
Trade herds 
2006 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2007 1 10 10 10 10 10 10 0 
2008 1 1,010 1,010 1,010 1,010 1,010 1,010 0 
2009 7 14 58 880 909 1,400 2,555 0 
2010 20 2 219 890 998 1,765 2,555 0 
2011 17 1 350 940 1,294 2,200 4,501 0 
2012 17 2 350 940 1,107 1,720 2,900 0 
2013 16 2 513 971 1,154 1,840 2,900 0 
2014 15 2 600 1,002 1,230 1,960 2,900 0 
2015 16 2 100 983 1,090 2,000 2,900 2 
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Number of  
active holdings 
Minimum 1st quantile Median Mean 3rd quantile Maximum Not available 
Pig shows 
2006 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 
2007 8 1 6 10 7 11 11 5 
2008 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
2009 6 1 4 6 6 9 11 4 
2010 6 1 4 6 6 9 11 4 
2011 6 1 4 6 6 9 11 4 
2012 9 1 4 6 6 9 11 7 
2013 9 1 4 6 6 9 11 7 
2014 6 1 4 6 6 9 11 4 
2015 7 1 4 6 6 9 11 5 
Livestock auctions 
2006 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2007 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2008 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2009 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2010 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2011 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2012 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2013 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2014 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2015 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
Collection points (CP) 
2006 7 NA NA NA NA NA NA 7 
2007 11 1 136 270 374 560 850 8 
2008 15 1 1 1 67 101 200 12 
2009 16 1 1 3 341 200 1,500 11 
2010 17 1 51 200 484 800 1,500 11 
2011 17 1 200 500 640 1,000 1,500 12 
2012 20 1 51 350 534 875 1,500 14 
2013 21 1 51 350 534 875 1,500 15 
2014 24 1 51 350 534 875 1,500 18 
2015 25 1 101 500 715 1,250 1,800 18 
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Number of  
active holdings 
Minimum 1st quantile Median Mean 3rd quantile Maximum Not available 
Slaughter animal 
markets 
2006 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2007 2 NA NA NA NA NA NA 2 
2008 2 NA NA NA NA NA NA 2 
2009 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2010 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2011 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2012 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2013 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2014 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2015 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
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Table 7. Descriptive summaries of holding sizes for miscellaneous sites. 
 
 
Number of  
active holdings 
Minimum 1st quantile Median Mean 3rd quantile Maximum Not available 
Zoos 
2006 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2007 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2008 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2009 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2010 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2011 1 20 20 20 20 20 20 0 
2012 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2013 4 20 20 20 20 20 20 3 
2014 4 NA NA NA NA NA NA 4 
2015 4 3 4 5 5 6 6 0 
Experimental facilities 
2006 0  NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2007 0  NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2008 1 400 400 400 400 400 400 0 
2009 1 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 
2010 3 3 52 102 102 151 200 1 
2011 3 4 12 20 141 210 400 0 
2012 2 3 7 12 12 16 20 0 
2013 1 20 20 20 20 20 20 0 
2014 2 20 20 20 20 20 20 1 
2015 5 1 1 30 116 100 450 0 
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Table 8. Descriptive summaries of holding sizes for end of production sites. 
 
 
Number of  
active holdings 
Minimum 1st quantile Median Mean 3rd quantile Maximum Not available 
Slaughterhouses 
2006 100 1 3 4 38 57 110 97 
2007 97 1 4 1,800 1,854 1,975 5,491 92 
2008 89 1 45 870 885 1,710 1,800 85 
2009 83 1 1 1 561 841 1,680 80 
2010 80 1 1 1 1 1 1 78 
2011 78 1 1 1 1 1 1 76 
2012 74 1 1 1 1 1 1 72 
2013 75 1 1 1 1 1 1 73 
2014 77 1 1 1 1 1 1 75 
2015 76 1 1 1 1 1 1 75 
Export isolation 
facilities 
2006 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2007 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2008 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2009 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2010 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 
2011 3 150 165 180 260 315 450 0 
2012 3 27 104 180 219 315 450 0 
2013 3 27 104 180 219 315 450 0 
2014 3 27 104 180 219 315 450 0 
2015 3 27 104 180 219 315 450 0 
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Number of  
active holdings 
Minimum 1st quantile Median Mean 3rd quantile Maximum Not available 
CPs for dead animals 
2006 2 NA NA NA NA NA NA 2 
2007 4 6 11 16 16 20 25 2 
2008 2 NA NA NA NA NA NA 2 
2009 2 240 280 320 320 360 400 0 
2010 2 25 25 25 25 25 25 1 
2011 2 1,620 1,620 1,620 1,620 1,620 1,620 1 
2012 7 10 83 155 155 228 300 5 
2013 18 10 83 155 155 228 300 16 
2014 35 10 83 155 155 228 300 33 
2015 121 300 300 300 300 300 300 120 
Cooling stations 
2006 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2007 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2008 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2009 1 180 180 180 180 180 180 0 
2010 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2011 1 420 420 420 420 420 420 0 
2012 9 NA NA NA NA NA NA 9 
2013 30 NA NA NA NA NA NA 30 
2014 33 NA NA NA NA NA NA 33 
2015 51 NA NA NA NA NA NA 51 
Rendering plants 
2006 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2007 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2008 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2009 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2010 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2011 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2012 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2013 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2014 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
2015 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 
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9.1.2. S2  FILE:  NUMBER OF PIGS PER MOVMENT  
Table 1. Batch sizes. Descriptive statistics of the development of the number of pigs per movment (batch size) of 
registered pig movements between 1 Jan 2006 and 31 Dec 2015 in Denmark. The column “not available” covers both the 
number of pig movements without batch sizes and with batch size equal to 0. 
 
Minimum 1st Quantile Median Mean 3rd Quantile Maximum Not available 
2006 1 2 8 49 60 9,780 45,092 
2007 1 2 9 53 65 9,000 40,811 
2008 1 3 10 61 76 7,187 38,705 
2009 1 2 9 67 82 7,035 37,003 
2010 1 3 10 75 93 7,893 35,843 
2011 1 3 10 79 100 9,381 37,481 
2012 1 3 11 83 105 6,918 37,408 
2013 1 3 11 85 108 7,071 37,769 
2014 1 3 11 90 115 8,721 40,636 
2015 1 3 11 96 125 7,588 43,221 
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Table 2. Median batch size. Median batch size by holding type of sending holding of registered pig movements between 1 Jan 2006 and 31 Dec 2015 in 
Denmark. 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Breeding sites 
          
Breeding and multiplier herds 10 10 11 11 14 15 15 15 16 19 
Quarantine stations 11 10 12 10 8 11 11 11 12 10 
Boar stations 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
           
Production sites 
          
Production herds 8 9 10 9 10 10 11 11 11 11 
Weaner herds 60 55 57 29 16 15 15 15 19 20 
Free-ranging pig herds 7 7 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Organic pig herds 5 7 8 8 9 8 9 9 7 8 
           
Hobby sites 
          
Hobby herds 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 5 3 
Pets 3 4 3 147 7 4   4 4 4 
Wild boar herds   2   1 2   2 10 6 3 
Organic wild boar herds                   2 
           
Transit sites 
          
Traders 200 235 52 35 11 22 13 13 38 71 
Trade herds   6 20 8 11 10 10 11 13 10 
Pig shows 3 3 3 11 15 14 6 5 15 8 
Livestock auctions 11 10                 
Collection points (CP) 4 4 4 4 6 8 12 13 10 10 
Slaughter animal markets 1 5 5         108   7 
 
          Miscellaneous 
          Zoos           2 1 2 2 2 
Experimental facilities         2   3     8 
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  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
End of production sites 
          Slaughterhouses 3 3 2 4 4 3 2 2 2 2 
Export isolation facilities           2 1 2 2 2 
CPs for dead animals 3 3 302 4 7 3 2 2 3 3 
Cooling stations 2 286 4 1 3 4 4 9 11 10 
Rendering plants 
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Table 3. Median batch size by holding type of receiving holding of registered pig movements between 1 Jan 2006 and 31 Dec 2015 in Denmark. 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Breeding sites 
          Breeding and multiplier herds 103 120 120 120 126 147 153 165 169 170 
Quarantine stations 7 10 5 12 5 5 4 4 5 4 
Boar stations 14 17 16 15 11 13 12 16 19 18 
 
          Production sites 
          Production herds 141 151 180 202 220 240 250 251 255 263 
Weaner herds 295 298 325 337 303 401 400 398 396 406 
Free-ranging pig herds 119 42 46 115 25 25 20 7 32 41 
Organic pig herds 50 85 127 150 188 186 205 228 149 175 
 
          Hobby sites 
          Hobby herds 5 106 75 166 260 6 5 24 6 4 
Pets 30 10   324 171 36 2 2 630 2 
Wild boar herds   8 2     2 7 58 2 3 
Organic wild boar herds                     
 
          Transit sites 
          Traders 44 10 30 28 174 270 250 60 78 53 
Trade herds       216 81 14 12 12 12 154 
Pig shows 4 4 3 6 2 2 4 2 2 2 
Livestock auctions 180 15                 
Collection points (CP) 11 15 18 70 73 80 109 151 254 285 
Slaughter animal markets 249 116 15           661 634 
 
          Miscellaneous 
          Zoos             1 7 3 3 
Experimental facilities     24 22 16 14 14 16 17 10 
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  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
End of production sites 
          Slaughterhouses 35 39 44 45 48 52 54 53 58 67 
Export isolation facilities             312 65 44 91 
CPs for dead animals     325 118 2 220 7 2 4 3 
Cooling stations   331         2 1 2 3 
Rendering plants 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
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Table 4. Average number of pig movements per holding type of sending holding per year between 1 Jan 2006 and 31 Dec 2015 in Denmark. 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Breeding sites 
          Breeding and multiplier 
herds 
157 167 166 163 148 144 135 137 142 151 
Quarantine stations 23 20 17 20 19 20 20 23 27 22 
Boar stations 40 43 45 48 47 47 46 44 46 51 
 
          Production sites 
          Production herds 75 80 79 82 87 90 87 88 89 90 
Weaner herds 78 81 89 104 108 106 104 102 106 107 
Free-ranging pig herds 37 33 33 24 20 19 18 16 18 15 
Organic pig herds 32 36 40 36 40 46 49 47 46 52 
 
          Hobby sites 
          Hobby herds 4 10 8 7 4 4 4 5 7 3 
Pets 1 1 1 19 8 1 
 
9 1 2 
Wild boar herds 
 
1 
 
1 1 
 
6 13 1 3 
Organic wild boar herds 
         
3 
 
          Transit sites 
          Traders 5 9 3 16 20 15 8 4 10 10 
Trade herds 
 
1 75 70 61 68 72 83 102 66 
Pig shows 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 
Livestock auctions 215 244 
        Collection points (CP) 82 71 93 73 94 67 69 59 57 63 
Slaughter animal markets 41 77 112 
    
3 
 
9 
 
          Miscellaneous 
          Zoos 
     
1 1 2 1 2 
Experimental facilities 
    
1 
 
18 
  
28 
 
 
          
151 
 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
End of production sites 
          Slaughterhouses 165 87 76 166 180 96 74 80 96 90 
Export isolation facilities 
     
3 3 11 12 5 
CPs for dead animals 51 1 6 5 3 57 51 23 32 54 
Cooling stations 79 41 1 1 4 1 34 7 26 35 
Rendering plants           
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Table 5. Average number of pig movements per holding type of receiving holding per year between 1 Jan 2006 and 31 Dec 2015 in Denmark. 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Breeding sites 
          Breeding and multiplier 
herds 
13 15 18 19 20 21 20 21 22 21 
Quarantine stations 39 52 19 28 20 24 25 26 29 31 
Boar stations 21 19 20 22 22 20 20 17 15 18 
 
          Production sites 
          Production herds 12 14 14 15 16 15 16 16 17 17 
Weaner herds 24 29 29 25 23 22 21 21 23 24 
Free-ranging pig herds 6 6 6 6 4 3 2 3 6 2 
Organic pig herds 3 3 4 5 4 4 5 5 8 7 
 
          Hobby sites 
          Hobby herds 1 4 9 4 9 2 3 5 6 1 
Pets 2 1 
 
12 4 2 1 1 4 1 
Wild boar herds 
 
1 1 
  
2 1 4 1 2 
Organic wild boar herds 
          
 
          Transit sites 
          Traders 15 6 5 6 25 93 24 5 8 52 
Trade herds 
   
14 21 41 62 81 78 22 
Pig shows 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 
Livestock auctions 539 585 
        Collection points (CP) 2,804 2,467 1,892 1,445 1,319 1,451 1,183 1,149 834 836 
Slaughter animal markets 217 512 1,299 
     
1 2 
 
          Miscellaneous 
          Zoos 
      
1 1 2 2 
Experimental facilities 
  
9 16 24 23 25 52 26 51 
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2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
End of production sites 
          Slaughterhouses 4,272 4,095 3,858 3,682 3,665 3,752 3,498 3,419 3,074 2,797 
Export isolation facilities 
      
3 2 12 4 
CPs for dead animals     8 1 1 5 43 48 27 55 
Cooling stations 
 
40 
    
23 38 64 86 
Rendering plants 401,386 405,473 370,127 350,848 340,541 333,422 302,656 295,889 297,428 295,306 
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9.1.3. S3  FILE:  IN-  AND OUT-LOYALTY PER HOLDING TYPE  
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Figure 1. In-loyalty. In-loyalty for each pair of consecutive years for the whole network of pig movements from 1 Jan 2006 to 31 Dec 2015 in Denmark. 
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Figure 2. Out-loyalty. Out-loyalty for each pair of consecutive years for the whole network of pig movements from 1 Jan 2006 to 31 Dec 2015 in 
Denmark. 
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Figure 3. In- and out-loyalty for breeding sites. 
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Figure 4. In- and out-loyalty for production sites. 
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Figure 5. In- and out-loyalty for hobby sites. 
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Figure 6. In- and out-loyalty for transit sites. 
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Figure 6 (continued). In- and out-loyalty for transit sites. 
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Figure 7. In- and out-loyalty for miscellaneous sites. 
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Figure 8. In- and out-loyalty for end of production sites. 
 
 
  
165 
 
Figure 8 (continued). In- and out-loyalty for end of production sites. 
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Table 1. Summary of in-loyalty per holding type. Levels for in-loyalty: (1) low – mean < 0.45, (2) intermediate – 0.45 ≤ mean ≤ 0.55 and  
(3) high – mean > 0.55  
  Minimum 1st quantile Median Mean 3rd quantile Maximum Level 
Breeding sites 
      
 
Breeding and multiplier herds 0,00 0,00 0,50 0,50 1,00 1,00 intermediate 
Quarantine stations 0,00 0,00 0,49 0,46 0,78 1,00 intermediate 
Boar stations 0,00 0,38 0,58 0,55 0,75 1,00 intermediate 
 
      
 
Production sites 
      
 
Production herds 0,00 0,00 0,50 0,52 1,00 1,00 intermediate 
Weaner herds 0,00 0,17 0,67 0,60 1,00 1,00 high 
Free-ranging pig herds 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,31 1,00 1,00 low 
Organic pig herds 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,35 1,00 1,00 low 
 
      
 
Hobby sites 
      
 
Hobby herds 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,20 0,00 1,00 low 
Pets 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,39 1,00 1,00 low 
Wild boar herds 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,08 0,00 1,00 low 
Organic wild boar herds NA NA NA NA NA NA not available 
 
      
 
Transit sites 
      
 
Traders 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,15 0,20 1,00 low 
Trade herds 0,00 0,00 0,35 0,40 0,67 1,00 low 
Pig shows 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,27 0,50 1,00 low 
Livestock auctions 0,25 0,27 0,29 0,29 0,30 0,32 low 
Collection points (CP) 0,00 0,13 0,33 0,32 0,44 1,00 low 
Slaughter animal markets 0,00 0,00 0,05 0,06 0,12 0,14 low 
 
      
 
Miscellaneous 
      
 
Zoos 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,14 0,00 1,00 low 
Experimental facilities 0,00 0,00 0,33 0,38 0,58 1,00 low 
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  Minimum 1st quantile Median Mean 3rd quantile Maximum Level 
End of production sites 
Slaughterhouses 0,00 0,27 0,43 0,40 0,54 1,00 low 
Export isolation facilities 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,06 0,11 0,29 low 
CPs for dead animals 0,00 0,00 0,18 0,48 1,00 1,00 intermediate 
Cooling stations 0,00 0,50 1,00 0,75 1,00 1,00 high 
Rendering plants 0,81 0,85 0,86 0,86 0,87 0,89 high 
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Table 2. Summary of out-loyalty per holding type. Levels for out-loyalty: (1) low – mean < 0.45, (2) intermediate – 0.45 ≤ mean ≤ 0.55 and  
(3) high – mean > 0.55 
  Minimum 1st quantile Median Mean 3rd quantile Maximum  
Breeding sites        
Breeding and multiplier herds 0,00 0,33 0,49 0,49 0,62 1,00 intermediate 
Quarantine stations 0,00 0,00 0,50 0,50 1,00 1,00 intermediate 
Boar stations 0,00 0,63 0,67 0,75 1,00 1,00 high 
 
       
Production sites        
Production herds 0,00 0,38 0,60 0,58 0,80 1,00 high 
Weaner herds 0,00 0,36 0,54 0,54 0,71 1,00 intermediate 
Free-ranging pig herds 0,00 0,00 0,43 0,43 0,83 1,00 low 
Organic pig herds 0,00 0,08 0,50 0,51 0,80 1,00 intermediate 
 
       
Hobby sites        
Hobby herds 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,32 1,00 1,00 low 
Pets 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,58 1,00 1,00 high 
Wild boar herds 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,35 0,75 1,00 low 
Organic wild boar herds NA NA NA NA NA NA not available 
 
       
Transit sites        
Traders 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,29 0,50 1,00 low 
Trade herds 0,00 0,35 0,60 0,56 0,80 1,00 high 
Pig shows 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,24 0,28 1,00 low 
Livestock auctions 0,36 0,36 0,37 0,37 0,37 0,38 low 
Collection points (CP) 0,00 0,20 0,41 0,47 1,00 1,00 intermediate 
Slaughter animal markets 0,00 0,00 0,13 0,34 0,63 1,00 low 
 
       
Miscellaneous        
Zoos 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,27 0,50 1,00 low 
Experimental facilities 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 low 
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  Minimum 1st quantile Median Mean 3rd quantile Maximum  
End of production sites 
Slaughterhouses 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,60 1,00 1,00 high 
Export isolation facilities 0,20 0,38 0,46 0,63 1,00 1,00 high 
CPs for dead animals 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,54 1,00 1,00 intermediate 
Cooling stations 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,64 1,00 1,00 high 
Rendering plants NA NA NA NA NA NA not available 
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9.1.4. S4  FILE:  INGOING-  AND OUTGOING CONTACT  CHAINS  
Figure 1. Contact chains. Size of (a) in-going and (b) out-going contact chain for the whole pig movement network in 
Denmark from 1 Jan 2006 to 31 Dec 2015. 
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Figure 2. In-going and out-going contact chains for breeding sites.  
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Figure 3. In-going and out-going contact chains for production sites.  
 
 
Figure 3 (continued). In-going and out-going contact chains for production sites.  
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Figure 4. In-going and out-going contact chains for hobby sites. 
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Figure 4 (continued). In-going and out-going contact chains for hobby sites. 
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Figure 5. In-going and out-going contact chains for transit sites. 
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Figure 5 (continued). In-going and out-going contact chains for transit sites. 
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Figure 6. In-going and out-going contact chains for miscellaneous sites. 
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Figure 7. In-going and out-going contact chains for end of production sites. 
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Figure 7 (continued). In-going and out-going contact chains for end of production sites. 
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9.2. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR MANUSCRIPT II 
9.2.1. DATA PREPARATION  
Herd information. Holding information data included the holding and herd identification numbers. Several 
herds could be owned by the same farmer and therefore share an individual holding number, yet have 
different herd identification numbers. To keep the herds anonymous, new herd identification numbers 
were generated, and the herd was used as the unit of interest. Herds owned by the same farmer were 
marked to track the connection between them. The registered numbers of sows, weaners and finishers 
per year, as well as the herd type were extracted from the CHR. 
The VetStat database records herd-level information on prescription-only drugs1. These data were used 
to add an antimicrobial usage index per year. The index was set to 1 if at least one prescription of 
tetracycline and/or beta-lactam was reported in the VetStat register. 
In addition, the number of registered movements to abattoirs for each herd ℎ per year was calculated 
based on the movement data and this value divided by 365, giving a herd-specific 𝜆𝑎
ℎ that was used as a 
parameter to model indirect contacts related to abattoir movements.   
Our datasets lacked information on UTM coordinates for some of the herds. This information was 
updated using a website to calculate the coordinates based on the address of the holdings provided on 
the CHR website2 (www.geoplaner.com/).  
All herds were categorised according to: (1) herd type (breeding and multiplier herds, production herds, 
weaner herds, organic and free-range pig herds and hobby herds), (2) the proportion of sows, weaners 
and finishers registered in the CHR (Table S1), and (3) the type of production (Table S2). 
No sows, weaners or finishers were registered in 181 herds in 2007 and 844 herds in 20143, but these 
herds had registered in-coming or out-going movements, and could therefore be considered active. The 
number of animals was estimated for these herds. For each herd type, the distribution of herds (with 
registered sows, weaners or finishers) was determined in each combination of categories 1-7 and A-C 
(Tables S1 - S2). In addition, the average number of sows, weaners and finishers registered in these herds 
in the CHR was calculated for each category combination. To estimate the missing number of animals, a 
category combination was randomly assigned to herds that had not registered any animals. Based on this 
combination, the number of sows, weaners and/or finishers was calculated using an exponential 
distribution with lambda given by the average number of sows, weaners and finishers.  
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Movement data. Information on the movements of swine was available from the movement database, 
including the holding and herd identification numbers for both sending and receiving herds, the date of 
the pig movements and the number of pigs moved. No information was available on the age group (sows, 
weaners or finishers) of pigs moved.  
The age group of pigs moved out of the sending herd and into the receiving herd was estimated based 
on the herd categories 1-7 and A-C (Tables S1-S4). If no weaners were registered, but were thought to 
have been moved out of a herd, they were assumed to have been moved directly from the sow section. 
9.2.2. MODELLING DISEASE SPREAD WITHIN A HERD  
Environment-related recurrence. The probability decreases exponentially over time as follows: 
𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟(∆𝑡) = exp(−𝛼𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟 ∙ ∆𝑡), (1) 
where ∆𝑡 is defined as the time difference between the current simulation day and the day when LA-
MRSA died out in the respective herd. 
Within-herd dynamics. For each individual susceptible animal, the probability of infection 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝐶𝑖
𝑡
 
 
 at each 
time step 𝑡 resulting from positive animals within compartment 𝐶𝑖 was assumed to be density-dependent 
and was calculated based on the number of LA-MRSA-positive pigs 𝐼𝐶𝑖
𝑡  and the total number of pigs 𝑁𝐶𝑖
𝑡  
within the individual compartment as follows: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝐶𝑖
𝑡 = 1 − exp (−
𝛽𝐶𝑖
𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐶𝑖
𝑡
𝑁𝐶𝑖
𝑡 ), (2) 
where 𝛽𝐶𝑖
𝑡  is the daily transmission rate of the infection for each compartment 𝐶𝑖, and 
𝑖 ∈  {𝑠𝑜𝑤𝑠, 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠, 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠}. The probability of infection 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝐶𝑖𝐶𝑗
𝑡  resulting from positive animals 
from another compartment 𝐶𝑗 ≠ 𝐶𝑖 was calculated as: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝐶𝑖𝐶𝑗
𝑡 = 1 − exp (−
𝛽𝐶𝑖𝐶𝑗
𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐶𝑗
𝑡
𝑁𝐶𝑗
𝑡 ), (3) 
where 𝛽𝐶𝑖𝐶𝑗
𝑡  is the between-compartment transmission rate. The total probability for each individual in 
compartment 𝐶𝑖 was therefore:  
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𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝐶𝑖
𝑡 =  1 − (1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝐶𝑖
𝑡 )  ∗  ∏(1
𝑗 ≠ 𝑖
− 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝐶𝑖𝐶𝑗
𝑡 ). (4) 
 
In order to slow the within-herd spread, a time-dependent scaling function was introduced: 
𝑓(∆𝑡) = 1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑘 ∗ (∆𝑡 − 𝑥)), (5) 
where ∆𝑡 is the simulation time since the introduction of LA-MRSA in the herd, and 𝑘 and 𝑥 are read-in 
parameters defining the steepness and the midpoint of the scaling function. The within-compartment 
transmission rates 𝛽𝐶𝑖
𝑡  were divided by the scaling function. The time-shifted transmission rates led to a 
similar but delayed level of within-herd prevalence (Figures S1-S5).  
Mimicking the within-herd dynamics in 100 large production herds for 365 days using the transmission 
rates adapted by Broens et al. (2012)4 led to a median within-herd prevalence of 65% for herds using high-
risk antibiotics and 59% for herds that did not use high-risk antibiotics (Figures S1-S4).  
Spread via indirect contacts. The transmission between two herds H1and H2 with the same owner was 
modelled using equation (2) to calculate the probability of infection 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝐻𝑖𝐻𝑗
𝑡  with 𝐶𝑖 = 𝐻2 and 𝐶𝑗 = 𝐻1. 
The number of LA-MRSA-positive pigs 𝑁𝐻1
𝑡  (𝐼𝐻1
𝑡 ) was equivalent to the total number of LA-MRSA-positive 
sows, weaners and finishers in 𝐻1. If 𝐻1 was a large herd, the low-risk between-compartment transmission 
rate of 𝐻1 was used, whereas if 𝐻1 was small, the within-herd transmission rate of 𝐻1 was used. If 
transmission was successful, new LA-MRSA-positive pigs were introduced to the sow compartment of 
herd 𝐻2.  
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9.2.3. FIGURES  
 
Figure S1. Development of the within-herd prevalence in large production herds in the first year after LA-MRSA 
initialisation in 100 production herds (1) using high-risk antibiotics, and (2) not using high-risk antibiotics for (a) 
transmission rates adapted from Broens et al.
4
 (Supplementary Information, Table S5) and (b) time-shifted transmission 
rates. The black dotted line represents the median of 500 iterations and the grey area spans the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure S2. Development of the within-herd prevalence in the sow compartment in the first year after LA-MRSA 
initialisation in 100 production herds (1) using high-risk antibiotics, and (2) not using high-risk antibiotics for (a) 
transmission rates adapted from Broens et al.
4
 (Supplementary Information, Table S5) and (b) time-shifted transmission 
rates. The black line represents the median of 500 iterations and the grey area spans the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure S3. Development of the within-herd prevalence in the weaner compartment in the first year after LA-MRSA 
initialisation in 100 production herds (1) using high-risk antibiotics, and (2) not using high-risk antibiotics for (a) 
transmission rates adapted from Broens et al.
4
 (Supplementary Information, Table S5), (b) time-shifted transmission rates 
and (3) time-shifted and scaled transmission rates. The black line represents the median of 500 iterations and the grey 
area spans the 95% confidence interval. 
191 
 
 
Figure S4. Development of the within-herd prevalence in the finisher compartment in the first year after LA-MRSA 
initialisation in 100 production herds (1) using high-risk antibiotics, and (2) not using high-risk antibiotics for (a) 
transmission rates adapted from Broens et al.
4
 (Supplementary Information, Table S5) and (b) time-shifted transmission 
rates. The black line represents the median of 500 iterations and the grey area spans the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure S5. Development of the within-herd prevalence in small herds in the first year after LA-MRSA initialisation in 100 
production herds (1) using high-risk antibiotics, and (2) not using high-risk antibiotics for (a) transmission rates adapted 
from Broens et al.
4
 (Supplementary Information, Table S5) and (b) time-shifted transmission rates. The black line 
represents the median of 500 iterations and the grey area spans the 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure S6. Violin plots summarising the herd prevalence in all herds in 2010 and 2011 based on 500 iterations of 17 LA-
MRSA initialisation scenarios using time-shifted transmission rates adapted from Broens et al.
4
 and modelling transmission 
only via animal movements. 
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Figure S7. Violin plots summarising the herd prevalence in all herds in 2010 and 2011 based on 500 iterations of 17 LA-
MRSA initialisation scenarios using time-shifted transmission rates adapted from Broens et al.
4
 and modelling transmission 
via animal movements and via indirect contacts between herds. 
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Figure S8. Violin plots summarising the herd prevalence in all herds in 2010 and 2011 based on 500 iterations of 21 LA-
MRSA sensitivity analysis scenarios using time-shifted transmission rates adapted from Broens et al.
4
, and modelling 
transmission via animal movements and via indirect contact among herds. The first violin represents the results of the 
default initialisation scenario 06.b1_09.b1p100. 
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Figure S9. Variance of the total number of LA-MRSA-positive herds on 31
st
 December 2015 against the number of 
simulation repetitions. Convergence is assumed when the variance stabilises. All convergence plots refer to the scenario 
with LA-MRSA initialisation in 100 production herds in 2006 and re-introduction for one breeding and multiplier herd and 
100 production herds in 2009. (a) and (b) represent scenarios including indirect transmission routes, while (c) and (d) 
represent the results for transmission via pig movements only.  
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9.2.4. TABLES  
Table S1. Herd categories related to the combination of sows, weaners, and finishers registered in the CHR, used to 
estimate the number of sows, weaners and finishers in herds that did not register any pigs. 
Category Sows registered Weaners registered Finishers registered 
1 yes yes yes 
2 yes yes no 
3 yes no yes 
4 no yes yes 
5 yes no no 
6 no yes no 
7 no no yes 
 
Table S2. Herd categories related to the type of production based on the registered number of sows and finishers. 
Category Type of production Definition 
A Finisher herd > 7.5 finishers per sow 
B Sow herd < 5 finishers per sow 
C Integrated herd 5 – 7.5 finishers per sow 
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Table S3.  Assumed age group (s = sows, w = weaners, f = finishers) of pigs moved out of the sending herd / in to the 
receiving herd. The letter x is used when the movement type is dependent on a defined threshold (Table S4). Below or 
equal to this threshold, finishers are assumed to be moved out of the sending herd and sows are assumed to be moved in 
to the receiving herd. Above this threshold, it is assumed that weaners/finishers were moved in to / out of the sending / 
receiving herd. 
 Herd category of receiving herd 
Herd category of 
sending herd 
1A 1B 1C 2A 2B 2C 3B 4A 5B 6A 7C 
1A w/f f/s f/s w/f f/s f/s f/s w/f f/s w/f w/w 
1B f/s f/s f/s f/s f/s f/s f/s w/f f/s w/f w/w 
1C x x x x x x f/s w/f f/s w/f w/w 
2A w/f f/s f/s w/f f/s f/s f/s w/f f/s w/f w/w 
2B f/s f/s f/s f/s f/s f/s f/s w/f f/s w/f w/w 
2C x x x x x x f/s w/f f/s w/f w/w 
3B w/f w/f w/f w/f w/f w/f w/s w/f w/s w/f w/w 
4A w/f w/f w/f w/f w/f w/f w/s w/f w/s w/f w/w 
5B w/f w/f w/f w/f w/f w/f w/s w/f w/s w/f w/w 
6A f/f f/f f/f f/f f/f f/f f/s f/f f/s f/f f/w 
7C w/f w/f w/f w/f w/f w/f w/s w/f w/s w/f w/w 
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Table S4. Assumed thresholds for setting the age group of movements if the movement type is given as x in Table S3. The thresholds are dependent on 
the registered herd type and for production, organic and hobby herds on the size of the herd. In small herds, homogeneous mixing of pigs is assumed, 
whereas separate compartments for the three age groups (sows, weaners, and finishers) were modelled for large herds. The number of pigs assumed to 
constitute a small herd was set to 200 animals. 
Threshold for  
movement types 
Production  
(small) 
Organic  
(small) 
Breeding and  
multiplier  
Weaner  
 
Hobby  
(small) 
Production  
(large) 
Organic  
(large) 
Hobby  
(large) 
Breeding sites         
Breeding and  
multiplier herds 
3 3 50 20 3 50 50 50 
Production sites         
Production (small) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Production (large) 3 3 20 20 3 20 20 20 
Organic (small) 3 3 3  3 3 3 3 3 
Organic (large) 3 3 20 20 3 20 20 20 
Weaner herds 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Hobby sites         
Hobby herds (small) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Hobby herds (large) 3  3 20  20 3 20  20 20 
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Table S5. Assumed values for a PERT distribution to define herd-specific cure rates and transmission rates based on the use of high-risk antibiotics, 
adapted by Broens et al.
4
 The most likely (mode) and assumed minimum and maximum values for the PERT distributions were calculated based on 
values for R0 (and their 95% CI) resulting from multivariable analysis of Dutch data, with 10.3 days taken to be the duration of the infectious period
5
. 
PERT distributions were defined as transformation of the Beta distribution with minimum (min), maximum (max) and most likely value (mode) and a 
mean μ =
min+4∙mode+max 
6
. 
Use of high- 
risk antibiotics 
Cure rate 
(all herds) 
Within-compartment 
transmission rate 
Low-risk between-
compartment 
transmission rate 
High-risk between-
compartment 
transmission rate 
Transmission rate 
in small herds 
no 
min = 0.056, 
max = 0.385, 
mode = 0.097 
min = 0.111 
max = 0.856 
mode = 0.307 
min = 0.00175 
max = 0.00301 
mode = 0.00233 
min = 0.07184 
max = 0.48155 
mode = 0.18301 
min = 0.111 
max = 0.856 
mode = 0.307 
yes 
min = 0.211 
max = 2.924 
mode = 0.784 
min = 0.00330 
max = 0.01029 
mode = 0.00583 
min = 0.13689 
max = 1.64515 
mode = 0.46796 
min = 0.211 
max = 2.924 
mode = 0.784 
 
201 
 
Table S6. Distance probabilities of indirect contact among herds for the different types of contact and distance categories. 
Distance category  
(up to … km) 
Contact from  
indoor herd 
Contact from  
outdoor herd 
Contact related to  
abattoir movements 
1 0.12 0.12 0.0054 
3 0.24 0.24 0.0224 
10 0.30 0.29 0.1898 
15 0.083 0.089 0.1503 
20 0.083 0.089 0.1252 
30 0.054 0.050 0.1747 
40 0.01714 0.01714 0.1347 
50 0.01714 0.01714 0.0823 
60 0.01714 0.01714 0.0454 
70 0.01714 0.01714 0.0274 
80 0.01714 0.01714 0.0141 
90 0.01714 0.01714 0.0099 
100 0.01714 0.01714 0.0108 
110 0 0 0.0041 
120 0 0 0.0025 
130 0 0 0.00018 
140 0 0 0.00006 
150 0 0 0.00006 
160 0 0 0.00006 
170 0 0 0.00006 
180 0 0 0.00006 
190 0 0 0.00006 
200 0 0 0.00006 
210 0 0 0.00006 
220 0 0 0.00006 
230 0 0 0.00006 
240 0 0 0.00006 
250 0 0 0.00006 
350 0 0 0.00006 
1,000 0 0 0.00006 
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Table S7. LA-MRSA initialisation scenarios tested using the developed simulation model. 
Acronym First introduction of LA-MRSA in the 
simulation model 
Initialisation of LA-MRSA-positive 
herds at later points in time 
06.b1 
2006: 
- 1 breeding and multiplier herd 
none 
06.b1_09.b1 
2009: 
- 1 breeding and multiplier herd 
06.b1_09.b1p100 
2009: 
- 1 breeding and multiplier herd 
- 100 production herds 
06.b2 
2006: 
- 2 breeding and multiplier herds 
none 
06.b2_09.b5p200 
2009:  
- 5 breeding and multiplier herds 
- 200 production herds 
06.p100 
2006: 
- 1% of production herds (100 herds) 
none 
06.p100_09.b1p100 
2009:  
- 1 breeding and multiplier herd 
- 100 production herds 
06.p200 
2006: 
- 2% of production herds (200 herds) 
none 
06.p200_09.b5 
2009: 
- 5 breeding and multiplier herds 
06.p200_09.b5p200 
2009: 
- 5 breeding and multiplier herds 
- 200 production herds 
06.p200_09.b10p300 
2009:  
- 10 breeding and multiplier herds  
- 300 of production herds 
06.p200_09.b5p200_ 
12.b5p200 
2009:  
- 5 breeding and multiplier herds 
- 200 production herds 
2012: 
- 5 breeding and multiplier herds  
- 200 production herds 
06.p200_07-09.p200 
2007-2009:  
- 200 production herds each year 
06.p200_07-12.p200 
2007-2012: 
- 200 production herds each year 
06.b5p200 2006: 
- 2% of production herds (200 herds) 
- 2% of breeding and multiplier herds (5 
herds) 
none 
06.b5p200/09.b5p200 
2009: 
- 5 breeding and multiplier herds 
- 200 production herds 
06.p300/09.b5p200 
2006: 
- 3% of production herds (300 herds) 
2009: 
- 5 breeding and multiplier herds 
- 200 production herds 
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